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I must admit to being unsure when I embarked on this work as to how much I 
believed in natural theology: yes the world is often remarkable but what we do to it 
and each other is frequently not. Could God really be shown to be revealing of 
Himself through it all? And what of chemistry? I am forever fascinated by a whole 
host of facts, materials, gadgets and experiences, but could that be, can these be, of 
God? The results of these investigations I lay out below, but the power of the 
argument and the implications of the symmetries uncovered continue to amaze me. 
These are yet another example of God allowing us to view yet more layers and 
components of His extraordinary creative work. 
E-mails are strange things: I sent some to Leiden University at my wife’s urging in 
mid-2012 and Prof Drees very kindly gave me a direction in which to launch these 
studies.  He also suggested someone who may be willing to supervise it. Another set 
of emails in early 2013 and Prof van den Brink pointed me towards Prof Marcel Sarot 
as one who might be willing to develop the proposal further. After many months of 
mutual exploration and more emails he graciously in the Spring of 2014 ‘took a punt’ 
that it might be made to work, in-spite of my lack of knowledge in certain key areas, 
knowledge which he immediately set about improving. Prof Derkse then kindly came 
on-board to inform, validate and develop, both parts of the philosophy and 
importantly the chemistry. I am very grateful to these kind people. 
I am indebted to Prof Jacob Claus of Saarland University and Professor Joachim 
Schummer of the HYLE journal, for most helpful suggestions around possible 
omissions and additions; to Mr Garth Cooper, a professional editor, for many 
comments on syntax and grammar; to both Canon Vernon White of Westminster 
Abbey and King’s College London, and to Prof John Hedley Brooke, for illuminating 
conversations. 
Having been given the opportunity to study, I sought permission from my superior, 
the Rt Rev’d Graham James, who was kind enough both to say ‘yes’ as well as to 
contribute financially. Thank you also to the leaders and people of the fifteen 
churches of the Barnham Broom and Upper Yare Group who voted to allow me to do 
this work and who have frequently had to suffer the results in innumerable sermons. 
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When many years ago I completed my MSc in Physical Organic Chemistry my then 
fiancée completed virtually all of the typographical layout from my inexpert diagrams. 
I failed to credit her for that work, much to my continuing shame. Now over thirty 
years of married life later, I wish to affirm her pivotal role also in enabling this present 
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The central argument of this book is that aspects of the natural science of chemistry 
as currently practiced, may inform a natural theology.  
Firstly in chapter 1 I will seek to establish an epistemological methodology for the 
treatment of knowledge of and about the Christian God and of the justification of that 
knowledge consistent with contemporary understandings. This section on religious 
epistemology attempts to codify how the knowledge that follows later is justifiably 
rationally held. This is why it is present at all and moreover is why it is present at the 
start of this book. I believe we must lay the ground work of what can be rationally 
held before we can start to treat the material. Within this section on Epistemology the 
reader should note the prominence given to the tenets of a movement known as 
’Reformed Epistemology’ and within that, to the novel use of certain terms most 
notably ‘justification’. These are explained there. It is perhaps unfortunate that two 
such well-known terms as ‘reformed epistemology’ and ‘justification’ should be re-
used in ways which are quite different from their anecdotally ‘obvious’ explanations. 
I will then in the second chapter review the current state of natural theology and seek 
to establish an approach within this discipline of systematics that is consistent with 
the epistemology established in the first chapter and that might build on an area of 
current chemical research. How should a natural theology, in the context of this 
book, be understood? The Gifford lectures, of which we shall have more to say 
below, deal with natural theology head-on according to their founding principles. 
Their website by way of introduction, describes natural theology both as a classical 
discipline, and as a type of study in a contemporary nuanced form thus: 
A more modern view of natural theology suggests that 
reason does not so much seek to supply a proof for the 
existence of God as to provide a coherent form drawn from 
the insights of religion to pull together the best of human 
knowledge from all areas of human activity. In this 
understanding natural theology attempts to relate science, 
history, morality and the arts in an integrating vision of the 
place of humanity in the universe. This vision, an integrating 
activity of reason, is religious to the extent it refers to an 
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encompassing reality that is transcendent in power and 
value. Natural theology is thus not a prelude to faith but a 
general worldview within which faith can have an intelligible 
place. (Gifford, 2016) 
 
This book seeks to build upon this understanding of the function of a natural 
theology: no longer a ‘proof’ but a ‘pulling together’ of various insights, in this case 
from chemistry. It will do so in the context of the conversation that must inevitably 
take place when such a “general worldview” is promulgated. More specifically and 
particularly, this is a conversation between a researcher in chemistry who does not 
profess a Christian faith and a Christian natural theologian. Thus a working definition 
of a natural theology as stipulated here involves a presentation of rational inferences 
from knowledge gained by human activities to the actions of the Divine in creating 
and directing the Universe. Within this overall definition I go further in this book, in 
that by ‘the Divine’ I mean the Christian God, with the natural theology being 
presented by a Christian natural theologian. 
I suppose this Christian natural theologian to be an ‘orthodox Christian’ by which I 
mean a person who treats the texts of the Bible, both the Hebrew scriptures and the 
explicitly Christian parts, as ‘inspired by God and useful for teaching, for reproof, for 
correction and training in righteousness’ (2 Timothy 3.16); who holds to what are 
termed the ‘catholic creeds’; and who treats meeting and engaging in worship with 
other Christian people as part of his regular practice. I have explicitly not spoken of 
the degree of that regularity or the nature or type of that worship and neither have I 
made any mention of denomination. One might reasonably expect such an ‘orthodox 
Christian’ to be regular attender at the place of worship of one of the mainstream 
Christian denominations, be that a church or a home or even a school. The reader 
will also notice that for the sake of brevity I have not defined precisely which books of 
the Bible should be regarded as canonical or part of it.  
I imagine such a chemistry researcher, this partner in dialogue, to be an ‘honest 
enquirer’ who may for the sake of personal interest, investigate the claims of the 
person of Jesus Christ by visiting one or more meetings of one of these ‘mainstream 
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Christian denominations’. Wil Derkse speaks of the value of such a conversational 
approach when he remarks: 
The position of dialogue, or, as I prefer to call it, 
conversation, might be seen as a stage in a continuing 
process of integration of science and religion, both being 
human and cultural activities ….. persons active in separate 
domains can converse about contents, attitudes, 
evaluations, motivations (just a side-remark, perhaps the 
motivation in scientific practice is aesthetically), moral 
quality. (Derkse, 2001, p. 167) 
Hence it will be plain that this book is to employ an attempt to hold in tension: 
people, human beings, who espouse a scientific approach to the elucidation of 
knowledge, together with those who also perceive matters in terms of Christian 
aesthetics. 
Modern natural theologians often engage in somewhat of an obfuscation: as Chad 
Meister remarks, contemporary authors in this discipline do not suppose that their 
writings constitute proof of God's existence yet very much seek to demonstrate the 
rationality of theistic, not to say Christian, belief (Meister, 2013, p.155). That said, 
such authors in their own personal conduct do not rest their own faith and practice 
on such a basis alone: they are frequently committed believers and practitioners and 
not uncommonly are ministers in their respective Christian denominations. There is 
therefore something of a subterfuge going on, or is there? Is the promulgator of a 
natural theology, whatever his proposed particular strategy, saying one thing but 
fervently believing another? Not at all, because natural theology is a common way of 
presenting the faith to 'honest enquirers' or at least to those who are not opposed to 
the Christian Gospel (in that such a theology is consonant with the faith of “ordinary 
believers”, see Wynn 1999, p.3). Such authors are offering an accessible 
methodology with which to approach the faith, to enable the Gospel to be seen as a 
rational and systematic response to contemporary life. In this present book I seek 
therefore as I have stated, to develop this argument as a conversation, as J V L 
Casserley has also suggested (Casserley, 1955, p. 7) between such an imagined 
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honest enquirer, and in this case I imagine her/himself to be a chemist researcher, 
and myself offering the natural theological argument. 
Among the contemporary physical sciences, chemistry stands out as one not 
generally thought to be helpful in contributing towards or informing, such a natural 
theology. Why this is so, is explained below. This project is therefore also an 
investigation into whether modern developments within the fields of epistemology, 
chemistry and theology might allow for a reappraisal of this hitherto largely accepted 
position. If this is possible, how might a proposed conversation of the type proposed 
above be re-invigorated, indeed re-legitimated, by and through contemporary revised 
understandings in epistemology? In chapter 3 I will discuss what is it about chemistry 
that lends itself to being implicated in such a revised appreciation. This will also 
require a brief historical survey of interactions between chemistry and theology from 
roughly the 17th century until the present time. In this chapter I will also will expand 
on my opening remark above concerning the suitability of chemistry informing a 
natural theology. 
Chapter 4 will include an analysis of a set of recent research papers in a particular 
area of chemical research. This analysis will look for commonalities in language, in 
assumptions and in methodologies so as to underline the common approach which I 
am proposing is used to speak in a cross-disciplinary manner.  
This will be followed in chapter 5 by a brief thematic survey of the relationship 
between God and Beauty including the role of the researcher when framing his 
conclusions.  
Finally in chapter 6 all of these elements will be drawn together to see what value 
might be obtained by applying this strategy to an appreciation of chemistry such that 
it may be allowed to have a place in informing natural theology. 
The overall objective of the book is as has been said, to contribute towards the 
furthering of the dialogue between those in the disciplines of theology and chemistry: 
between Christian believers and chemist researchers wishing to enquire into the 
Faith. 
Thus in short, the project will be addressed in the following order: 
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• The first chapter deals with epistemology and lays the groundwork for the 
approach presented in chapter two. 
• The second deals with natural theology and within the wide definition given 
above, offers one that fits well with the epistemological approach presented in 
the first chapter. 
• The third chapter describes chemistry in relation to its history, to metaphysics 
and to beauty. 
• The fourth chapter surveys a small selection of contemporary chemistry 
research papers and comments on how they reinforce arguments rehearsed 
in the previous chapters. 
• The fifth chapter gives a wider historical view on the subject of God and 
Beauty and crucially comments upon the role of the researcher’s attitude to 
the Christian faith. 
• Finally in chapter six I bring the preceding chapters together, offer a definition 








In this chapter my purpose is to answer such questions as: if I assert that I am 
justified in my belief in the Christian God and seek to assist others to also acquire 
this justified belief, how do I justify such a position of 'faith toward God’ (Hebrews 
6.1): what particular strategy or structure do I propose? By what means, using what 
methodologies do I justify my Christian belief; in short, how can I be assured that I 
know what I say I know? I start by providing an overview of contemporary 
approaches to religious epistemology. In so doing I hope to arrive at a considered 
personal position. 
More generically Matthias Steup says of epistemology that: 
The debate over the structure of knowledge and justification 
is primarily one among those who hold that knowledge 
requires justification. From this point of view, the structure of 
knowledge derives from the structure of justification. 
(Steup,2013, p.14) 
In qualifying the justification of belief as needing to be ‘rational’ and implying also 
that it needs to be adequately structured, these authors are joined by Martin Smith 
who implies that the rationality of belief has also to do with the status of both the 
justification and the knowledge (Smith, 2014, p.135); thus we need to be clear about 
what ‘evidence’ - the status of the justification -, and the assertion - the nature of the 
knowledge - mean for an individual protagonist in the debate. Such additional 
qualifications are a sign of the considerable degree of reflection that is current in 
religious epistemology. Peter Forrest defines ‘evidentialism’ to be ‘the initially 
plausible position that a belief is justified only if “it is proportioned to the evidence” ’ 
and at times over the last two to three decades religious epistemology has swung 
towards strongly evidentialist approaches and then away again (Forrest, 2013, p.1). 
Yet to state as Forrest does in the same place that: ‘Contemporary epistemology of 
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religion may conveniently be treated as a debate over whether evidentialism applies 
to religious beliefs, or whether we should instead adopt a more permissive 
epistemology’ is to make the case too starkly: for one thing, it implies a uniformity to 
the idea of what ‘evidence’ amounts to, which as we shall see below, is itself 
doubtful. 
It will become clear that not all the authors cited here are Christians themselves. In 
this way I hold that in order to facilitate the conversation proposed above, it is 
necessary to conduct the discussions in ways that are epistemically intelligible to 
those who are Christians and those who are not. Within contemporary epistemology 
various terms and understandings are used. For the purposes of the current book it 
is necessary for such a thing as ‘knowledge’ to be possible, about certain ‘truths’: 
that there is a God who was ‘made known’ by Jesus Christ (John 1.18), and that this 
knowledge can in some way be supported by or even revealed-in, the natural world 
around us. Current epistemology is a wide discipline and so for my current specific 
purpose I propose certain smaller categories or theses about justification and truth 
as suggested by Bruce Marshall, to enable the discussion to proceed (Marshall, 
2000, p. 50): 
• Christians may justify their position and beliefs on the basis of certain inner, 
in-the-mind, experiences; the sense of this is that such persons express their 
beliefs as interpreting that which they have experienced within themselves. 
We are not therefore speaking pejoratively of ‘voices in the head’ but rather of 
impressions and sensations which are then translated into narrative, or 
perhaps paintings or poems. Thus it is not the narrative or poem or painting 
which convinces the recipient of the truth of their belief, but the experience 
itself, and it is this latter which is committed to memory. See for example the 
account of the so-called Emmaus Road event in Luke 24: ‘didn’t our hearts 
burn within us’ (Luke 24.32). This Marshall terms the interiority thesis. 
• Christians are firm in their beliefs on account of what are to them certain self-
evident items or pieces of ‘incorrigible data’ or beliefs which are logically 
derived from them. Such belief systems are described as being 
foundationalist and hence Marshall terms this the foundationalist thesis. 
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• Christians are able to explicate their beliefs in terms of criteria more 
universally held and that are as such not distinctively Christian. This Marshall 
calls this the epistemic dependence thesis. 
Marshall further goes on to define in the same place: 
• a pragmatic thesis, according to which Christian beliefs are justified by the 
communal and individual practices bound up with holding them true; 
• a correspondence thesis, according to which the truth of beliefs, including 
Christian ones, consists in their agreement or correspondence with reality.  
Thus according to these helpful categorisations and in recalling the desire to 
investigate specifically whether a natural theological approach might be most 
efficacious, there is already the hint that an epistemology that offers to the ‘honest 
non-christian enquirer’ into the Christian faith, an approach containing variously: 
• some correspondence with reality 
• arguments that are recognised by both Christians and non-Christians 
• arguments that are held by a substantial and recognised community and are 
in that sense not of a single person only 
might be the more promising of any group of approaches. 
In what follows I discuss positions which themselves fall into one or more of the 
theses outlined above: 
• (Wittgensteinan) Fideism 
• Reformed Epistemology 
• Prudential accounts 
• Religious experience, memory and testimony 
• Furthermore if the above represent more positive attempts to answer the 
question of the existence of God, we should also include some references to 
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atheistic beliefs by way of balance. I end with a short conclusion summarising 
the chosen epistemological position in the light of the direction I wish to follow. 
 
1.2 Contemporary Epistemological Approaches 
1.2.1 (Wittgensteinan) Fideism 
As Richard Amesbury explains, fideism is:  
the name given to that school of thought …. which answers 
that faith is in some sense independent of, if not outright 
adversarial toward, reason. In contrast to the more 
rationalistic tradition of natural theology, with its arguments 
for the existence of God, fideism holds …. that reason is 
unnecessary and inappropriate for the exercise and 
justification of religious belief (Amesbury, 2014, p.1) 
As Stig Hansen remarks, when seeking to describe Wittgensteinan Fideism it should 
be distinguished from Wittgenstein’s own thinking in philosophy of religion (Hansen, 
2010, p.1). In this sense Wittgensteinan Fideism functions as a label or name to a 
movement rather than an attribution of specific thoughts on Christianity to 
Wittgenstein himself, which were few in any case (Hansen, 2010, p.1). None of this 
matters for our current study but it is useful to understand that the movement 
amounts to an application of Wittgensteinan principles of language by those who 
sought to promote his ideas. One such person was D Z Phillips and he described 
Wittgensteinan Fideism as an ‘ill-conceived notion’ (Phillips, 1993, p.xi) but as can 
be seen by careful reading, only because it was misunderstood. In contrast, far from 
being an advocate, Kai Nielsen describes Wittgensteinan Fideism as ‘profoundly 
misguided’ (Nielsen, 1973, p.29). Thus creating an adequate definition of this 
movement is an exercise in coming to a negotiated view between advocates and 
critics. 
 
In what follows I will provide a pair of quotations as attributed and then following this 
give a distillation of, or working description of, Wittgensteinan Fideism. 
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…. Wittgenstein held the view that no belief at all should be 
considered as an underlying explanation of a given ritual. 
Rather, we should see ritual and religion as the natural 
expressions of a ceremonial animal (Hansen, 2010, p.3) 
 
The believer is not like someone who sees objects when 
they are not there, since his reaction to the absence of 
factual evidence is not at all like that of the man suffering 
from hallucinations..... When the positivist claims that there 
is no God because God cannot be located, the believer does 
not object on the grounds that the investigation has not been 
thorough enough, but on the grounds that the investigation 
fails to understand the grammar of what is being 
investigated - namely, the reality of God.... It makes as little 
sense to say, 'God's existence is not a fact' as it does to say, 
'God's existence is a fact.' In saying that something either is 
or is not a fact, I am not describing the 'something' in 
question. To say that x is a fact is to say something about 
the grammar of x; it is to indicate what it would and would 
not be sensible to say or do in connection with it (Phillips, 
1993, p.2) 
On the strength of these quotations, Wittgensteinan Fideism amounts to a method of 
describing a perceived reality witnessed-to by a group of people, in which the 
specific language grammar (Wittgenstein uses the collective term ‘language games’ 
for such grammars) being used within that group of people, becomes the way of 
correctly understanding that perceived reality. In this way the words used by such a 
group of people mean what they do only in the context in which they are being lived-
out. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein himself in paragraph 7 of the Philosophical Investigations, 
speaks of ‘language-games’ being the means by which language is taught to 
children (Wittgenstein, 1958). On the function of such ‘games’, Wittgenstein gives 
the following in paragraph 499, amongst many examples: 
 
16 
To say ‘This combination of words makes no sense’ 
excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds 
the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary it 
may be for various kinds of reason. If I surround an area with 
a fence or a line or otherwise, the purpose may be to 
prevent someone from getting in or out; but it may also be 
part of a game and the players be supposed, say, to jump 
over the boundary; or it may shew where the property of one 
man ends and that of another begins; and so on. So if I draw 
a boundary line that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for.  
(Wittgenstein, 1958) 
Given such talk of boundaries and fences, it might be supposed that those who hold 
to such a method of justification of religious belief, perhaps feel less of a need to 
interact with the world at large and Amesbury above certainly appears to be saying 
just that. Van den Brink characterises such a stand point as ‘withdrawing into a 
bombproof bastion of fideistic starting-points about which no further rational 
discussion is allowed, and to which the rule of “take it or leave it” applies’ (van den 
Brink, 2009, p.176).  
Yet there are two further characterisations of Wittgensteinan fideism which might be 
more positive: D Z Phillips shows that this method of justification may come hand-in-
hand with a lively Christian faith. Phillips discards the idea that fideists have only a 
’theoretical belief’ and instead affirms them as being ‘lovers’ of God, not only lovers 
but in addition those who are passionate in their love (Phillips, 1992, pp. 90, 91). 
A characteristic of Wittgensteinan fideism is that the words one might use to justify 
one’s belief in God, will not make rational sense to those (non-Christians) listening. 
The reason for this is the language one uses is particular to one’s own group and 
one should not expect to provide an intelligible rational justification to those who do 
not share one’s faith (in this instance). Furthermore as Forrest implies, such a form 
of fideism ‘is about attitudes not facts’ and is ‘only appropriate to Zen Buddhism and 




Thus in conclusion on this point, fideism whilst potentially providing epistemic 
succour to the individual Christian, offers no rational explanation of the 
transformational Christian faith to those enquiring about faith in Christ. Since the 
Christian scriptures enjoin us to be able to express to others a ‘reason for the hope 
that is in us’ (an understanding taken from 1 Peter 3.15), it would seem that not to 
have any such reasons which might make sense to an enquirer, is a negation of that 
particular scriptural injunction. 
 
1.2.2 Reformed Epistemology 
The school of thinking known as Reformed Epistemology emerged in the latter part 
of last century with the philosopher Alvin Plantinga as one of its chief protagonists.  
Before I outline the principles underpinning this significant new development in 
religious epistemology a word of warning about terms. ‘Reformed Epistemology’ is 
not merely an epistemological position espoused by thinkers of the protestant 
reformed branch of the Christian church: it amounts to a specific movement within 
religious epistemology. Plainly there remain people of the reformed protestant 
tradition who do not agree with the principles of ‘Reformed Epistemology’. 
Furthermore in speaking of any beliefs that are ‘basic’, these should in the thinking of 
Reformed Epistemology be understood to be quite distinct from beliefs which are 
formally held to be ‘properly basic’. 
This distinction is important because the schema known as ‘Foundationalism’ made 
use of ‘basic’ beliefs to provide for a superstructure to justify belief systems. A 
natural theology where it seeks to provide evidence to justify rational belief in God 
presupposes a form of foundationalism. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman 
remark that it is because of the ‘wide favor’ previously enjoyed by foundationalism 
and its subsequent ‘falling out of favor’ that we are in this position now of exploring 
new epistemological positions, new ways of justifying religious belief such as 
Reformed Epistemology (Geivett and Sweetman, 1992, p.4). 
Foundationalism as Marcel Sarot remarks: 
distinguishes between two classes of propositions: (1) 
Propositions of which the truth is clear without further 
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argument: These can function as the foundation of our 
knowledge (basic propositions). (2) Propositions that need 
further argument to establish their truth …[thus] we can give 
full credence to a proposition only when it is a basic 
proposition, or when it is in a logically valid way derived from 
basic propositions. (Sarot, 2008, p.260) 
As Geivett and Sweetman remind us, natural theology was employed precisely to 
provide evidence for such basic propositions. It is in that sense an ‘evidentialist’ 
strategy. The work of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) as interpreted by some neo-
thomists, is seen as being of great importance in this regard, since in his writings he 
provides such basic evidences or proofs of God’s existence (the so-called Five 
Ways). It is upon such, as Vincent Brümmer points out, that a foundationalist 
epistemology including elements of natural theology, whilst plainly coming centuries 
later, could usefully be built (Brümmer, 1981, p.208). Foundationalism as a term was 
coined at the beginning of the 1980s by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff ‘for 
the deep-rooted assumption that they encountered far and wide in the history of 
Western thought, that the human mind can come to a real knowledge of the truth 
when we start from a solid ‘rock-bottom’, an indubitable point of departure’ (van den 
Brink, 2009, p.112). 
The difficulties with foundationalism are multiple: 1) how might we know that a basic 
proposition is indeed basic and how can we be sure that our basic proposition itself 
does not come from another even more basic proposition? and 2) how might we 
justify the logical movement from one basic proposition to a derived proposition, this 
certain ‘glue’? Furthermore should we accept point 1) just stated, we are in danger of 
continuing backwards ad infinitum, never being sure when we might encounter a 
basic proposition, one that we could rationally say was indeed basic. In addition as 
Brümmer points out, foundationalism (he uses the term ‘rationalism’) is too strict to 
allow for all that we might want to characterise as knowledge. Such knowledge might 
for example include characteristics of objects or events that are in addition to those 
that are directly observed and these he terms impressive characteristics, where one 
might be impressed with for example the beauty and wonder of such an event or 
object (these are my examples: see Brümmer, 1981, p. 210 where he mentions the 
sublime and mysterious).  
 
19 
Certain contemporary authors contrast ‘foundationalism’ with ‘coherentism’. In this 
way for example Stanley Grenz and John Franke contend that: 
Coherentists [, therefore,] reject the foundationalist 
assumption that a justified set of beliefs necessarily comes in 
the form of an edifice resting on a base. In their estimation, 
the base/superstructure distinction is erroneous, for no 
beliefs are intrinsically basic and none are intrinsically 
superstructure. Instead beliefs are interdependent, each 
belief being supported by its connection to its neighbors and 
ultimately to the whole. Rather than picturing human 
knowledge as a building, coherentists draw from the image 
of a network in which beliefs come together to form an 
integrated belief system. (Grenz and Franke, 2007, p.39) 
Other authors again raise the profile of coherentism as an epistemically distinct 
position. Steup (2013, p.18) goes so far as to say that coherentism is a competitor 
for foundationalism. He further makes the distinction (which I believe does have 
considerable merit) that whereas foundationalism consists of justified beliefs on the 
basis of either some form of epistemic privilege (which a Christian might infer to 
mean ‘faith’) or on the basis of some physical experience (which one might feel 
justified in saying is an accurate representation of the physical reality), a coherentist 
view would speak of your belief in for example the perception representing the 
reality. Thus Steup states that the foundationalist is contending that either of these 
two positions (that of epistemic privilege or experiential privilege) provide a 
methodology for establishing basicality. With that basicality the foundationalist may 
then construct their belief ‘superstructure’. For Steup and as I stated above for Grenz 
and Franke too, the coherentist view is epistemically of an equivalent ‘type’ to 
foundationalism in that it provides a starting-point for justifying belief. Yet in my view 
this is unhelpful. Coherentism provides a methodology of marshalling propositions or 
components of a belief superstructure, but is unlikely to be able to provide the 
desired-for starting-point for justifying belief. It may have a use in this present book 
as a way of doing just that: of providing a rationale for the grouping together of 
certain strategies under one overall superstructure, but it is not a suitable place to 
start since the epistemological basis for belief is not being provided. 
 
20 
To return to Reformed Epistemology: this might also be understood as a schema or 
epistemic strategy for justifying Christian religious belief. It is important to understand 
that this strategy was not arrived at within a contextual vacuum. It is rather a strategy 
which is negotiated to sit firmly within the reformed position, for which to be true it 
must a priori uphold the notion of Christian faith being the supernatural gift of God ‘of 
grace by faith’ (Romans 5.2) and distinctly not something arrived at by an enquirer 
through logical deduction. The Apostle Paul expresses this further in addition to the 
words in Romans, in his saying ‘For by grace you are saved through faith, and this is 
not from yourselves, it is the gift of God’ (Ephesians 2.8). Since the process by which 
a person becomes a Christian is in that sense mysterious, being a supernatural gift 
of God, it follows that it cannot be based upon ‘evidence’ construed in the scientific 
understanding. It is thus not ‘evidentialist’ in contrast to Foundationalism and as 
Joseph Kim says, in an argument endorsed by Plantinga as ‘careful, judicious and 
accurate’, the ‘Reformed Epistemologists, unlike Aquinas, reject the notion that one 
can offer a sound argument for the conclusion that God exists’ (Kim, 2011, p.3), 
although it must not be supposed that this movement rejects natural theology. 
Reformed Epistemology must however still rely on something being ‘true’ at the root 
of its system and yet the schema apparently does not permit evidence. 
How is this dilemma to be resolved? A Christian person may look back upon their life 
and acknowledge that there was a time when they were not a believer and similarly 
that they are such now. Something must have happened. Plantinga and those who 
hold to his strategy need for this apparently supernatural event to be explicable in a 
way that is philosophically intelligible. Whatever happened cannot be susceptible to 
‘evidence’ scientifically construed, but must nonetheless be rationally explicable. 
Reformed Epistemology’s solution is to postulate that to the believer faith in God is 
self-evidentially true. It is as experientially true as water is wet or grass is green. In 
this way Deane-Peter Baker alludes to an ‘immediacy’ to one’s knowledge of God 
(Baker 2007, p.9). Such a fact is deemed to be ‘properly basic’ (Baker 2007, p.8). 
There is no need, so this schema goes, for there to be any evidence for it. God is, 
and the believer knows this to be true. The Reformed Epistemologist sees no need 
to provide evidence for such an assertion. 
In order to overcome the obvious defeaters such that for example a person might be 
deluded in their thinking something that to them is ‘obviously true’ and ‘properly 
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basic’, Plantinga constructs a threefold platform of positive epistemic status’ 
consisting of justification, rationality and warrant (Plantinga, 2007, p.615). According 
to this platform, justification is achieved by the person being plainly sensible in 
holding their ‘properly basic’ proposition, where they could not be faulted in a moral 
sense for holding it to be true. (Let the reader note the alternate uses made of such 
terms as justify, justified and justification where for example earlier the quote used to 
define evidentialism as ‘the initially plausible position that a belief is justified ….. ‘ 
uses this root in a different manner). Plantingan rationality is achieved where the 
beliefs are arrived at with an absence of cognitive dysfunction and may include 
beliefs held on the basis of the testimony of others and I would include scripture 
within such testimony. Warrant is somewhat different however and is that which 
translates a true belief into knowledge: 
The idea of our cognitive faculties functioning properly in the 
production and sustenance of belief is absolutely crucial to 
our conception of warrant; this idea is intimately connected 
with the idea of a design plan, a sort of blueprint specifying 
how properly functioning organs, powers, and faculties work. 
(Plantinga, 1993, p. vii) 
In addition: 
The way to put it, then, is that a belief B has warrant for a 
person S if and only if B is produced by properly functioning 
faculties in an appropriate environment according to a 
design plan successfully aimed at truth. (Plantinga, 2008, 
p.12) 
Thus, as Richard Fumerton remarks, ‘warrant’ is that quality that converts belief into 
knowledge (Fumerton, 2006, p.81). It is constitutive of whatever it takes to translate 
mere belief into knowledge and ‘whatever it takes’ could include reading the right 
materials, regularly practicing certain liturgies and actions, as well as being an active 
participant of a community of like-minded persons.  
When Mark Wynn speaks of belief formation within a series of trust relationships, 
that are current within a given ‘epistemic community’, it appears reasonable to 
extend the understanding of such a ‘community of like-minded persons’ to being the 
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Christian Church. Such beliefs are then justified within a web of both testimony and 
evidence, that also necessitates a practical dimension or outworking (Wynn, 1999, 
pp.5, 120, 124, 125, 130). Wynn uses the same term ‘properly basic’ to signify 
beliefs held justifiably outside of the considerations of evidence, and yet as he 
himself says, his is a book setting forth a new form of the argument from design and 
as such within the same epistemic movement as natural theology (Wynn, 1999, p.2). 
His ‘evidence’ is then generated through his arguments: broadly that the physical 
world shows forth such evidence, in the case of Wynn’s specific argument, for the 
goodness of God. This latter is presented as a moral argument and so is not of 
interest here, yet the sense that Christian belief may be justified partly through a 
reliance on the collective noetic structure of the particular epistemic community I am 
part of, which I would call the Church, and must also contain an element of practical 
outworking, is significant. Thus Christian belief is something one does, as well as 
something one believes in, and indeed the significance of the two cannot be 
separated. It would appear from Wynn that we have translated a personally justified 
Christian faith into one that is relational and capable of being socially active through 
a series of trust relationships, or we might say from Christian tradition, relationships 
where we defer to one another in love (Romans 12.10, Ephesians 5.21). 
This it would seem is one of the great advances in religious epistemology provided 
through the Reformed position, certainly since the 1980s: its reliance upon a 
property, this ‘warrant’, which translates Christian belief or some might say ‘faith’, 
from opinion into knowledge, by reason of the mechanism - namely the cognitive 
faculties - of the person or persons holding those beliefs. Thus warrant as stated 
bears an additive quality: it is a property which when added to Plantingan 
justification, gives rise to knowledge. Smith concurs that the Reformed 
Epistemological approach allows for warranted belief even when ‘not supported by 
evidence’ yet it seems to me that this might be more correctly stated as insufficient 
or inadequate evidence from the point of view of those opposed to the argument, 
since the Reformed Epistemologist plainly has justified or evidenced their belief(s) to 
themselves, and indeed Smith alludes to this later (Smith, 2014, pp.137, 139).  
Yet what of the other components of the Reformed Epistemological strategy? What 
of ‘proper basicality’:  
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it should be relatively uncontroversial that many different 
sorts of beliefs can be properly basic. One main reason for 
this is just the fact that a wide variety of beliefs can be 
accepted, without cognitive dysfunction, on the basis of 
testimony, at least as long as the believer isn't aware of 
defeaters. The vast bulk of what I believe, I believe on the 
basis of testimony; the same, I dare say, goes for you. That I 
live in the US, that there is such a state as South Dakota-
indeed, that my name is Alvin Plantinga - all of these things I 
believe on the basis of testimony. (Maps, birth certificates, 
histories of South Dakota are all, of course, forms of 
testimony.) Christian belief too, clearly enough, can be 
accepted on the basis of testimony without cognitive 
malfunction. Christian belief, therefore, can be basic with 
respect to rationality. (Plantinga, 2007, p. 615) 
Plantinga then moves-on beyond this passage, to rehearse as he has done 
elsewhere, his schema for enabling him to assert that it is epistemically rational for 
Christians to hold certain Christian ‘creedal beliefs’ (Plantinga, 2007, p. 619). In this 
latter paper Plantinga is replying to an objector of his schema. It would seem that the 
result of Plantinga’s conversatio is not a joining or a coming-together of minds, rather 
a more starkly delineated argument. I can and do admire his learning that allows me 
to justify to myself that I am not mad when I and my fellow congregants intone the 
Nicene Creed in the context of a Christian service, however I cannot agree that this 
is helpful or even inspiring for those who are merely visitors to such a service: the 
warranted justification appears to work for me and not for my conversation partner. 
Furthermore and perhaps crucially, given the above quotation, properly basic beliefs 
may be rationally held, in the Plantingan sense, by many who are not Christians. 
Indeed establishing ’proper basicality’ speaks of a methodology which might well be 
effective for any number of sets of beliefs (see for example Plantinga, 2000, pp. 422-
457 where he discusses religious pluralism). I have not in demonstrating proper 
basicality for my Christian belief-set, drawn anyone into a conversation with Christ. 
Thus it seems that we have reduced the great set of beliefs held by all humans, 
down to a smaller subset of those likely to be true, but have not pointed at the one 
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that is true. The essence of a natural theology is that it is a rational, indeed more 
probable, explanation for an experience that is valid for and intelligible to, both 
believers and enquirers. It seems however that the intellectual exercise of 
demonstrating ‘proper basicality’ would be less useful in sustaining this conversation 
between such believers and enquirers. 
In addition to the scriptural reasons given above, a further objection within Reformed 
Epistemology to the use, to the purpose, of any evidence for the existence of God 
lies in the theologically developed understanding of the effects of sin upon cognition, 
particularly as articulated within again reformed or protestant understandings of the 
Fall and of soteriology. As Baker explains, in the Calvinist schema, sin provides a 
degree of impediment to the non-believing (in Christianity) person, such that they are 
incapable of perceiving God (Baker, 2007, p.7). Thus evidence, such as that 
provided by a natural theology, would be of no use to such a person as they are 
defined as being ‘seeing yet not perceiving’ (Isaiah 6.9, Mark 4.12). The non-
Christian sinner then can only be susceptible to God’s grace alone in finding Him, 
and not to evidence. The result is that it might be thought a Reformed 
Epistemological approach to justification differs little from the Wittgensteinian fideist 
approach:  
The Reformed tradition has insisted that the belief that God 
exists ….. may justifiably be found there in the foundation of 
our system of beliefs. In that sense, the Reformed tradition 
has been fideist, not evidentialist, in its impulse ….. Perhaps 
it would be just as well or better to point out to some 
inquirers that justifiably believing in God does not always 
require holding that belief on the basis of arguments (Geivett  
and Sweetman, 1992, p.149). 
Yet Alvin Plantinga (1992, p.134) remarks: ‘many Reformed thinkers and theologians 
have rejected natural theology’, although distinctively he does not include himself 
and the Reformed Epistemology movement amongst these, saying elsewhere: 
 …. as he [Calvin] sees it, one needs no arguments to know 
that God exists. One who holds this view need not suppose 
that natural theology is of no use. In the first place, if there 
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were good arguments for the existence of God, that would 
be a fact worth knowing in itself …. Second, natural theology 
could be useful in helping some-one move from unbelief to 
belief (Plantinga, 1983, p. 73) 
 
A distinct value in the Reformed position is that it firmly encompasses a realist 
approach, since this will in itself provide a useful bridge in the conversation between 
Christian and non-Christian chemical researcher. In this manner the character of 
‘religious’ truth-value propositions is deemed to be the same as those of science and 
philosophy (Kim, 2011, p.5). This is of great importance in the current project, for it 
allows us to move with ease from the method of justification (with ‘justification’ now 
being used in the more usually understood sense) to the substance of our enquiry 
confident that we remain intelligible to those who are not Christians, with this 
direction of thought taken from Alister McGrath (2001, p.xix). Thus it is now possible 
to distinguish the Reformed Epistemological approach from that of the fideist: if 
Christians are always to be ‘ready to give an answer to anyone who asks about the 
hope you possess’ (1 Peter 3.15), they must present an approach that is intelligible 
to those not of their persuasion. The Wittgensteinan fideist is able to say something 
like ‘it would make sense to you if, whilst using language as we do, you also 
comprehended it from our point of view’; the Reformed Epistemologist in contrast is 
able to assert to the non-believer that they have a mutually intelligible justification of 
belief. 
We have not stated how such a shared mechanism for agreeing that which is 
rationally held belief, might then give rise to the inference that the divine is at work in 
the natural world. Furthermore we are of course not asserting that mutual 
intelligibility between Christians and those studying the existence of God through an 
exploration of the natural world, equates to mutual agreement as to its origins. 
Overall however, the Reformed Epistemological thesis would appear to be very 
useful. It has been established that it is entirely rational to hold to the Christian faith. 
A natural theology is moreover a useful approach to be adopted towards someone 
‘moving’ towards the Faith - precisely the use I wish to develop below. In reading 
Wynn it is possible to move from the perhaps overly person-centric view of epistemic 
justification proposed by Plantinga to those more community and relation-centric loci 
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that are the expressions of churches existing within the framework of a Christian 
Faith founded upon the orthodox traditions. Finally as I have just mentioned, 
Reformed Epistemology encompasses a realist approach. 
 
1.2.3 Interlude: On the Nature of Evidence 
In this section I seek to show how a Christian may agree about the need for 
evidence for their beliefs, but that this evidence is of a different character to that as 
usually understood.  
As I indicated above, Forrest’s quoted view on evidence was too starkly drawn. For 
the proposition ‘God exists’ to be true from an evidentialist perspective, it is 
necessary to produce evidence that ‘adequately supports’ the contention (Smith, 
2014, p.139). Yet as Martin Smith says in answer to his own question ‘adequate for 
what?’: ‘adequate for justification’. It is not clear what evidence could be given. What 
follows are certain observations on the nature of that evidence. 
It is unlikely that a person, given the relative importance of say the existence of God, 
would rely on a single piece of evidence to justify their claim. Smith suggests that 
such a contention would be supported by cognitive processes of varying degrees of 
generality and indeed quality (Smith, 2014, p.140). A believer is more likely to rely on 
a range of experiences, personal narratives and third-party testimonies. Thus in our 
present discussions of different epistemological approaches, it would be usual to 
expect any given person to offer not one, but possibly several elements of various 
strategies. Something of the quality of those ‘elements of various strategies’ will then 
inform the nature of the proposition being put forward. In this way, an understanding 
of the nature or quality of our proposition is based upon the nature of our evidence: a 
belief is supported on the basis of the evidence, something Martin Smith refers to as 
‘evidence basing’ (Smith, 2014, pp.140-141). 
Wolfhart Pannenberg asserts ‘Any intelligent attempt to talk about God - talk that is 
critically aware of its conditions and limitations - must begin and end with confession 
of the inconceivable majesty of God which transcends all our concepts’ 
(Pannenberg, 1991, p.337). In the Christian tradition and understanding it is the 
person of Jesus Christ who reveals, both historically as well as contemporaneously, 
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this indescribable majesty. Thus the question of the justification of rational belief in 
God also begins and ends with the historical claims the Christian Gospel makes 
about the life, death and resurrection of the one man Jesus Christ.  
When this consideration is then taken together with Smith’s ‘evidence basing’, it is 
clear that we should expect something of the quality of that which we seek to prove, 
to be evident in the nature of the evidence we seek to prove it by. This is quite 
different from the nature of for example mathematical proofs, which are tautologous: 
in contrast, here the nature of the evidence is the proof we seek. The nature of the 
evidence that might point towards the existence of God, contains within it something 
of the nature of the divine: it is itself not the truth or the Divine we seek to portray, yet 
rather bears something of the quality of that which we seek to prove. We should 
therefore expect to see something of God in anything we might say points towards 
God. Again thinking back to the logical proofs in for example mathematics, the 
individual elements of an equation are not of themselves reflective of the answer (the 
quantity ‘2’ is not reflective of the quantity ‘4’ in the equation 2+2=4). In contrast 
Smith borrows the term ‘evidentialist reliabilism’ to describe a ‘model of the world’ in 
which a rational justification for belief in God might arise, for the ‘religious believer’ 
(Smith, 2014, p.141). This evidential reliabilism is possibly an inelegant term yet it 
does helpfully combine the notion of warrant provided through cognition functioning 
correctly, combining it with a modified type of evidence of the sort we have 
described, producing the required-for evidence base. It might be countered that 
arguments of this type are in danger of shaping the divine to be merely a mirror of 
our own reflections and yet Smith is careful to point out that the evidence used 
relates to a divinity that is external to the person. 
Thus, I reject the contention that there can be no evidence for the existence of the 
Christian God. Evidence that asserts the existence of God is only valid for the 
Christian believer and is of a different nature to evidence as understood for example 
in the mathematical sciences: it does in fact reflect something of the nature of the 
Christian God it points towards. Such evidence is in fact the work of faith, a ‘gift of 
God’ and so ‘of God’. Evidence that could be effective in proving the existence of 
God to the non-believer, would amount to evidence that was in contrast independent 
of the God whose existence it sought to prove. If such evidence could exist it would 
then become necessary to qualify qualities attributed to God such as His 
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omniscience or His all-powerful nature: there would be a sense in which such 
‘evidence’ would be sitting in judgement over that which as Christians we say gave 
birth to it, namely God. This god could not be God. For this reason any such 
evidence for the existence of God, evidence that is independent of the God it seeks 
to substantiate, can not exist, and such would include that produced according to a 
scientific methodology. 
 
1.2.4 Prudential Accounts of Justification 
As Thomas Morris remarks, in being a ‘simple, down-to-earth, practical, and decisive 
line of reasoning’ (Morris, 1992, p. 257) to enable a rational belief in God, prudential 
justifications for theistic belief are, as Jeff Jordan remarks, a subset of pragmatic 
arguments (Jordan, 2013, p.3). From this we might assume that these support 
Christian belief as well. Prudential beliefs ‘are predicated upon one’s preferences or 
goals or self-interest’ (Jordan, 2013, p.3). Thus a person might declare that they hold 
to such beliefs not because they necessarily believe them to be true, but on account 
of thinking that ‘it would be best for me if I did’. There is therefore something 
speculative about holding to such a belief system. 
Let’s remember that the goal of this opening chapter 1 of the project is to establish 
an epistemological ‘platform’ from which to explore a certain contribution towards 
natural theology, that might then - reasonably - direct an enquirer towards the 
Christian faith. Seen from such a perspective and again from Jordan (2013, p.4), is it 
reasonable to enjoin our enquirer to agree with me, that it is rational to believe in 
God because of the probability of it being true, whether or not I can demonstrate the 
evidence (a truth-dependent argument) or indeed purely and simply because of the 
benefits this brings (a truth-independent argument)? Could such an approach be 
considered moral? Indeed James Cargile criticises such a prudential approach to 
justification precisely for this reason amongst others, that it is immoral (Cargile, 
1992, pp. 283 - 289). Jordan though counters by reminding us that to not believe 
something that turns out to be more likely than not, would also be immoral (Jordan, 
2013, p.8).  
On the subject of what God might think of the efforts of those who fake adherence to 
him, Cargile suggests that the Christian God if, as he says, He exists, is likely to be 
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so ‘nice’ that he would not object to being treated in this manner. This of all his 
statements is by far the most interesting. It suggests that Cargile holds out the hope 
for himself that such is indeed the nature of the Christian God, presumably on the 
basis of examples Cargile himself has found in life since he does not report any 
investigation of Christian teaching on this subject (for example by reading the 
Christian scriptures in Isaiah 29.13, Matthew 15.8). 
Cargile’s remark is also perhaps the answer to one of the other objections to such 
prudential arguments: how could you know, if you are only ‘being religious’ by way of 
a bet or wager on yourself, which ‘god’ to pick [see note 28, William Lycan and 
George Schlesinger (1992, p.270), see also Jordan, 2013, p.6]? It seems that people 
have a notion of the character of this God they are enquiring about. 
Thus the argument that Christian truth-claims might be possible and consequently 
would be worth further investigation, would appear to be a reasonable remark to 
make to someone enquiring about the Christian faith. Yet this would not amount to a 
prudential justification for such a person’s entire ‘faith-journey’ throughout their life. 
Thus there exists the subtle distinction that I, in proposing a natural theology might 
‘sell’ it to others in terms of ‘try it out; it might be true’ but would not use a similar 
argument to justify my own beliefs, nor would I seek such a justification as a long-
term option for and in others. 
 
1.2.5 Religious Experience, Memory and Testimony 
Whilst discussing the Reformed approach above, I remarked that recourse to the 
warrant provided by a person thinking in a sound manner had much to commend it in 
terms of providing justification for belief. Yet this did not explicitly extend to 
experiential data but rather was directed at making belief in God a rational position to 
hold. An appeal by the Christian to a ‘religious experience’ brings in a wholly different 
and more problematic dimension. One might have what one terms a religious 
experience and one may or may not justify one’s belief in God on the basis of that 
religious experience. There is also the issue that what one person perceives to be a 
religious experience, might not be acceptable to another. 
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In a section in his book, largely designed to refute any description of an event as 
being of God directly communicating with a human as true, John Shook helpfully lists 
all those ways in which one might be deluded into thinking that a ‘mystical’ 
experience, is actually God communicating supernaturally (Shook, 2010, pp.99-110). 
These include what one might reasonably expect, including too much alcohol, an 
excess of nervous excitement, illusion, hallucination, errors in perception, lying etc 
etc. John Hick fortunately makes the assertion that ‘we normally live on the basis of 
trust in the veridical character of our experience’ (Hick, 1992, p.307). Thus it is 
reasonable to evaluate sense data in terms of there actually being something in 
reality to assess, bearing in mind that such sense data can only be produced on the 
basis of the warrant provided through ‘cognitive faculties functioning properly’ (see 
above). This last would then again helpfully, remove most if not all of the items on 
Shook’s list. Equally fortunately, Hick describes this understanding of our brain 
function as relying on ‘trust’ and things ‘seeming’ to be as they appear, since 
otherwise it would become impossible to adjudicate between competing accounts of 
the nature of theistic belief. Furthermore as Hick goes on to explain in the same 
place and mirroring Shook’s account, in evaluating our experience we must be 
careful to filter-out perceived experiences that might have arisen through cognitive 
functions functioning improperly. We might usefully add to any such list, other factors 
which we know from personal experience have a tendency to alter our own individual 
judgement. In this way for example I know of several people who can do without 
sleep for prolonged periods and still operate effectively; I however do not share that 
skill. 
Should such criteria be satisfied, Hick contends not only that it is entirely rational for 
us to be believed should we assert that we have had an experience of God, but 
moreover we can sensibly believe another who says such a thing. He uses Jesus as 
referred to in the Gospels as someone who may be trusted in this regard. Shook 
explicitly rejects this although only via a blanket statement that all scripture is 
rationally untrustworthy in regard to proving God’s - or “a god’s” as he says - 
existence. It would take only a single rational human to ascribe their belief in the 
existence of the Christian God as having arisen on the basis of scripture to refute 
that contention, and since there are many, Shook’s point may be discarded (Shook, 
2010, p.102). In summary, we can create potentially not only a web of contemporary 
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acquaintances who have, whilst demonstrably acting rationally, experienced the 
presence of God, but moreover extend this web back in time to include others who 
have described experiences of a similar nature. 
Shook (2010, pp. 99-100) disqualifies both groups as well as individuals who claim to 
have justified their belief in God on the basis of such ‘religious experiences’. He does 
so largely on the basis that there are a great variety of religions who contend that 
their followers have experienced such phenomena. The underlying principle he 
presumably invokes, although does not state, is that not all can be correct or more 
specifically that only one can be correct at any one time. Yet this is itself difficult to 
accept: I see no reason why a Muslim can not have an intense experience of the 
love of God whilst not realising per se that it is Christ loving her/him, as a Christian 
would contend. Similarly, and most importantly for this project, surely almost all 
humans do or could express a great sense of wonder at the sight of a sunset or 
sunrise or some other great manifestation in nature e.g. the rainbow. It seems 
therefore perfectly reasonable to allow for individuals who belong to different 
religious groups to lend a supernatural explanation to the same event, without 
necessarily being aware of the identity of the ‘god’ who put it there, at least in the 
first instance. The Christian will offer an alternative explanation as to where such 
impulses arise from and with the warrant provided through historic precedent, 
attempt to explain the source, as seen for example in Genesis 41, Daniel 5 and Acts 
8.26-40. 
In an important re-telling and commentary upon one Christian person’s reception of a 
‘religious experience’, Baker offers a narrative originally recounted by Wolterstorff 
regarding the experience of a sudden powerful sense of being given a message from 
God (Baker, 2007, pp.26-30). The person concerned acted upon the message as 
she believed she was directed to, which included relating part of it to her local church 
leader as well as other members of that church.  Not only did she act as described, 
she also took herself off to a psychologist as she was concerned that she might be 
experiencing some form of mental illness. This professional recounted how such 
things were in the psychologist’s experience quite common, and saw no need for the 
caller to be treated. With that it should be noted that with cognitive faculties having 
been assessed as functioning normally, a degree of cognitive Plantingan warrant had 
been achieved. Baker also states that apparently the person receiving the message 
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was not of a Christian denomination where such things are commonplace. 
Interestingly Baker then goes on to relate the criticism Wolterstorff received, since he 
had decided - being of the Reformed Epistemological persuasion - that since the 
subject had correctly functioning cognitive faculties, the woman had indeed had a 
genuine communication from the Christian God. The substance of the criticism in the 
main, was that insufficient evidence and context had been provided to satisfy the 
contention that God had spoken to her, and that in simply applying the judgements 
he had, Wolterstorff was leaving the door wide open for persons with manifestly 
bizarre ideas, to also have similar epistemic justification for them. Yet what is not 
observed, is that in addition to the woman having proper warrant for her belief, quite 
plainly her group, her community, in fact her local Christian church, thought so too. 
There is therefore something here of the pragmatic theses of justification outlined 
above. Moreover the psychologist related that such experiences were perfectly 
normal and common. It is precisely this additional layer of epistemic justification - 
comprising testimony, community agreed memory and importantly relationality as 
providing justification - that would nullify those believing absurd contentions, since 
anecdotally we might reflect that for example, tales of communications from aliens 
are neither normal, nor common, nor likely to be agreed-upon by all members of a 
wider community (Baker, 2007, footnote to p.30). 
Similarly, Peter van Inwagen is apparently referring to the degree to which it is 
permissible to believe in the absurd (Van Inwagen, 2012, pp.11-26). He is discussing 
how we can be sure that something is absurd in the face of no evidence, even 
though whatever the proposition is, it is plainly absurd. By way of example, he posits 
that there is an invisible (invisible because we do not have the technology to detect it 
even if present) teapot orbiting the sun between the earth and Mars. In his writing he 
appeals to two broad areas of general agreement: firstly that the means by which 
this came about cannot be reasonably and rationally imagined (he suggests aliens 
put it there) and secondly that we all know it is an absurd suggestion.  As Baker 
implies above, we are appealing to a general sense in the population of what is 
sensible and what is not, and that the process by which the substance of the 
proposition came into being, is a valid point of justification of the knowledge of it 
being true or not. Thus in a Plantingan sense, the epistemic warrant for a proposition 
can be destroyed by a lack of general agreement within the group as well as a lack 
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of an agreed pathway to achieve the proposition. Plainly not all propositions have 
pathways to their creation in this sense and yet here we are speaking of religious 
experiences, where one should reasonably expect such pathways to exist. 
Thus in conclusion, Christian religious experiences, set within a context of the 
approval of a religious ‘group’ meaning the Church community, may be experienced 
by an individual functioning rationally, and when free from impediments as set out 
above, may reasonably be claimed to be genuine, as being from God Himself. Such 
attested experiences might then be used as arguments for the existence of God. 
 
1.2.6 Objections to Religious (Christian) Belief 
A particular type of objection to specifically Christian belief may be illustrated by the 
following Biblical parable which as commonly understood, is a narrative which is 
designed to illustrate examples of prevalent attitudes rather than recounting a single 
historical event. The specific pericope is somewhat lengthy and so by way of 
introduction it recounts how two men, one wealthy and another living in close 
proximity yet profoundly poor, both eventually die. The formerly wealthy individual, 
now resident in some unspecified form of hell, seeks to have messages sent to his 
family to warn them that their continuing evil deeds in the form of ignoring their poor 
fellow citizens, will land them in a similar predicament. The parable continues: 
But Abraham said, ‘They have Moses and the prophets; they 
must respond to them.’ Then the rich man said, ‘No, father 
Abraham, but if someone from the dead goes to them, they 
will repent.’ He replied to him, ‘If they do not respond to 
Moses and the prophets, they will not be convinced even if 
someone rises from the dead.’” (Luke 16.29-31) 
This parable is illustrative of a more general scepticism:  
Whether religious experiences and testimony are able to 
provide adequate support for the existence of God will not 
[….] be something that can be settled just by reflecting on 
how strong these kinds of evidence seem – rather, it will 
depend on whether religious experiences and testimony are, 
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in actual fact, reliably correlated with God’s agency. A 
religious sceptic may deny that there is any such correlation 
but, for a religious believer, convictions about the origins of 
religious experiences and testimony will likely form a part of 
his overall worldview. The sceptic’s charge that the evidence 
in question provides inadequate support for the existence of 
God will, then, be question begging – it will already take for 
granted a kind of non-religious worldview. (Smith, 2014, 
p.141) 
Thus arguments put forward in this book for the rational justification of religious belief 
should be seen to be aimed at the ‘honest enquirer’ into the Christian faith and not 
as either convincing proofs for the existence of God or the apologetic refutations of 
non-theistic commentators. Instead by portraying the Christian faith as a rational 
enterprise, it aims to draw others to investigate the claims of Jesus Christ. 
Whilst therefore recognising the above, there are nonetheless certain strands to 
objections to Christian belief, which we might usefully survey now. 
John Hedley Brooke outlines the major objections through a brief survey of those of 
Darwin. What is noteworthy (indeed it is the subject of his entry in the book) is how 
the objections to theistic belief come not from a positive affirmation of the truths of 
science yet rather from more general and indeed unscientific, observations of the 
apparent failure of organised religious practice. In this manner Brooke includes: 
• the effect of preaching by Christian polemicists on the subject of hell and the 
likely destination of those who rejected the Christian gospel; 
• the prevalence of pain and suffering in the world; 
• the assertion of the existence of forms of divine revelation, given the apparent 
inconsistencies within and mutual incompatibilities of, various portions of the 
Christian scriptures; 
• the inability to ‘ascribe the contingencies affecting every human life to a 
designing and watchful Providence’ (Brooke, 2010, p.111) 
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Lesser issues that again were seen to speak against the existence of God included 
the degree of disagreement and even conflict between religious groups of the same 
persuasion; that others who were not religious could also in addition to Christian 
people, exhibit extreme moral rectitude and finally the indiscretions of leaders of a 
given Christian religious group. 
Immediately, it will be apparent that there is no incompatibility between the holding of 
religious, indeed Christian beliefs and witnessing to the ‘beauty and elegance’ 
uncovered as a result of scientific research, with the result that the ‘experiential and 
emotional aspects of the religious life’ are not threatened by science (Brooke, 2010, 
p.110). Brooke goes on to affirm that there are numbers of prominent scientists who 
are also fervent Christians. It might be reasonably expected that such highly 
intelligent persons had also appraised themselves of the above objections and 
resolved them to their own satisfaction. 
Still others make various moral objections, which in large part focus on the less-than-
exemplary conduct of Christian denominations and persons. The effect of such 
objections, as Donald MacKinnon tells us, is to force much-needed self-reflection 
upon Christians themselves rather than to generate fundamental objections to the 
faith (MacKinnon, 1963, pp.11-34). 
MacKinnon raises a further important matter: 
For Christians there is no escape from the issues raised by 
the involvement of the author and finisher of their faith in 
history. It is at once their glory and their insecurity that he is 
so involved. The very precariousness of our grasp of his 
ways reflects the depth at which he penetrated the stuff of 
human life. We cannot have that depth of identification on 
his part with our circumstances unless we pay the price of 
the kind of precariousness, belonging even to the substance 
of our faith, from which we may seek to run away to a 
spurious certainty even at the price of a kind of dishonesty 
which infects our whole outlook. We must be as sure as we 
can that we have rightly estimated the sort of certainty which 
we can hope to have about Jesus and do not make the 
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mistake of trying to make that certainty other than it is. 
(MacKinnon, 1963, pp.31-32) 
MacKinnon anchors the point of this present study accurately in the person of Jesus 
Christ. Furthermore in stating that there is ‘no escape’ he acknowledges the 
complete centrality of the identity and actions of Christ in history to its substance, in 
the ‘depth he [Christ] penetrated the stuff of human life’. MacKinnon also goes some 
way towards negating the effect of any ‘precariousness’ causative of an ‘insecurity’, 
since it would appear difficult for something so apparently ephemeral to have such 
an essential effect. 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
Where have we arrived in our survey of contemporary epistemological approaches? 
What strategy would appear to be most appropriate in any conversation with the 
non-Christian physical scientist? Since ‘faith is the gift of God’ and God cannot be 
coerced into giving that same faith to any given individual, the focus of the Christian 
becomes that of providing a rational explanation for the epistemic position one holds 
as a practicing Christian believer, to any enquirer (1 Peter 3.15). This amounts to a 
conversation with such a presumed non-Christian. It must be held in language that is 
mutually intelligible, quite obviously. Consider such a conversation from the 
Reformed Epistemological perspective: it would amount to the Christian informing 
the enquirer that she was rationally justified in holding to her Christian beliefs and no 
more. From the Wittgensteinan fideist perspective it would amount to the Christian 
informing the enquirer that her Christian faith was internally coherent. Prudential 
accounts I would suggest offer nothing attractive at all in any ethically justifiable 
sense. We are left with offering reasonably imparted accounts of where the stuff of 
life and living demonstrates the enormity of the import of the Christian gospel; 
evidence that amounts to defeaters for those apparently overwhelmingly solid 
arguments for an entirely naturalistic explanation of all of what we can perceive.  
And so like Smith I wish to ‘tackle evidentialist objections to belief in God head-on’ 
believing it entirely rational to hold to such beliefs when having the evidence for them 
(Smith, 2014, p.145). Yet such a position would epistemically be only the starting-
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point, for there remain significant challenges once it has been accepted that belief in 
a god is rational: 
• Can such a belief be rationally developed into belief in the Christian 
God; how may Christ be introduced? 
• Quite how much justification is required or to put it another way, 
how much evidence is required to confer rationality? 
• Orthodox Christianity includes truth-claims about Jesus Christ. It is 
plainly not sufficient to affirm ‘belief in the Christian God’ as a 
Christian: we must go beyond this and affirm our belief in who 
Jesus is. 
On the approach developed above, this is now possible. The Christian believer, 
adopting the somewhat inelegantly-named mechanism of Smith’s ‘evidential 
reliabilism’ may rationally sustain a belief in God. Yet I assert beyond this, that in 
belonging to and functioning as a part of a Christian tradition or ‘church’, being a 
group of liked-minded persons who also hold to and teach these same views and 
who affirm the orthodox ecumenical creeds, I may rationally hold to the scripturally 
expressed account of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, as penned by 
his followers after his ascension. These latter comprise the so-called New Testament 
Gospels, Acts, the Epistles and the Book of Revelation. 
Moving on to considerations of evidence, we should expect the type of evidence 
offered for this rational belief to be reflective of the Object of our search. Thus we 
agree with Steup quoted above and attest that our epistemic structure - the typology 
of our knowledge - is reflected in the typology of our justification, of our evidence. In 
this way we would expect this evidence to conform to a pattern alluded to by the 
Apostle Paul when he instructed: ‘brothers and sisters, whatever is true, whatever is 
worthy of respect, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is 
commendable, if something is excellent or praiseworthy, think about these things’ 
(Philippians 4.8). On a first assessment this looks like an Epistemology based not on 
reason yet rather on Faith - on revelation. Yet this is not what is meant. The typology 
of evidence may be contextual: for example a personal failure in a certain challenge 
may be construed as evidence for that person’s lack of suitability for that given task 
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or the very springboard required for future success. All that is being suggested here 
is that scepticism may blind the enquirer to good evidence, and that Paul’s enjoining 
us to consider all that which is good, may enable a similar enquirer to value that 
which another had discarded. The Reformed Epistemologist says something similar: 
the cognitive faculties functioning correctly must be doing so in an ‘environment in 
which it was designed to function’ (Smith, 2014, p.137). For our purposes here, such 
an ‘environment’ would include our conversation partner being able to view the 
evidence respectfully. 
As for the level or quantity of required evidence, at first it might seem that for a belief 
as important as that of belief in the Christian God where I am required for example to 
daily take up my cross and follow Jesus (after Luke 9.23), the principle of pragmatic 
encroachment would apparently require a very high degree of proof (Smith, 2014, p. 
144). Yet as Smith also shows in the same place, the practical considerations 
consequent upon following Christ - the perceived daily benefits - , whilst these do not 
amount to that which evidentialism requires, do act  ‘as a kind of catalyst, making it 
easier for one’s evidence to [provide justification]’. To this principle then we do 
appeal in this project. In considering what this evidence might amount to, it will 
include but not be limited to, variously: personal, possibly infrequent, experiences 
duly affirmed by those in the church as being supernatural and sensations of the 
beauty of phenomena in the natural world, provided they conform aesthetically to the 
quotation from Philippians above. 
It will have been noted that in constructing this project as in some sense a 
conversation between a Christian believer and an honest enquirer in the field of 
chemistry, there are self-evidently two parties involved in the discussion: the 
Christian listening and responding to questions and the ‘honest enquirer’ from the 
field of chemistry putting them. 
Epistemically, Christians feel warranted in holding their beliefs on account of their 
properly functioning cognitive abilities within an environment which includes an 
active faith practiced in the context of a local expression of the Christian Church. The 
phrase ‘active faith’ implies a practice of the Christian faith which includes taking part 
in local and communal organised Christian services after the historic or orthodox 
pattern, as well as practical loving service towards one’s neighbour after Christ’s 
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example, however imperfectly fulfilled. Possibly this believer will have had and/or 







2.1 Natural Theology within the Epistemological Framework: Introduction 
This book has as its aim the investigation of the possibility of ‘a natural theology 
informed by chemistry’, yet what does a natural theology entail? How should it be 
understood? James Barr tells us: 
Traditionally ‘natural theology’ has commonly meant 
something like this: that ‘by nature’, that is, just by being 
human beings, men and women have a certain degree of 
knowledge of God and awareness of him, or at least a 
capacity for such an awareness; and this knowledge or 
awareness exists anterior to the special revelation of God 
made through Jesus Christ, through the Church, through the 
Bible. Indeed, according to many traditional formulations of 
the matter, it is this pre-existing natural knowledge of God 
that makes it possible for humanity to receive the additional 
‘special’ revelation. The two fit snugly together. People can 
understand Christ and his message, can feel themselves 
sinful and in need of salvation, because they already have 
this appreciation, dim as it may be, of God and of morality. 
The ‘natural’ knowledge of God, however dim, is an 
awareness of the true God, and provides a point of contact 
without which the special revelation would never be able to 
penetrate to people. Note that natural theology, thus 
understood, does not necessarily deny special revelation: it 
may, rather, make that special revelation correlative with a 
‘general’ or ‘natural’ revelation that is available, or has been 
granted, to all humanity. But it does, in its commoner forms, 
imply that valid talk about God without any appeal whatever 
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to special revelation is possible and indeed highly significant 
and important. (Barr, 1993, p.1) 
Useful though this understanding is, it does not tell us what a natural theology is for. 
It would seem by implication that it exists to enable ‘valid talk about God’, and yet 
only of a restricted form. There is a dividing line within it, for there is knowledge that 
may be known ‘naturally’ and knowledge that can only be known through a form of 
particular (divine) revelation. Natural theology is therefore a tool, a device to enable 
rational conversation between those who have already been enabled to know God 
through (a special divine gifting of) revelation, and those yet to do so, and who must 
therefore only know God ‘naturally’: it ‘provides the Christian thinker with a point of 
contact or convergence with non-Christian thought which, from the apologetic point 
of view, may be of the greatest philosophical importance’ (Casserley, 1955, p. xix). 
Barr also makes use of that same phrase ‘point of contact’ but goes further than 
Casserley in saying that without it that deeper or ‘special’ revelation of God to people 
is not possible. Also of interest is the way in which Barr states that natural theology 
does not deny special revelation and thus underscores the approach taken here and 
alluded to in the writings of Meister above: the Christian in promulgating a natural 
theology is not in any way ‘cheating’ in the argument. It is expected that they have an 
appreciation of the destination of their argument in that this is the acknowledgement 
of who Christ is. Equally such an approach as I am taking here still allows for an 
indeterminacy in the unfolding of outcomes, as I explore below.  
From this we may agree with Rodney Holder that: 
It would seem that, for Christian faith to be commended in 
the modern world, natural theology is vital. (Holder, 2013, p. 
131) 
Once again Holder is underlining that which Barr says, that a natural theology is not 
merely a ‘good to have’, but essential if the Christian is to commend the Faith to our 
contemporary context.  
We have spent some time attempting to navigate a way through epistemic research, 
developing a position that might enable a natural theology within the context of this 
project, to find a voice in the debate around the rationality of professing the existence 
of the Christian God. The question of rational justified belief in God was addressed 
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through contemporary epistemological research; now the position of natural theology 
will be evaluated within this epistemic framework. Yet is there only one ‘natural 
theology’? Russell Re Manning in the introduction to the recent Handbook from 
where the Holder quotation above was taken, says ‘one of the primary aims of this 
Handbook [is] to highlight the rich diversity of approaches to, and definitions of, 
natural theology’ (Re Manning, 2013, p.1). He goes on in the same place to speak of 
‘new varieties of natural theology’ and their ‘complex diversity’. In this present book I 
propose just such a ‘new variety’. We must therefore decide upon this (rational) 
natural theology which arises out of our chosen epistemological position such that 
we might then usefully dialogue with chemistry and chemists. In its widest sense 
such an approach to natural theology, as a tool enabling this rational dialogue within 
the constraints given, also validates its contemporary use, irrespective of how it may 
have been seen historically. 
 
I will now proceed to outline some of the elements of such a natural theology. 
2.1.1 The Audience 
Chemistry as a discipline has exploded in terms of its significance over the last 
several decades as we shall discover below. It is practised by people in an arguably 
largely religiously neutral way in that no one is concerned to enquire of the religious 
persuasion of the university researcher in chemistry or the industrial worker in a 
factory producing agri-chemicals, for example. The language used by and between 
Chemists involved in research might anecdotally be expected to differ from that of 
natural theology. Immediately therefore a project of this type should be aware of its 
audience. Since I contend that the epistemic reasoning employed in Chapter 1 is 
there for both Christians and for non-Christians, and since the chemistry such as it 
is, may be read by all, this project is specifically not utilising a fideist approach, this 
meaning that the language being employed is that used in academic circles in 
Western Europe. This is of importance because even if the arguments employed in 
favour of a natural theology informed by chemistry are not convincing to non-
Christians, they must be intelligible to them. Equally such arguments must be 




Why does this matter? In his introduction to an important volume setting out a novel 
approach to natural theology Alister McGrath (2008, pp.1-5) speaks of how his new 
approach is located in a newly articulated although not it must be said ‘new’, sense 
of the natural as informed by people transformed through their Christian faith. In this 
way he suggests that a natural theology is ‘seen’ through ‘certain specific ways - 
ways that are not themselves necessarily mandated by nature itself’ (McGrath, 2008, 
p.3). He argues rightly I would suggest for a specifically Christian approach to natural 
theology. In so doing however he risks perhaps making this suggested new ‘seeing’ 
of natural theology opaque or at least unintelligible to the non-Christian, and in our 
case perhaps the enquiring non-Christian chemist. Such an approach if adopted in 
this book would miss our intended audience. He ends his extended essay (p.315) 
with a quotation from the English polymath John Ruskin (1819-1900) which itself 
includes part of the following pericope from Ecclesiastes 3: 
What benefit can a worker gain from his toil? I have 
observed the burden that God has given to people to keep 
them occupied. God has made everything fit beautifully in its 
appropriate time, but he has also placed ignorance in the 
human heart so that people cannot discover what God has 
ordained, from the beginning to the end of their lives. 
(Ecclesiastes 3.9-11) 
My purpose is not to enter into a debate about the translating of challenging 
passages of ancient Hebrew but merely to suggest that in its context this passage is 
speaking of the depth of wonder, complexity and elaboration of life that largely lies 
hidden from the human to the extent that (as the writer of Ecclesiastes then 
immediately goes on to suggest) all we should resolve to do is make the very best 
we can of our lives on earth. As McGrath himself says, this amounts to a 
theologically informed consideration of the subject of Ruskin’s study - a 
consideration that would be immediately rejected by the non-theist as begging the 
question of the origins of both the capability of the (physical and metaphysical) sight 
as well as its object. The Christian would wish to maintain that our understanding of 
‘creation’ is radically altered by and through the Incarnation - something which we 
know McGrath himself is keen to maintain (McGrath, 2001, p.176). In summarising 
his discussion of 20th century developments, Holder acknowledges that this sense of 
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confusion over who the audience is, for arguments from natural theology, persists: 
‘The fundamental ambivalence remains: are all these insights [from variously 
McGrath, Pannenberg, Barth, Torrance and others] simply confirmatory of beliefs 
already held or do they constitute arguments meant to command normative assent?’ 
(Re Manning,  2013, p. 130). In this project at least it is I would suggest essential to 
maintain a language and a natural theology, that is intelligible to all of our audience, 
in order that Christian faith might continue to be ‘commended’ (see above) to the 
contemporary world. Such is therefore one aspect of this proposed natural theology: 
it is to be widely intelligible amongst the contemporary population including our 
conversation partner, the non-Christian chemistry researcher. 
2.1.2 The Role of Order 
I now digress to consider the issue of ‘order’ within the natural world, in the sense of 
how this word is apparently understood by various authors. This is of importance as 
certain natural theologies argue from the premise of the apparent order perceived in 
the natural world.  
I have yet to discuss the modern natural science of chemistry in any detail, yet it will 
be clear from various introductory remarks, that those who pursue a natural theology 
have at times despaired of bringing chemistry into its orbit. The reasons for this are 
various but for our present purpose it will be sufficient to note that the study of 
mathematics and physics describes various set laws, apparently set into the fabric of 
the Universe (however so conceived). These are said to be immutable and as such 
are there to be discovered: we could for example call to mind the research being 
done at the CERN laboratories. Chemistry in contrast, since it makes new and 
transforms existing materials, plainly operates in a different way: it is utilitarian 
science or ‘interventionist’ and somewhat less ‘contemplative’ (Brooke and Cantor, 
2000, p.338). The practice of chemistry is also frequently messy and brings real 
physical skill into play. A sense of order might be discerned in the heavens or in the 
way fundamental particles make-up matter, but could this apply to chemistry? 
Much is made of the words ‘order’ and ‘orderliness’ in McGrath’s understanding of 
Creation. There are many examples in his Scientific Theology volume 1: Nature of 
which I note: 
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Kepler's belief that there existed a fundamental congruence 
between the mind of God, human rationality and the fabric of 
the universe rests upon a classic insight of Christian 
theology, rigorously grounded in a Christian doctrine of 
creation. A scientific theology will wish to reclaim this 
neglected theme, and to affirm its importance, not merely for 
a right understanding of the relation between Christian 
theology and the experimental sciences, but for a proper 
grasp of the nature and scope of theology itself 
(McGrath,2001, p.214) 
And he notes the following conclusion from Brunner’s work: 
Created human nature is such that it is able to discern the 
divine ordering of the universe (McGrath, 2001, p.204) 
The difficulty here as Foster noted, is that such conclusions if misused could come 
dangerously close to suggesting that we are able to say a priori what God may or 
may not do. [As Bruce Russell explains, if I use the term ‘a priori’ of my (piece of 
knowledge) or proposition, I am saying that I hold something to be true, independent 
of experience (Russell, 2013, p.1)]. Within this present project an ‘a priori’ 
understanding is something that might be worked-out from first principles, from 
presuppositions, from faith even and so known to be absolutely true without recourse 
to experiment or experience or any form of empiric investigation.] Such a mechanism 
implies that we may come to know God through reason alone. Thus in an analysis of 
the natural world as being ordered, what potentially can be lost in this understanding 
of the ‘orderliness’ of creation, is its contingency. What I am keen to establish is that 
a natural theology need not be only about a view of God that sees His creative acts 
as imposing order upon chaos; if God is being revealed in and through that which He 
has created, there is more to this portion of His self-revelation than Him saying ‘I am 
an ordered God’! Yes we may legitimately speak of a certain dynamism within 
creation (McGrath, 2001, p. 288) but I would go further to suggest that Creation is 
contingent in the sense of 1 John 3.2: what we shall be has not yet been revealed. It 
is only in our relationship with God that we both know our eschatological destination 
and know that we do not know what we shall become. 
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Anecdotally, it is plain that both orderliness and disorderliness can be perceived in 
the natural world: a meadow of wild flowers is apparently disordered and yet it is only 
the framework, indeed a very carefully ordered framework, of natural conditions, 
which can possibly - in great vulnerability - give rise to the right conditions for the 
meadow to exist at all. There is an extravagant disorderliness about a wild flower 
meadow: its profusion of colours and great variety of species giving often great 
pleasure to those who find it and succour to the animals that depend upon it. Our 
solution, to how a framework dedicated to orderliness can give rise to its self-same 
contingency, will provide the key to a comprehension of how a natural theology can 
with confidence understand if only in part, the Divine placing of order upon chaos in 
concert with its resulting complexities and disorder (Genesis 1.1-2). The reader will 
appreciate that such an understanding also reflects the tensions between 
perceptions of mathematics and physics as capable of upholding a natural theology 
and chemistry which is often seen as presenting difficulties in this regard. My present 
argument needs to move towards a theologically informed vision within a natural 
theology, that can resolve these tensions between ordered simplicity and the plain 
fact of nature’s organic complexities yet all of this proceeding from some attempt at 
comprehending the God who made it.  
What Foster, in a densely argued series of articles, so powerfully develops in his 
understanding of the intertwining of science and theology, is that an orthodox 
Christian theology allows for an ‘undetermined-ness’, a true contingency within both 
theology and the natural world: 
… a rationalist theology is logically bound to admit a further 
voluntarist element. The objects of God’s reason, in so much 
as they are intelligible, must be universal, and no universal 
contains in itself a ground of the necessity of its own 
existence. It is not true merely that God need not resolve to 
materialise his ideas at all ……. God must therefore select 
from among his ideas those upon which he is to confer 
existence, and his act of selection cannot be necessitated by 
his reason, because there is nothing in any idea which would 
constitute it more suitable for existence than any other 
(Foster, 1936, p.19-20) 
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Thus from this, not only don’t we know ‘what we are to become’ (1 John 3.2-3) but 
neither do we know why what is here, is here. There is nothing wholly set, nothing 
pre-determined in terms of what is to be created, at least such that we might come to 
have knowledge of it. Furthermore an understanding of any particular proposition 
may contain elements of justified knowledge that are known a priori as well as a 
posteriori. This is true both of theological and scientific propositions. Perhaps when 
Foster was writing this would have been a novel approach, certainly if made about 
scientific laws, yet this is now readily understood across the disciplines. Such a 
position is of importance to the current argument, since it allows for an active 
orthodox Christian faith which is worked-out on the basis of both things that are 
known, as well as things that may become known as the relationship between the 
person and God is developed, enlarged on, throughout life. From the perspective of 
the chemical sciences it is again of importance, as it allows for an holistic realisation 
of chemistry where elements of art and science, of experience and a priori Quantum-
derived postulations, may epistemically validly be intertwined into a single synthetic 
understanding of a particular reaction or process. As I mentioned above, we have yet 
to understand chemistry in this way, yet already we have identified elements of a 
natural theology, carefully underpinned by epistemology, that allow for such a 
composition. 
Yet Foster’s work serves us further, possibly in even more substantial ways. For he 
is able to link the passion of love, of God’s love shown in His decision to create, with 
a Christian rationalist theology. He declares that a rationalist theology should contain 
two markers (the second of which is quoted above, and the first here) of what he 
calls voluntarism: 
Although what God produces [may] be held to be completely 
determined by the ideas of his understanding …. His will 
must be arbitrary, in the sense of being free from 
determination by his reason ……. The productive activity of 
the artificer differs from that of the lover, in that the former is 
guided by an object of reason, the latter by an object of 
desire (Foster, 1936, p.18) 
Earlier Foster remarks: 
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a divine Creator [.....] can embody his ideas in nature with 
the same perfection in which they are present to his intellect, 
so that the scientist can find in nature itself the intelligible 
objects of which he is in search, and not merely imperfect 
ectypes of them (Foster, 1936, p.15) 
Hence we may readily understand that the scientist can expect to find ‘intelligible 
objects’ which are indicative of the God who is love (1 John 4.8), and who is in turn 
in love with His creation. In this way, as J B Stump remarks, the natural theologian 
acts in an interpretive manner towards her/his non-Christian colleagues in that the 
discovery of new truths about the natural order that might seem ‘surprising and 
incredible’ are no longer to be seen as incredible when viewed ‘through the lens of 
Christian theism’ (Stump, 2012, p.148).  
As so often in this writing, Foster’s assertions overlap or appear to be contingent 
upon each other, as is here the case. It is exciting that Foster postulates that the 
exercise of God’s free will is commensurate with a demonstration of his love. 
Furthermore to discern such markers in the natural world, the indeterminacy, the 
voluntarism, the combining of ‘an empirical element [in these sciences] with their a 
priori character’ (Foster, 1936, p.18) is to see God’s hand in what is perceived.  It is 
in an abrogation of any ‘right’ to predict, that we might come upon God’s self-
revelation. And all of these come to us as markers of God’s loving desire. True 
enough, we might only discern the truth of this by revelation and so move ourselves 
outside of the sphere of a natural theology. Yet the Christian acting as implied in 1 
Peter 3.15 and offering ‘an explanation for the hope that is in them’, is able to offer 
such interpretations to their non-theistic colleagues within their natural theological 
conversation.  
The natural theology proposed here will on account of the issues raised in this 
section, need to be in some manner showing-forth the love of God in creation. It will 
also provide an interpretive resolution to the tension between the orderliness that 
mathematics and physics tells us underpins the laws governing the natural world and 
the disorderliness made apparent in the contingency of outcomes. 
2.1.3 The Role Played by Nature and the Natural 
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In considering the term ‘natural theology’, if we understand theology as being talk of 
and about God, then what of ‘nature’ and the ‘natural’? McGrath (2008, pp.3-5, 226) 
makes the very reasonable point that the Christian faith does shape a concept of the 
‘natural’ and that a valid understanding of nature is ‘a prerequisite for a natural 
theology which discloses the Christian God’. Yet such an approach does not 
guarantee a language that might be acceptable or even intelligible to the non-
Christian enquirer as we have already remarked. Thus such a natural theology might 
well be helpful for the Christian community yet not for anyone else. McGrath goes on 
again to assert - and I would agree - that the Incarnation ‘can be said to redeem the 
category of the ‘natural’ allowing it to be seen in a new way’ (McGrath, 2008, p.4). 
Once again though, such ‘seeing’ might be challenging for those who do not 
acknowledge Christ.  
In our discussion of prudential accounts of epistemic justification, it was noted that 
some authors had suggested that following a religious faith was rational on the basis 
that to do so was a sensible bet, given the uncertainties of scientific discernment. If I 
were to suggest that a person should at least investigate the claims of the Christian 
faith on the basis that it is rational and offer if not a convincing proof of God’s 
existence at least the sense that it is ‘not improbable’, some might think I was 
weakening my claim to have knowledge of God’s existence, of warrant for the belief 
that God exists. It might be thought by a the non-Christian that my postulated natural 
theology was providing reasonable grounds for belief and not proof of knowledge. In 
turn, it might be thought by a Christian apologist that I was suggesting the Christian 
faith could be adopted solely on the basis of reason: that a person might arrive at the 
conclusion the Christian faith was entirely true, having followed a rationally reasoned 
argument through a series of steps. McGrath in the above-mentioned volume is to be 
commended for pointing out that the Christian faith involves a transformation of the 
person through an encounter with the actual person of God, initiated not on the basis 
of for example, that person’s character or intrinsic goodness or suitability, or indeed 
for any other reason (including Reason itself) than that God decided to do so 
(McGrath, 2008, pp.4-5). There is therefore an epistemic gap between a knowledge 
that says ‘there is a God’, and a human person who says ‘I am a Christian’. Scripture 
witnesses to such a gap ‘You believe that God is one; well and good. Even the 
demons believe that – and tremble with fear’ (James 2.19). To have been enabled to 
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bridge this gap is to have experienced God through His grace by revelation, which a 
natural theology cannot speak of since it evinces revelation. The objective of my 
natural theology therefore is not to prove that God exists, since such proof (through 
Reason alone) does not yield the transformation through God’s grace, of the person 
in the face of an encounter with Christ. The purpose of a natural theology is to lend 
rationality to the thought that there is a Creator of the Universe and in the manner 
presented here, a Universe redeemed through Christ. This theology is presented in a 
language that speaks rationally (and evidentially) to those not (yet) of that 
persuasion. It gives the hope of a reality beyond Charles Gore’s ‘faint and flickering 
gleam’ (Gore, 1891, p.77). This is in part then the ‘new’ aspect of the natural 
theology being proposed: not a proof of God’s existence but an aid in our 
conversation to point towards the Christian God. 
Can we identify such a natural theology and in what way might it be thought 
‘natural’? 
Re Manning in his introduction to the major new Handbook to the discipline quoted 
from above, can provide ‘no easy answer’ to the question of what natural theology is 
and goes on to speak of the diversity of approaches and definitions of natural 
theology (2013, p.1). For the purposes of this project it is therefore necessary for the 
reasons already set out, to define which particular ‘natural theology’ we are speaking 
of. 
I will be speaking about the role of chemistry below, yet immediately in relation to the 
‘natural’ of a natural theology, any such theology that only relates to pre-existing 
structures and laws, as elucidated through for example mathematics or physics, 
would be insufficient to involve chemistry simply because this particular discipline 
involves the transformation of material from one form into another. Frequently it also 
involves the creation of entirely new compounds or materials. Anecdotally it appears 
that many find describing such materials as being ‘natural’ problematic: in what way 
for example could modern polymers or plastics be considered ‘natural’? Given that 
less and less of the earth’s surface is unaffected by human activity I believe that it is 
timely to reconsider what it is that we consider to be ‘natural’. This is the conceptual 
bridge that must be crossed for chemistry to be considered in any way ‘natural’.  
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I would also not wish to appeal to a natural theology reliant upon any notion of a 
sensus divinitatis as being that inbuilt perception of God inherent and inherited by all 
humans, as spoken of by many commentators, not least John Calvin, yet see for 
example Justin Barrett (2012, p.324). I would therefore, using the word ‘natural’ in a 
different context, reject the idea that there is anything natural about humans simply 
knowing that there is a God. I would do so not because I disagree with the Apostle 
Paul that such exists: ‘because what can be known about God is plain to them, 
because God has made it plain to them’ (Romans 1.19) but rather precisely because 
humans, again as Paul says in the same place, are so very adept at ignoring it. As 
Paul points out in the preceding verse, people ‘suppress the truth in 
unrighteousness’. 
Taking these points together I would therefore wish to encourage a revision of our 
perception of the ‘natural’ world, to include that which nature itself, on account of its 
laws, permits to be created, in addition to that which apparently came about of its 
own (that is nature’s) volition. Furthermore any appeal to Romans 1 as espousing a 
natural theology is to some degree not helpful if it is so readily ignored by the 
sceptic. 
Chemical knowledge has become the workhorse of so much of modern industry 
through the abilities of its practitioners in providing raw-materials for the 
transformation of ‘stuff’ into saleable product. Chemistry assists in the marshalling of 
similar empirically-discovered transformations into generically valid patterns and of 
materials with similar properties into groups. Chemistry works within the possible and 
then forges new procedures to expand on what is possible. It solves physical 
problems and with that chemistry falls within the ‘province of the Natural’ (Foster, 
1957, p.18). It would therefore seem unwise to define the ‘natural’ as being solely 
that which has been untouched by human interaction. Chemistry is realist and a 
realistic discipline in that it deals with concrete realities outside of the self (McGrath, 
2001, p.71). Chemistry has been accused of lacking a metaphysical dimension. 
Would this lack militate against it being capable of informing a natural theology? I will 
demonstrate below that this too is not the case. 
Christianity champions a transformational soteriology, because God in Christ 
transforms the individual. The wonder that belongs to chemistry is that it is a partaker 
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in and a user of, a ‘natural’ framework that subtends a transformative ability. Thus 
the ‘natural’ I argue for in this book, describes and glories in, a framework that 
enables transformation. Whatever it is that enables that ‘framework’ is thus the 
definer of the ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ I seek to find the Christian divine imprint in. Such 
a definition of the ‘natural’ in a natural theology, immediately sets this present 
approach apart from certain classical positions, as well as more modern 20th century 
approaches, for I will be suggesting that the Christ through whom Christians 
understand they are transformed is potentially on display, or at times could be seen 
to be visible, within the transformational discipline of chemistry. That which is 
‘natural’ is no longer considered to be just that which is ‘of Nature’. Nonetheless if 
care is not taken, such an approach could be said to represent a partnership 
between created and Creator as postulated for example in Process Theology, which 
is not what I am suggesting. I address Process thought further below, yet for now 
see for example Brooke and Cantor (2000, pp.315, 338). We must not forget that sin 
and the Fall engendered a rupture in the framework of creation, such that it ‘groans’ 
for regeneration (Romans 8.18-22).  
In speaking of a framework, the natural theology I am tentatively moving towards, will 
tend to move away from a ‘God of the gaps’ (spoken of by many authors but see 
W.D. Drees (2002) for a sensitive exposition of this particular term) towards a 
theology that proclaims the world that the sciences describe, as indeed also being 
God’s world (Re Manning, 2013, p.124). Such a sentiment chimes with the 
experience of the Apostle Paul as described in Acts, when on a journey to Athens he 
sees the Christian God being acknowledged even by those who do not realise that 
they are worshipping Him (Acts 17.16-34).  
Having read thus-far in this section, it might be reasonably asked: ‘So which is it? Is 
God within the natural world or outside of it? If outside, how do you argue God 
communicates with and within the world? If the Apostle Paul was asking for a re-
appraisal of the object of the Athenians’ worship, was he asking merely for an 
intellectual assent? The work of Vincent Brümmer discussed below provides part of 
the answer: there is within the orthodox Christian understanding a separation 
between the transcendent ‘wholly other’ and the world he created. That being the 
case, how is God made visible in the ‘natural’? These are some of the issues we will 
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expand upon below in the section on natural theology and the Hebrew/Christian 
scriptures. 
Thus to answer my own implied question about the quality of the ‘nature’ and the 
‘natural’ in the natural theology that I am moving towards, this quality: 
• is capable of being perceived by all, Christian and non-Christian 
(and equally capable of being ignored by both);  
• has to do with the frameworks described by the physical sciences, 
including the mechanism of interactions between reacting 
components in creating novel outputs; 
• moves the focus of our considerations away from individual 
instances of conceived complexity in nature (established forms of 
the so-called teleological arguments or arguments from design, for 
the existence of God) and towards this rationality just mentioned; 
• engenders in those studying it, aesthetic appreciations such as 
wonder, awe and beauty. 
2.1.4 Resolving the Incommensurabilities between Theology and Chemistry 
A not unreasonable objection to natural theology might be, as Eric Oberheim and 
Paul Hoyningen-Huene suggest, that the fields of study comprising ‘the things of 
God’ (theology) and ‘the things of the natural world’ (the natural) are rationally 
incommensurable: that is that these potentially ‘competing paradigms fail[ing] to 
make complete contact with each other's views, so that they are always talking at 
least slightly at cross-purposes’ (Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene, 2013, p.1). In 
rejecting a Wittgensteinan fideist epistemological approach, I from the theological 
side, negated this objection. The remark by Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene relates 
specifically to the physical sciences and yet it does for this present purpose count as 
a very reasonable cautioning statement when attempting to formulate or identify a 
natural theology. The difficulty might be that the chosen approach might function for 
chemistry for example, but be thought incompatible with natural theological 
approaches in other physical sciences. In this regard for example Max Jammer 
(2009, p.61) describes incommensurabilities in concepts of mass in physics. Far 
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from resolving such conflicts he maintains that such controversies amount to 
differing views of the development of physical science; no longer are we dealing with 
right and wrong yet rather we become content to live and work alongside, different 
models of, in this instance, the concept of mass. We are discussing the same thing, 
but our point of view and our particular context, lends that ‘thing’ a different quality 
dependent upon the context in which it is discussed and utilised.  
Furthermore, the way in which Pannenberg’s (2008, p.65) theology combines with 
his quoted understandings of further work by Jammer is of especial significance in 
this present study: 
God’s immensity and eternity are prior to the finite reality of 
the world of creation that is the object of geometrical 
construction and of physical measurement. The infinite 
space of God’s immensity, however, and the infinite whole of 
simultaneous presence that is God’s eternity are implicated 
and presupposed in our human conceptions and in our 
measurements of space and time. Thus, God’s eternity is 
different from the time of his creatures but constitutive of it, 
and his immensity is constitutive of the space of his 
creatures. (Pannenberg, 2008, p.69) 
which remarks might reasonably constitute an understanding of what a natural 
theology is, in that God’s immensity and presence are implicated in human 
conceptions (a description reminiscent of Romans 1.19-20). Pannenberg had in 
preceding pages developed an understanding of ‘fields’ (analogous to but not 
synonymous with for example magnetic or gravitational fields in physics) as spacial 
realities which might be projections of the reality of the Holy Spirit in Creation. 
Bearing this explanation in mind he goes on to say: 
At this point, I return to the field concept and to the 
significance of its application to the doctrine of God as spirit. 
I said before that space and time, or rather space-time, are 
the only basic requirements of the field concept in the 
general theory of relativity. Here, the universe is described 
as a single field, while, in principle, the states of bodily 
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matter (or particles) are considered as singularities of the 
cosmic field. If all geometrical descriptions of time and 
space, however, are dependent on the prior conception of 
space and time as an infinite and undivided whole, the 
immensity and eternity of God, then this infinite and 
undivided whole may also be described as infinite field, the 
field of God’s spirit that constitutes and penetrates all finite 
fields that are investigated and described by physicists, even 
the space-time of general relativity. This relationship makes 
intelligible how the divine Spirit works in creation through the 
created reality of natural fields and forces. The interpretation 
of the concept of God as spirit in terms of the field concept, 
then, functions as a key to obtaining some understanding of 
God’s fundamental relationship to the world of nature. 
(Pannenberg, 2008, pp.69-70) 
He then helpfully, in the same place, adds: 
Such a theological use of the field concept does not and 
need not rely on any specific field theory that physicists have 
produced. Nevertheless, it is related to the field language of 
physics because it claims to deal with the preconditions of 
any physical field that occurs in the spatial and temporal 
setting of the universe. 
To underline then what has just been said, such a field concept claims to deal with 
‘preconditions of any physical field that occurs in the spatial and temporal setting of 
the universe’. The further significance of what Pannenberg has achieved at this point 
ought also be underlined: he has been able to hold together within the same 
academic milieu or discourse concepts intelligible to theology as well as to those 
working within the physical sciences: potential incommensurabilities have been 
dispelled. Furthermore it has been shown that the laws or frameworks which produce 
the observed behaviours within the discipline of chemistry might rationally be 
considered as displaying the Christian God’s handiwork within the physical world.  
2.1.5 The Place of Transcendence in the Natural Theology 
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We are in this section seeking to understand how the Divine might be visible in the 
everyday or natural world. The areas of difficulty that must be avoided include 
holding to the anti-Christian position that God and nature are in fact one and the 
same on the one hand, against one interpretation of the orthodox Christian position 
on the other: that humans are estranged from their divine Creator to the extent that 
they are incapable of discerning God visible in creation. In the first position we see a 
non-Christian god embodied within the natural world and in the second a radical 
dualism making any conversation between the two, impossible. Plainly some form of 
transcendence is needed: 
Against any idea that the natural order was chaotic, irrational 
or inherently evil (three concepts which were often regarded 
as interlocking), the early Christian tradition affirmed that the 
natural order possessed a goodness, rationality and 
orderedness which derived directly from its creation by God. 
A radical dualism between God and creation was thus 
eliminated, in favour of the view that the truth, goodness and 
beauty of God (to use the Platonic triad which so influenced 
many writers of the period) could be discerned within the 
natural order, in consequence of that order having been 
established by God (McGrath, 2001, p.163). 
As implied in the introduction to this section 2.1, such a consideration of some form 
of transcendence matters in the selection of a natural theology because natural 
theology is vital, as the quotation given above proclaims, for any engagement of 
theology with the sciences. Furthermore as Christians we contend, we know, that we 
are speaking about the truth. Many engaged in scientific research would similarly 
contend that discovering new truths is what urges them on. The Incarnation was 
fundamentally about the God of unimaginable and indeed limitless power, limiting 
Himself in His coming amongst us (Phil 2.5-8). Should we be seeking to enable a 
conversation between the Creator and created, be seeking to discern the Divine in 
the everyday ‘natural’ world, we need not look further than the person of Jesus 
Christ, since as He Himself remarked ‘no one comes to the Father except through 
Me’ (John 14.6). Thus both from the point of view of understanding a Christian 
soteriology (where the non-Christian comes to faith in Christ solely through an 
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encounter with His person as a result of revelation and thus outside the scope of this 
present project), as well as wanting to have a point of focus for the non-Christian 
enquirer into the faith, the person of Christ is where that focus should lie. It is in 
Christ that the transcendence is visible and yet only to the one enabled through 
Grace to ‘see’ it.  
And how does this seeing ‘work’? When Christ asked His disciples ‘who do you say 
that I am’ (Matthew 16.13-20) he was met by various answers. The correct answer 
was not deduced by the one giving it, it had ‘been revealed [to him] by my father in 
heaven’ (Matthew 16.17). The powers of reason only led so-far: a radical break with 
reason was required for the truth to be imparted. This is indeed intelligible when we 
appreciate that for Christians a transcendent knowledge of God is not a logical 
extension of either empirical knowledge or of other understandings: the transcendent 
is not in anyway a continuation of the immanent (Brümmer, 1992, p.29); there is no 
logical argument that can rationally derive knowledge of God (although as we have 
started to acknowledge there are things about God draped around and enfolding the 
natural world, which leave more than sufficient clues). However, simply because 
there is no rational or logical derivation through reason alone of the connection 
between what is empirically observed (the immanent) and what gave rise to it (the 
transcendent), this does not in any sense mean that there is no connection. Indeed 
the connection is very real and may simply be concluded (Brümmer, 1992, p.30) 
through some form of as yet undisclosed insight - an insight we suppose of a similar 
nature to that which the Apostle Peter received when he correctly appreciated the 
Christ as reported by the writer of Matthew’s Gospel.  
Someone might reasonably ask, ‘why does God not provide sufficient evidence’ for 
these claims, rather than requiring a plainly non-scientific leap to a conclusion, 
having observed the evidence of God’s handiwork in the natural world. It is in the 
nature of scientific evidence and indeed of the scientific method itself, that claims 
should be falsifiable. It is the possibility of a scientific finding being wrong, which 
drives research and ever deeper knowledge of a given scientific discipline. Yet 
relationships cannot be founded or rest upon, the possibility of deception. Yes it is 
true, we are often deceived in our relationships, yet it is our desire that they should 
be steadfast. In the Christian understanding God as revealed in Christ calls us to 
friendship with him (John 15.15-17) in ‘real-time’ and as such certainty is required 
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(Hebrews 11.6) for such a properly functioning relationship (plainly we cannot have a 
relationship with someone we do not believe exists). For ourselves too we require a 
level of trust in our own relationships for example in the family or even in business: it 
would be both undesirable and impracticable to be forever questioning whether we 
even had the basis for a relationship, before starting to work with and in such 
relationships. At this point then the function of our natural theology is to provide the 
environment for God to introduce himself to the non-Christian’ honest enquirer’ so as 
to commence such a (lasting) relationship, a relationship that is formed according to 
the pattern of Christ as shown-forth in the Scriptures (Brümmer, 1992, pp.39-40). 
Should we therefore examine our Christian (New Testament as well as Hebraic) 
understandings of the relationship between the Divine and the temporal, we may 
become enabled to perceive the gap between the Divine and the temporal and so 
again affirm the nature of the Transcendent. This will then provide a key to 
perceiving the divine in the everyday, even when the person entertaining that sense 
of wonder, may not acknowledge the God who has produced this understanding. 
This incidentally then legitimises the theology being promulgated in this book, as a 
true ‘natural theology’ i.e. one which requires no (revelational) knowledge derived 
through a ‘faith’, since the Unseen is revealed in the temporal, to a degree 
anonymously, as Paul implies (Acts 17.23).  
McGrath agrees with Torrance that: 
… dualist assumptions are deeply ingrained within the 
Western theological tradition, and can be argued to reflect 
the influence of speculative Hellenistic philosophy rather 
than its Jewish intellectual context (McGrath, 2008, p.14) 
In contrast to the Hellenistic world-view that all lays at the feet of the rational mind to 
uncover, in the Hebraic view, God is separate from the world and hidden (Foster, 
1957, p.42). This is a symptom of His holiness and suggestive that there must be 
some transformation of the human in order to interact with the divine, as already 
spoken of above.  




Then came the age of physical science. The break up of the 
mediaeval system of thought and life resulted in an atomism, 
which, if it had been more perfectly consistent with itself, 
would have been fatal alike to knowledge and society. 
Translated into science it appeared as mechanism in the 
Baconian and Cartesian physics: translated into politics it 
appeared as rampant individualism, though combined by 
Hobbes with Stuart absolutism. Its theory of knowledge was 
a crude empiricism; its theology unrelieved deism. God was 
'throned in magnificent inactivity in a remote corner of the 
universe,' and a machinery of 'second causes' had 
practically taken His place. It was even doubted, in the 
deistic age, whether God's delegation of His power was not 
so absolute as to make it impossible for Him to 'interfere' 
with the laws of nature. (Gore, 1891, p.73)  
Yet in the orthodox Christian understanding, the person of Christ as revealed in the 
Incarnation was then and as the work of the Spirit within the world, remains today, 
that ‘interference’ in the laws of nature. It will be readily understood that Pannenberg 
is saying something similar, as reported in the discussion of his ‘field concept’ above. 
We now digress briefly to introduce some terminology. Foster (1957, p.18) builds on 
the work of Mascall and Marcel to create an essential typology: a ‘problem’ is 
something that can be solved and so might be said to belong to the ‘natural’; a 
puzzle is something that might be elucidated by a re-combination of current 
understandings and so is something of a synthesis; a mystery is ‘something 
fundamentally different’: it is that which maintains its ability to impress, to remain 
hidden, to remain epistemically ‘other’, ‘even when understood’ (Foster, 1957, p.19). 
Mystery exceeds our comprehension. We may see it, we may understand the 
physics or the chemistry or the mathematics and yet it maintains its inherent inability 
to be fully comprehended, and indeed even if it is, it remains ‘wonderful’. Foster goes 
on to draw the distinctions clearly between (Christian) mystery and those who 
espouse what we might today see as a Fideist approach (Foster, 1957, p.27) as well 
as that which we might see as magic and superstition. In so doing we maintain a 
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realist approach in the face of the physical world and are not drawn away into fictions 
and unrealities. 
Foster’s notion of ‘problem’ may validly be re-interpreted as that which is a purely 
scientific investigation: Foster (1957, p.21) quotes Schlick who ‘proclaims the faith 
that there is no mystery in the world which can resist elimination’. Foster identifies 
the root of the belief or ‘faith’ of humans to wrestle with nature and master it, as 
coming from ancient Greek philosophy (Foster, 1957, p.42) which in its rationalism 
‘vanquished’ superstition (ibid., p.44). He is thus implying that to a certain degree 
scientism or the unswerving belief that science will answer all necessary questions, 
is a form of religious ‘faith’. This is helpful because with this we have identified our 
contemporary understandings of that which is naturalistic: it is the academic field the 
natural theological operates in and so builds upon our discussion of ‘nature and the 
natural’ above. Natural theology is thus shown to be capable of operating rationally 
in the ‘realistic’ physical world whilst insisting that the wonder it evinces speaks of 
the transcendent. (Interestingly it would appear that all human effort requires the 
operation of a ‘faith’ or of a ‘faith-in’, of some description. As Edward Wilson affirms, 
even those opposed to theism, do at times enjoin us to make a ‘leap of faith’ and 
assent to the eventual triumph of science (Wilson, 1998, p.265).  
With this we now have to separate-out our understandings about the nature of faith. 
The person with faith or ‘a faith’ will arrive at a potential problem with certain pre-
formed suppositions. This may to some sound like a return to foundationalism, 
however let the reader be patient. Those who affirm a scientific world view - Gore’s 
‘crude empiricism’ as evinced by Schlick quoted above - have their faith resting on 
the premise that all problems will eventually be elucidated using the power of the 
rational human mind, through the scientific method. For such persons there is no 
dualism since there is no ‘wholly other’ and all of life and history is a ‘problem’ which 
will be solved. Yet as we have seen and shall see again below, mystery persists 
even when (it is thought to be) understood. And the ‘attitude correlative of mystery is 
wonder’ (Foster, 1957, p. 34). This sense of wonder is present even amongst those 
who have no Christian faith, but only a ‘scientific’ or more properly a naturalistic faith. 
Our sense of wonder becomes the suspicion that there is a transcendent reality 
beyond that which we can perceive. It is this suspicion which through an act of God 
can become the bridge to the transcendent ‘Other’: for a human to experience 
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wonder becomes an instance where they begin to perceive the specifically Christian 
‘Wholly Other’. In order to become a Christian, the terminus of this sense of wonder 
must be revealed to be Christ Himself through an act of God’s self-revelation, yet for 
our purposes the perception of wonder in our enquirer is sufficient for now. In this 
schema our natural theology is accessible to the non-Christian, not requiring 
McGrath’s dogmatic presupposition. No longer should a Christian interpretation 
precede any engagement with the world in such a public theology: 
natural theology offers a comprehensive means by which 
theology may address the world, and engage in productive 
dialogue concerning the legitimation and consequences of 
belief systems. In a free market of ideas, in which competing 
conceptions of 'nature' clamour for attention, the question of 
how the natural order is to be interpreted is of critical 
importance. Presuppositionless exegesis of the book of 
nature being an impossibility — as is also the case with the 
book of Scripture - there is room for a proper and informed 
debate over how the natural order is to be construed 
(McGrath, 2001, p. 303) 
Such an approach appears to place too great a burden of divine knowledge upon 
Christians, leaving theologians interpreting nature rather than God; thus theology 
addresses the world but the world is not permitted to be addressed through itself by 
the One who in love created it. Christians must forever be open to the possibility that 
the how - never the why - of Creation will be re-interpreted by the One who made it, 
the Creator. It is precisely this that makes our enquiry into the wonder that is Christ 
so completely overwhelming and absorbing, and our conversation with non-
Christians a mutual journey of discovery. The implications of this approach are clear: 
that the Christian does not expect to be able to provide full and final explanations of 
the natural world; that the Christian expects to be changed by the world since it is the 
locus of their formation, the disciplining arm (see for example Hebrews 5.7-8, 12.7-
13), of their loving Creator; that contingency and a profound sense of 
underdeterminedness inform all their considerations of the naturalistic elements of 
the world; above all that we should join Christ in the mêlée that is life, just as he did. 
 
62 
Thus from these perspectives, a natural theology must evince a sense of wonder in 
the beholder, correlative of a mystery that persists even when the explanation has 
been uncovered. This sense of wonder, of experiencing the transcendent, grips both 
the Christian and the non-Christian in our proposed conversation, leading both to 
walk together in a dialogue of hopeful exploration. ‘Hopeful’ because the Christian 
knows where this search in wonder will conclude, but only on a journey where the 
way is discerned ‘through a glass darkly’ (1 Corinthians 13.12) and where God in 
Christ provides the interventions. Of this wonder we shall have more to say below. 
2.1.6 Considerations of Simplicity and Complexity in Natural Theology 
In the past certain types of natural theology have, as one of the so-called ‘Arguments 
from Design’, made use of the key finding of complexity in the natural world. The 
overall objective of this section is precisely not to suggest that the types of natural 
theology discussed here, are candidates in this present book. I may personally find 
encouragement in the phenomena being analysed, especially as they make use of 
scientific discoveries. I may in addition speak of what I take to be the imprint of God 
in the world, but for the reasons given, they are not suitable candidates for my 
present purpose. Thus the purpose of this section is to move the candidate natural 
theology I am developing, away from those based around notions of complexity as 
found in the natural world. 
Given the sheer power of the notion of simplicity in so many areas of the everyday 
(Derkse, 1993, p.202) it might seem almost perverse to comment upon complexity in 
the same place as simplicity. And yet we are here seeking to formulate a natural 
theology and so the question might sensibly arise: should we seek for the Christian 
God in the complexities of the natural world or in its apparent simplicity? Does our 
notion of the grand, the majestic, the glory of God most ably find its expression in the 
extraordinary intricacies of the Universe, or do we perceive the Divine in something 
clear, something pared-down, something simple to observe and comprehend? 
Derkse makes the most useful point that there exists ‘an intricate relationship 
between the assumed role and status of simplicity and the ontological suppositions 
of one’s epistemology’ (Derkse, 1993, p.206). A not unreasonable criticism from 
those who deny the existence of God might be that in accepting this assertion I am 
perhaps mapping out a pathway to perceive of beauty in the manner God has 
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embedded a sense of simplicity in the natural world. I might effectively then be  
begging the question of where I am proposing to identify imprints of the Divine in my 
natural theology, if I were to then also suggest a degree of simplicity within certain 
areas of chemistry. Yet Derkse goes further and provides justification for such a 
theistic interpretation of the appearance of simplicity in the natural world. Although 
Derkse does not call it such, he goes on to define a natural theology by proceeding 
to state that ‘the sense of simplicity and beauty is a sign of the resonance between 
human rationality and the rationality of the ordered cosmos’. Note that he is here 
linking a human perception resident solely in the mind with a series of concrete 
physical phenomena. Can there be any other explanation of the bridge between the 
noetic makeup of the human (such that such a resonance is perceived and 
‘perceivable’) and the inanimate, the non-living rational structure of the cosmos, 
other than a metaphysical one? Yet that is not all, he then goes on to say that ‘the 
sense for[/of] simplicity is an almost metaphysical intuition for what is fitting and right. 
From this perspective an indicator of beauty is to be identified with an indicator of 
truth’ (Derkse, 1993, p.206). We have already elsewhere asserted that we wish to 
hold to a realist epistemology and Derkse here agrees that to appreciate simplicity in 
this way, as many scientists do, is to adhere to such a view. Thus I would assert that 
our natural theology is one that prizes simplicity (and as we shall see, elegance and 
beauty) not only for its own sake, yet also because of the fact that it is explicitly 
perceived as being so by the observer; that the observer has within in them the 
capacity to react positively to the value of simplicity, of beauty etc. 
Yet what of those arguments for the existence of God, the so-called arguments from 
design, which posit that certain named structures seen in the natural world are of 
such intricacy that their very existence indicates that ‘there must be a God who 
created them’? is there a ‘degree of complexity’ such that an item may have been 
created ‘naturally’ and then yet another greater degree of complexity such that the 
object now must have been created by God? Is it being suggested by those who put 
forward these arguments that lesser, simpler structures were allowed by God to 
develop in one manner, but that for others He intervened and introduced them fully 
formed into the natural world? Or is it that the Divine imprint is more easily seen in 
the complex structures, yet not so readily in the simple? William Paley in his natural 
theology was of course addressing this issue head-on. The index to his famous book 
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illustrates this only too well: he writes at length about the arrangement of muscles 
and the skeleton, of blood vessels in animals more generally. In one place he says: 
these provisions compose altogether an apparatus, a system 
of parts, a preparation of means, so manifest in their design, 
so exquisite in their contrivance, so successful in their issue, 
so precious, and so infinitely beneficial in their use, as, in my 
opinion, to bear down all doubt that can be raised upon the 
subject (Paley, 1881, p.57) 
He is here speaking of the human eye. (He goes on in the same place to explain that 
it is not merely a case of complexity but also of relationship, in that different parts 
only make sense within the whole).  
The apparent knockdown argument to Paley’s work was the mechanism suggested 
by Darwin which of course proposes random competitive incremental change over 
lengthy periods of time as the solution to how all this complexity came about. Yet 
against such an assertion, it proves difficult to characterise randomness. The most 
that can be said, as William Dembski remarks, is that something is ‘random to the 
best of our current understandings’ (Dembski, 2002, p.2). Such a conclusion is of 
importance in teleologically-derived arguments for the existence of God, and from 
this for questions about the prevalence of design in the natural world: it is not 
possible to prove that the emergence of life was a random event. 
Yet even if it were possible to prove the opposite, that the complexities of life show 
evidence of some form of design in the process of their emergence, what has been 
demonstrated? Perhaps if it could be shown that something was too complex to have 
emerged according to the known processes of evolutionary change, might this be 
sufficient to prove that the loving (Christian) God had created that ‘something’? 
Dembski has produced a statistical analysis (Dembski, 2002, pp.6-10) to show how 
unlikely it is that living objects expressing coordinated working of multiple co-
dependent complex components, could have arisen without the input of a designing 
‘agent’ or intelligent hand. Yet as he concludes, the prevailing culture within the 
academia of the biological sciences will not allow for the consideration of any other 
than a Darwinian basis for study, having ‘faith’ that where current understandings in 
evolutionary biology are incapable of explaining the emergence of particular complex 
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living systems, a mechanism is sure to emerge eventually to do so (Dembski, 2002, 
pp.22, 23). 
Yet even if or where, it is possible to demonstrate a mechanism, this is not in itself a 
comment upon agency. In this way, Alexander Rosenberg indicates that teleological 
explanations of physical interactions in the natural sciences are non-causal: if we 
have established or can reasonably hope to establish ‘causal laws’ Rosenberg 
believes, any question as to the ‘why’ of something is ‘unfounded’ (Rosenberg, 2005, 
p.59). He does not however immediately explain what a ‘causal law’ is: presumably it 
is a scientific principle with ontological status, something which is itself disputed.  
We seem to be going around in circles, evading any clarity of what the perception of 
‘complexity’ might bring to the search for a natural theology.  
It seems that demonstrating complexity on its own would not make for a sufficient 
natural theology to cause the non-theist to examine the claims for the existence of 
God. According to the criteria set out above, such a natural theology would be 
insufficiently accessible. Indeed is it truly complexity on its own which brings a sense 
of wonder? Consider cooled volcanic magma: it is indeed structurally highly complex 
and appears to be increasingly so with the ever greater violence of the quenching 
process. If the cooling process is slowed down, crystals have a chance to form. 
Suddenly there is order to the resulting rock and indeed that order might simply be 
great regularity as seen in smooth uniform marbles. Derkse speaks of the use of 
human intuition, the capacity of the human mind to analyse with both synthetic and 
unifying intent, which tames ‘unconnected variety’ in the discerning of pattern, of 
aspects of rhythm and harmony (Derkse, 1993, p.160). In this way he comments that 
science has the task of decomposition for the purposes of comprehension and 
recomposition in order to make use of it all. We seem to have arrived at a synthesis 
of simplicity with complexity: human cognition within a purposeful framework 
enlivened through its unique meta-physical insights, joyfully rationalises complexity 
as patterned beauty (Derkse, 1997, p.49), thus establishing pathways to truth. 
Drawing on our epistemological framework discussed above, perhaps such aesthetic 
activities as the rationalising of the complex, amount to apprehensions of the Divine: 
a realistic touching of the beauty of God in the natural world. Simplicity and 
complexity coexist - a similar instance of incommensurability as discussed above - 
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within the same set of observable entities. Arguments by for example Shook, who 
accuses theology of having to abandon science in order to explain (ever increasingly 
observed) complexities observed within nature (Shook, 2010, pp.98-99), may be set 
aside in the light of Derkse’s work. 
2.1.7 The Role of Aesthetics: of Elegance, Beauty and Wonder in Natural 
Theology 
The explanation offered by Darwinism of the origins of the complexities seen in the 
natural world as mentioned above, cannot explain away the sense of wonder felt at 
apprehending the intricacies uncovered. The remarkable fact of the human ability to 
be cognisant of these aesthetic properties and that they are markers for truth, has 
also been mentioned. John Barrow comments:  
The prospective properties of things [… he includes Beauty, 
simplicity, truth …] cannot be trammelled up within any 
logical Theory of Everything. No non-poetic account of reality 
can be complete. The scope of Theories of Everything is 
infinite but bounded; they are necessary parts of a full 
understanding of things but they are far from sufficient to 
reveal everything about a Universe like ours. (Barrow, 2007, 
p.245) 
Barrow is thus (re-)locating aesthetic concepts as possibly adjudicators in the field of 
theories (as of course Derkse also does), and specifically theories of the origin of the 
Universe. McGrath makes the link even more explicit: 
A strong doctrine of creation (such as that associated with 
Christianity) leads to the expectation of a fundamental 
convergence of truth and beauty in the investigation and 
explanation of the world, precisely on account of the 
grounding of that world in the nature of God. (McGrath, 
2001, p.240) 
McGrath helpfully gives examples in the same place of where researchers have 
made decisions on the basis of aesthetics which have led to revelations of essential 
(scientific) truth (again, Derkse comments upon this at length). This is important 
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because an oft-referred-to work by James McAllister (1989, p.47) places beauty 
alongside or below rationality in the quest for truth. McAllister (1989, p.25) appears 
mistaken in thinking that the discernment of elements of beauty in any selection of 
competing ’truthful’ theories, amounts to irrationality. McGrath demonstrates that this 
is not the case. McAllister formulated his paper apparently in the belief that aesthetic 
principles properly and successfully applied could amount to an attack on the 
rationalist model of science. 
In offering an explanation for the potential of aesthetic properties to be successful in 
being deciders for truthful theories or propositions, Rosenberg (2005, p.136) offers 
some supporting reflections from contemporary Bayesian theorising. In postulating a 
role for the experienced Bayesian researcher in making a priori choices that increase 
the calculated probability of a given proposition, is he not in fact suggesting that the 
experience of the more mature (in amount of work though not necessarily in age) 
researcher, is playing a role? And of course such researchers would then be 
suggesting that it was the aesthetic qualities of their examples, accumulated over 
time, which then led them to make more accurate predictions about the nature of the 
solution to the given current problem. Yet the mechanisms for creating Bayesian 
predictions are shown to be in some sense subjective (and possibly dare it even be 
said, subject to considerations of aesthetics: Rosenberg, 2005, p.141).  
One of the most modern of the physical sciences, neuroscience, might be thought to 
be the discipline that could complete Descartes’ work of destroying any notion that 
aesthetics and especially wonder, might lead us to truth. At the end of his 
neuroscientific study, Kelly Bulkeley in his ‘book about wonder’ (2005, p.3), shows 
that the opposite appears to be the case:  
Whatever feelings of wonder may be lost in the process of 
analysis, explanation and knowledge formation, the potential 
always exists for a renewed and expanded capacity for 
surprise amazement and curiosity. (Bulkeley, 2005, p.197) 
Thus wonder, beauty and elegance emerge again I would suggest, largely unscathed 
from criticism to be worthy arbiters of truth, when applied through the lens of 




2.1.8 The Place of Scripture in Natural Theology 
Texts from the Christian scriptures, the ‘Bible’, have been used above. Whilst 
recognising that not all authors accept that the Bible is sustaining of natural theology, 
it is necessary to provide a scriptural basis for the current project. This will be done 
partly here and partly within the section on theologies in Chemistry below. 
This division is necessary because we are here concerned with natural theology 
within our epistemological framework - a framework that specifically is seeking to put 
forward a rational case for the Christian faith outside of any special knowledge or 
revealed truth about the faith. 
Yet if it is the Christian faith that I wish to argue for here, then it must plainly be 
Christian and not simply theist. The question then becomes ‘at which point in the 
discussion - between the Christian and the “honest enquirer” - does “god-talk” 
become “Christ talk”’? If, using an understanding developed from the work of 
Brümmer (1992), we are waiting for our enquirer to conclude that there is a 
transcendent God even if s/he cannot deduce it, and if we are saying that such a 
conclusion can only come about because God has formed it within them (because 
‘faith is the gift of God’ Ephesians 2.8), it follows that the God our enquirer is 
responding to, is the God who is (self-)revealed in Christ. Such a response is taking 
place immediately before God ‘names himself’ to them.  Francis Collins offers a 
touching and powerful account of this process (Collins, 2009, pp.3-9): the enquirer is 
beginning to suspect that there is ‘something more’ than what they can logically 
deduce from their natural surroundings, somewhat more than their scientific research 
tells them is there. 
Here we can combine the work of both Brümmer and Plantinga and state that 
against the positivists, knowledge can and does extend beyond that which we can 
perceive through our physical senses. 
The God being argued for in this natural theology is revealed to us in the Incarnation 
as the Christ, and communicated to us in and through the Spirit, who in the Christian 
orthodox understanding was the ‘master builder’ (Proverbs 8.30), God Himself, at 
work in Creation at the beginning, in the Genesis 1 and 2 accounts. God is delighting 
in His handiwork [see also Alan Richardson (1953, p. 50)]. Furthermore as Patrick 
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Sherry remarks, in considering Proverbs 3.16-18 it is noticeable that this pericope in 
describing Wisdom says: 
Long life is in her right hand; in her left hand are riches and 
honour. Her ways are very pleasant [from the Hebrew נַֹעם : 
no’am, see below] and all her paths are peaceful (Sherry, 
2002, p.57) 
Although the beauty of God both in classic and contemporary writing is well attested 
to, the phrase ‘God is beauty’ or ‘God is beautiful’ does not appear in scripture, 
whereas for example ‘God is love’, plainly does (Sherry, 2002, p. 56). Does this pose 
a problem? I believe it does not and illustrates how God is written about on account 
of how He acts towards individuals: God is not often portrayed for example as ‘lovely’ 
although God is love. Similarly there is a ‘something’ about how God is manifest  - 
how God communicates Himself - to individuals under certain circumstances that 
elicits the property ‘beautiful’ from them when asked to describe how God should be 
understood and moreover how His Creation should be framed. This ‘communication’ 
is the key: where beauty is spoken of in relation to God in the Hebrew bible it is 
frequently as He is experienced when those who speak of Him, feel that they are in 
His presence (see for example Psalm 27.4 and also Berlin and Brettler, 2004, p. 
1311). By way of confirmation see also Psalm 73.25 for example, where the one in 
God’s presence speaks of his ‘delight’ (chaphets) at being there, having gone into 
the temple for the express purpose of communing with God and having previously 
been unable to make sense of their own predicament (Psalm 73.16-18). Taken 
together and as a result, the words used to describe being in God’s presence are 
given in response to this underlying cause and those words are multiple: Sherry 
gives several examples including (using his transliterations) hah-dahr (see Psalm 
145.5); tiphahrah (see Psalm 96.6); yophee (see Psalm 50.2) as well as no’am as 
already explained. Thus theologically the witness of scripture is that the beauty of 
God is a something that is communicated as a result of being in God’s presence, in 
the sense of being blessed by God with His presence. As a result, as Claus 
Westermann explains, beauty in Scripture is perceived as ’event’ rather than as 
‘being’ and with that is distinct from for example the appreciation of objets d’art 
(Westermann, 1997, p. 585). And this blessing ‘means abundance, wealth, thriving, 
success, exuberance; and this includes beauty in a variety of ways’ (Westermann, 
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1997, p. 586). It is in the poetic language of scripture, which includes the Psalms as 
mentioned in Sherry’s work above and especially ‘in the collections of Proverbs - yet 
not only there - [that] the description of beauty is expressed by … rich and abundant 
language’ (Westermann, 1997, p. 597). Thus multiple Hebrew words are used to 
describe beauty, since this sense of blessing, of being blessed by God, is 
communicated by Him in many ways as illustrated below: 
  











































And in the poetry of Proverbs, we see a proliferation of similitudes where beauty is 
repeatedly compared to wisdom (Westermann, 1997, pp. 597, 598). Expanding on 
such similitudes Westermann goes on to note that we:  
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can find parable and comparison in …. the love song 
[meaning the Song of Songs], the Psalms, the sayings of the 
prophets. Every explicated similitude is poetry: an event is 
compared to one that has occurred in another realm, and 
thus the one is illuminated by the other or helps to explain 
the other. (Westermann, 1997, p. 598) 
And as Westermann observes in the same place, whilst there are many words used 
to speak about these events of beauty, they are all in fact illustrative of God’s story, 
his narrative (even some narrative can be seen as poetry, see p. 600), his works, 
amongst his people. 
Since in 1 Corinthians 1.24 Christ is described as ‘the wisdom of God’ and in 
Ephesians 2.14 as ‘our peace’, and since it is the Spirit of God who communicates 
Christ to the world, it is justified to assert that the Christian Trinitarian God imparts 
beauty to the ways of Creation [Sherry, 2002, pp.70-72, and see also Tom Schreiner 
(2013, p. 299) for a brief discussion around the personification of Christ in Proverbs 
8.22 and the Christian New Testament]. As Westermann observes, beauty ‘is an 
intrinsic quality of the creation …. because the creation is beautiful in the eyes of 
God’ (Westermann, 1997, p. 587). Thus God is self-revealed through a blessing: this 
blessing being the gift of perceptions of beauty sensed in creation. 
Crucial to the arguments advanced in this present book is Sherry’s further 
observation in the same place that ‘the ascription of divine beauty is made as a 
result of experiences of worldly beauty, which is regarded as reflecting divine beauty’ 
- occurring in Westermann’s ‘other realm’ (see above). This overwhelming and at 
times sudden assault upon the senses that is beauty, being God Himself who is 
being apprehended in this way, is expressed thus in the Psalm 27.4: 
I have asked the Lord for one thing – this is what I desire! I 
want to live in the Lord’s house all the days of my life, so I 
can gaze at the splendour of the Lord and contemplate in his 
temple. 
In connection with this, what is exciting is that the Psalmist is contemplating this 
aspect of God in Creation, of Christ, by ‘faith’ in the sense that this aspect of God’s 
beauty is not seen in the visible. Such an apprehension of beauty is in some 
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measure similar to that same aspect of beauty in chemistry. Such beauty is held in 
the mind’s eye and not by sight, since of course the molecules and processes, the 
novel compounds, are being appreciated and yet are not seen. 
Now both the realism of the beautiful and its being perceived, clash headlong at the 
vision of Christ, as Jozef Wissink relates: 
Would a theological reflection on the person and work of 
Christ not be leaving something substantial out, if it were 
accompanied by a complete refusal to consider the glory and 
beauty of both the person and the work? [Laat een 
theologische reflectie over persoon en werk van Christus 
niet iets wezenlijks weg, als er geheel niet wordt nagedacht 
over de heerlijkheid en schoonheid van deze persoon en dit 
werk?] (Wissink, 1993, p. 11) 
This is a rhetorical question that demands a loud affirmative reply. Wissink says this 
in the context of reminding his readers of the words of Isaiah as follows: 
He sprouted up like a twig before God, like a root out of 
parched soil; he had no stately form or majesty that might 
catch our attention, no special appearance that we should 
want to follow him. (Isaiah 53.2) 
Thus we should not be looking to an oxymoronic response to the visual tragedy of 
the flogging and crucifixion of Jesus on Good Friday when beholding His beauty, but 
rather accepting of the tensions and straining of our understanding of what beauty 
actually is, as Wissink acknowledges in the same place. Christ in his person creates 
this contrast between what is anecdotally one understanding of beauty, and that truth 
of beauty which is resolved in Himself. Likewise Sherry reminds us that Karl Barth in 
reflecting on this self-same pericope also speaks of Christ in Incarnation as revealing 
the beauty of God (Sherry, 2002, p. 74). 
Note the following more paradigmatic view of scripture and beauty: 
The message of the Scriptures is not only that Yahweh is 
king over his people but also that his people will see the King 
in his beauty, that they will revel in his promise, and that 
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knowing him will be all-satisfying. The Edenic and 
paradisiacal love between a man and a woman is the closest 
analogy on earth to the delights and pleasures of the love 
that marks Christ’s relationship to the church. (Schreiner,  
2013, p. 319) 
Schreiner later conflates this ‘King in his beauty’ with Christ as the ‘new David’ 
presiding over a ‘new Eden’ (Schreiner, 2013, p. 363-364).  
Thus the natural theology I develop here, being one that accentuates the beautiful, is 
commensurate with the Christ revealed through the Spirit, in those scriptures. In this 
way if something within nature is perceived to be beautiful, it is the Christ who gave it 
form: ‘the beauty of Christ makes manifest His own watermark within creation, since 
by Him and through Him all things were, are, and continue to be’ (Ward, 2003, p. 43). 
If complexity or indeed simplicity (within the meaning of so-called ‘arguments from 
design’ or the teleological arguments) are aspects of this beauty, it is Christ that 
gives rise to these appreciations. If part of a natural world which appears capable of 
being engineered to create chemical compounds, the ingenuity of which fascinates 
the chemist that synthesises them, is it not Christ causing this to be so? And of 
course as Jesus Himself said of the paraclete: the Spirit would take from Him and 
impart it to His followers (John 16.14-15). 
Immediately it is obvious that we are speaking of aspects or properties that are so 
perceived from our perspective: things/events/objects are variously simple, complex, 
beautiful, cause wonder, are seen as intricate - all from a human perspective, some 
thinking they are so and others pleased to quell their enthusiasms in the name of 
knowledge. Thus and again, I am speaking of matters in the natural world, that I am 
calling others to appreciate - in the course of our conversation - in a similar way as I 
do. Yet I belong to one of Wynn’s ‘communities of trust’ where centuries of reflection 
and living according to consistent (orthodox Christian) principles have, through 
everyday experience, taught us that Christ is alive and active in some real and 
realistic sense, within the temporal sphere He has created. 
We might think of God as ‘undifferentiated purposefulness’ (see Wynn, 1999, p.155). 
For example when we say, after scripture, that ‘God is love’, He is always thus 
(meaning He was love in the 18th century and is love in the 21st and in all places). 
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Since I uphold the notion that God upholds, projects, the Universe, it is inconceivable 
that the truths we know of God (for example that ‘God is love’), should not be true 
and discernible in this temporal sphere, as they are in the sphere that He inhabits, 
meaning that these must be true at all times. And similarly it would surely be absurd 
if any vestigial appreciations of the aesthetic welling-up within humans ‘created in 
His image’ did not emanate from the Christ who formed them, being in this way 
communicated by the Spirit who discloses them. 
Yet there are difficulties: if ‘God is love’ some might say, why are there wars or 
earthquakes? In what way is my natural theology to cope with tragedy? If God is 
alive and active in this temporal sphere, is He affected by it or not? In what manner 
is God like us, and in what way different; is He ‘far away’ or is He near? Does our 
natural theology affect the rocks of planets and the gasses of stars or does it only 
come into play in the interactions between people? These are important issues 
because they define the type of Universe we inhabit and inform our expectations of 
what a non-theistic person, indeed a non-Christian person, might be expected to be 
able to perceive of God, by simply observing the natural world. The Christian Natural 
Theologian speaks and the non-theist listens; the non-theist speaks and the 
Christian listens - one inhabits a space where God is discerned and spoken to 
(hopefully) daily (or more frequently) and the other at first might think that only what 
can be tested physically, is what is real and true: the Christian must know and 
understand in what way their friend is to meet the one they the Christian knows, but 
which the non-Christian cannot perceive. And so their discourse is as though there is 
no revelation, yet the Christian knows God is speaking within the conversation. 
And so how are we to understand human contingencies within the Divine certainties 
of the rules that govern the Universe? Or to put it in another way, how might the 
eternal never-changing God be revealed and perceived within the dynamic 
environment which is the chemical reaction or in human relationships? 
In his commentary Oliver O’Donovan remarks: 
…. in speaking of the order which God the Creator and 
Redeemer has established in the universe, we are not 
speaking merely of our own capacities to impose order upon 
what we see there. Of course, we can and do impose order 
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upon what we see, for we are free agents and capable of 
creative interpretation of the world we confront. But our 
ordering depends upon God’s to provide the condition for its 
freedom. It is free because it has a given order to respond to 
in attention or disregard, in conformity or disconformity, with 
obedience or with rebellion. (O’Donovan, 1986, pp.36-37) 
Thus it can be seen that it is our own attitude ‘of heart’ which then regulates our 
perceptions of this God-imposed order, indeed of the world around us. We can 
choose to ‘see things as God would have us perceive them’ or we may rebel and 
choose not to. Perhaps we might go so far as to suggest that the non-Christian 
person, in seeing things as God would have us do, is beginning to be susceptible to 
revelation (Romans 2.14-16). Furthermore in being ourselves responsible for the 
ordering of what we see, and understanding that this ordering is according to a God-
given freedom, it is not necessarily Godly. Importantly, the Universe is shown to be 
‘ordered’ only within the perception of the human. And of course O’Donovan has not 
said here what is also evident, which is that the concept of ‘order’ within human 
freedom might itself be an entirely human construct. If this is the case then a person 
could only have such an appreciation of order, as a result of God revealing that to 
them. Thus in the context of the theme of this book, within a single conversation, the 
non-Christian and the Christian are conversing as if over a wall: the start of a 
willingness to see the Universe according to a God-given perception leads to a 
transformation (see Romans 12.2) in our abilities to ‘see’. Scripture therefore gives 
us to understand, indeed leads us to the point of, a new type of ‘sight’, where all of 
Creation is seen to be ‘of God’. This is the ‘appropriate conformity of human 
response to divine act’ (O’Donovan, 1986, p.36) amongst those of the Christian faith. 
Thus it should not come as a surprise to hear the Christian arguing for perceptions, 
indeed interpretations of more generic perceptions, of the natural world, as being a 
necessary consequence of knowing the God through whom the Universe was 
created (see Hebrews 2.10). 
It is precisely on account of the understandings gained by reading the cosmology of 
Psalm 8 through this Epistle to the Hebrews, that O’Donovan is able to say that the 
unknown writer of this quasi-Sermon ‘sees in Christ ….. the vindication and perfect 
manifestation of the created order which was always there but never fully expressed’ 
 
76 
and importantly for our present discussion that the ‘elusiveness of that order in our 
experience did not mean that it had no kind of existence. It existed from the 
beginning in God’s creative conception’ (O’Donovan, 1986, p.53). As a result we can 
agree with the Epistle to the Hebrews, that Christ is the first and final cause of the 
ordered cosmos (Hebrews 2.10 and see also O’Donovan again in same place). The 
reader will note that I am using ‘order’ in differing ways here. Order as in ‘created 
order’, is plainly used to allude to the Universe or ‘Creation’ more widely. But 
O’Donovan’s ‘order’ as used in for example the ‘order which God has created in the 
Universe’, has to do with the laws God has embedded in the frameworks of Creation 
and of which our knowledge is necessarily contingent. 
Thus in conclusion on this point we can reliably assert that from a Christian 
Scriptural perspective, all of the natural world speaks of Christ as communicated to 
us through the Spirit of God. As Christopher Rowland remarks, scripture testifies ‘to 
the divine being discerned through the ordinary course of nature, whether that be the 
physical world, or human intercourse and the various modes of human engagement’ 
(Rowland, 2013, p.28). Rowland then helpfully underlines this aspect of the 
challenge biblical texts provide to the ‘worldy’ or normative way of ‘seeing’: they are 
‘effective texts  … they persuade, disturb, and elicit praise, a sense of awe or 
injustice … their purpose is to awaken people to life reflecting the divine image, by 
drawing readers into the dynamic of communication ….’ (Rowland, 2013, p.28) - all 
of which is a renewed encouragement to use the present approach of a natural 
theology as a means of facilitating a conversation. Such a conversation within the 
adopted natural theological framework once again does not seek to prove the 
existence of the Christian God, but through (as Rowland remarks) persuasion and 
challenge encourages our non-Christian chemist researcher to recognise within their 
experienced sense of awe, something of ‘life reflecting the divine image’. 
2.1.9 An Interim Conclusion: which Natural Theology? 
It would be useful to categorise natural theologies more generally to ascertain where 
this current study sits in terms of such explorations. This would then allow an 
appropriate natural theology to be selected as a vehicle for the use of chemistry in 
an extension or enhancement of that natural theology.  
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It can be difficult to define precisely what a natural theology is, although as Re 
Manning (2013, p.1) has demonstrated this does not stop one going on to edit a 
large volume on the subject. The objective of this book is to describe the 
development of a conversation between the scientist and the Christian, more 
specifically in this case aided by and through chemistry. Such a conversation is not 
static across the centuries and is re-invented for each generation or change of public 
philosophical outlook (Casserley, 1955, p.1). The essentials of the Faith are 
unchanging yet the manner of their presentation alters for each generation: both for 
the Christian proposing the natural theology and the non-Christian listening. 
From Re Manning we can safely assume that those approaches tackled in his 
Handbook (2013) are indeed natural theologies, at least to some. His categorisations 
are made thus: Historical, Theological, Philosophical, Scientific and Aesthetic. 
Having divided all theologies more generally into the revelational and the rational, L 
Harold deWolf (1958) expands upon Casserley’s (1955, pp. 2-3) classification of four 
broad categories of natural theology (1. an intellectual debate internal to the mind, 2. 
an argument using observations of the natural world, 3. a theology of nature 
sufficient in its cogency to convince the non-Christian of the Reality underlying it, 4. 
relating a similarity between an experience of the natural world and an experience of 
the world of Christian Faith) by adding a 5th, being the ‘philosophical evaluation of 
doctrines believed to be revealed’. DeWolf mentions William Temple as proposing 
this particular development, and hence I suggest that it might include for example, 
demonstrating how social action in showing love of neighbour might rationally be 
explained as having been derived from the revealed doctrine of Christ sacrificially 
giving Himself to humanity on the Cross. 
If we might briefly consider this classification: an example of type 1 might include 
Anselm’s Ontological Proof; type 2, the Cosmological argument or arguments from 
complexity; I offer no examples of type 3, although see section discussing some of 
William Dembski’s work below; type 4 would include considerations like those of 
Pannenberg given above as well as Guy Bennett-Hunter’s (2014) treatise on 
Ineffability and finally type 5, where by way of example I offer the effect upon 
appreciations of the ways of Creation resulting from a philosophical evaluation of the 
revealed doctrine of the Trinity. I appeal to this latter form of natural theology as 
being most likely to make an appeal both emotionally and logically within the context 
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of the proposed conversation between the natural theologian and enquiring chemical 
researcher. This then is how ‘natural theology’ is understood in the context of this 
present book. It has the elements as described in the sections above and rests upon 
the epistemological basis as delineated in chapter 1. It is new in that it does not seek 
to prove God’s existence. It is new in that although being a type of the ’argument 
from design’, it does not concern itself with complexity. 
In this way, I would agree with for example Dembski’s commentary on CSI (Complex 
Specified Information in natural systems, most notably biology) that this does show 
that ‘natural causes are incapable of generating [the] CSI [they nonetheless exhibit]’ 
(Dembski, 1999, pp. 153, 170): I find this a convincing argument. Yet my 
acknowledgement of the worth of such analysis, does not cause me per se to enter 
into a relationship with Christ. I offer this example most certainly not because I 
endorse Dembski’s wider thesis and philosophy, but merely by way of illustration that 
not all arguments from design have an immediate appeal; they can appear overly 
complex to an honest enquirer and are not as accessible I would suggest as the 
treatment I am proposing here centred on apprehensions of beauty. Similarly with, as 
recounted by Richard Southern, Anselm’s Ontological argument (Southern, 1990, 
pp.127-137) - it makes sense, indeed even Bertrand Russell said this argument ‘is to 
be treated with respect’ (Russell, 1961, p.411), yet it is hard to see how this alone 
might cause me to fall in love with the Christ who gave Himself for me (Galatians 
2.20). Perhaps these are the natural theologies more suited to a quieter age, an age 
that allowed one to believe that sharply drawn proofs based on the order perceived 
in the Universe, would generally appeal. It is this sense of the simplicity of an age 
where such language was used (as in ‘sharply drawn’), which ‘is passing’ (Murphy 
and McClendon, 1989, p. 191). Nancey Murphy and James McClendon, in a paper 
which is now seen to be seminal, go on to modify a diagram showing ‘modern’ 
theologies in a two dimensional space (ibid., p. 196) by adding the third dimension 
(ibid. p.199), the result being that according to formal vector mathematics, such 
‘postmodern’ theologies may show components reminiscent of variously for example 
representationalism, collectivism and foundationalism or again of skepticism, 
individualism and expressivism - for the purposes of this present argument, the detail 
is less important than the fact that human thought and comprehension of the Divine, 
is no longer rigid, simple and two-dimensional, but may be multi-layered and 
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complex, even contradictory. Yet overall such theologies show ‘holism in 
epistemology, the relation of meaning to use in philosophy of language, and the 
discovery of an organic ….. view of community … - a corporate metaphysics’ 
(Murphy and McClendon, 1989, p. 199)  - all of which have been put forward in the 
chosen epistemology described above. 
The beauty of such a position, of such a natural theology, is that it deals with all of 
the person: someone living within a web of relationships, who is possibly both 
scientist and mother, chemist and theologian, teacher and student, lover and 
beloved, sinner and saint, ‘both-and’ rather than ‘either-or’ (Casserley, 1955, p. 22): a 
person Christ Incarnate came to be in relationship with. More than this, it should be 
noted that Christ was made to be like humans (Hebrews 2.17, 1 Timothy 2.5, see 
also Brown, Fitzmyer and Murphy, 1990, pp.1317-1319) and that as such we should 
be seeking for a certain human quality in our chosen natural theology if it is to be 
reflective of Christ. Such ‘human qualities’ Wynn terms ‘evaluative responses’: 
Contemporary alienation from religion reflects, I suggest, not 
so much the sense that it lacks evidential support, but rather 
the belief that it is of no real consequence existentially. And 
any natural theology which appeals merely to the abstract 
intellect rather than drawing upon a range of affective and 
evaluative responses to the world is likely to contribute to 
this sense that religious belief lacks existential depth  
And for the point of view of this present study helpfully goes on to say: 
Now of the traditional natural theological arguments, it is the 
design argument which is most naturally associated with an 
evaluatively engaged response to the world. The ontological 
argument is after all purely a priori, making no reference to 
the quality of our experience (Wynn, 1999, p.3) 
This is precisely the point being made above about the lack of efficacy of certain of 
the natural theological arguments in formulating a conversation between the 
Christian and the non-Christian chemist.  
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As a result I am not wanting to appeal to ‘regularity understood abstractly or a quasi-
mechanical conception of the world’ as I explained in the discussions on order 
above, but rather to the particular sense of an evaluation of beauty, that ‘the world is 
a locus of value’ (Wynn, 1999, p. 15). Of this value, the physicist Andrew Steane 
suggests in a dialogue reminiscent of those employed by the ancient Greek 
philosophers: 
[A] We seem to be a long way from the argument from 
design. 
[B] Not so very far. I have just admitted that all arguments 
from design can only suggest a very restricted amount about 
God, and then one has the problem of pain. 
[A] But you are saying that, if one argues not from particular 
physical structures, but from the human intimation of 
meaning and value, then the arguments are at least 
suggestive. 
[B] Yes.  
(Steane, 2014, p.159) 
Such a version of the argument should ‘not appeal simply to the disengaged intellect, 
and only as an afterthought’ and in addition should have this ‘evaluative commitment 
built into its premises’ (Wynn, 1999, p. 15). 
And so the version of the design argument - for that is what it is - being proposed 
here, is not of the traditional type: there is no appeal to intricacy or complexity as I 
mentioned for example in Dembski’s work above. There is by contrast an appeal to 
the power of similarity (allowing for truth-conducive links to be established between 
the worlds of science and ‘evangelical’ or Faith experience, see Casserley, 1955, p. 
3) and it references the experience of people in their everyday lives. It is a natural 
theology that puts forward a suggestive argument (see Steane above) utilising the 
‘human intimation of meaning and value’, specifically in this case the meaning and 
value attached to intimations of beauty. There is then above all, here posed the 
question about the nature, the quality of, indeed the wonder of the fact of the 
existence of, the evaluative response within the human mind. This lies at the core of 
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the natural theology being proposed to be used in a survey of current research in a 
narrow branch of the chemical sciences. 
2.1.10 The Place and Function of this Natural Theology 
We have thus-far spoken of the desired components of a natural theology. It has 
already been noted above that natural theology, as a major evidential anchor for 
justified belief in God, was previously one of the main methods in use within a 
foundationalist approach to the justification of a rational belief in God. As such this 
was the face of justification being presented to the non-Christian public, yet it does 
not answer the question as to why such an approach might be thought the most 
efficacious to be presented, from a Christian perspective. In other words, why would 
the Christian think that a natural theology was the most effective method of engaging 
a non-Christian in questions about God’s existence? Answering this question will 
now be attempted. Doing so successfully will enable us to link the overall proposed 
epistemological approach for this project as explored in the first section, with an 
appropriate Christian theological underpinning. 
Consider the familiar opening words of Psalm 19: 
The heavens declare the glory of God; 
the sky displays his handiwork. 
Day after day it speaks out; 
night after night it reveals his greatness. 
There is no actual speech or word, 
nor is its voice literally heard. 
Yet its voice echoes throughout the earth; 
its words carry to the distant horizon. 
These words encapsulate so much of what it means for a Christian to contemplate 
nature and see therein the Divine imprint. Below I develop an argument for linking 
certain perceptions of one part of the physical world with the God that created it, and 
yet here in this Psalm written perhaps twenty-five or more centuries ago, the writer 
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has already achieved that objective by linking the declarative ‘heavens’ with God’s 
law in the two halves of this Psalm. As Konrad Schaefer remarks: 
… the two halves answer the question, what is the source of 
revelation? The response is twofold, nature and God’s 
revealed law. The tôrȃh embraces natural revelation, yet 
transcends it as it restores the soul and teaches wisdom. 
The cosmic and moral orders are complementary spheres of 
God’s design; the two can be contemplated in the visible 
world and within the moral fibre of the heart (Schaefer, 2001, 
p.45) 
In reflecting on that Divine imprint seen in nature, it has already been noted above in 
considering prudential accounts of religious epistemology, that arguments that might 
be effective in attracting an enquirer to consider the claims of Christianity, will neither 
be sustaining for that person in the longer term (should they decide to follow the faith 
in practice), nor be operative in an existing Christian’s day-to-day practice of their 
faith. In considering the function of a natural theology within a person’s epistemic 
understanding, it is thus obvious that there are tensions between what might make 
such a person ask questions about the Faith, and what provides ‘proof’ or justified 
true belief in the God of that Faith. 
It is therefore sensible to expand upon what our developed natural theology is, and is 
for. We have already stated that it is not there to prove that God exists. Our rationale 
for a natural theology has to deal with the growth in faith of one who is already a 
believer, as well as the complexities of an individual’s search for belief. On this 
schema a natural theology has functions both for Christians as well as ‘enquirers’ 
about the Faith. This twin functionality has importance in our consideration of 
objections to natural theology which we shall address below. 
When the father of a boy suffering from what we might perhaps today characterise 
as a form of epilepsy had a conversation with Jesus about his condition, Mark’s 
Gospel reports the encounter thus: 
Jesus asked his father, “How long has this been happening 
to him?” And he said, “From childhood. It has often thrown 
him into fire or water to destroy him. But if you are able to do 
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anything, have compassion on us and help us.” Then Jesus 
said to him, “‘If you are able?’ All things are possible for the 
one who believes.” Immediately the father of the boy cried 
out and said, “I believe; help my unbelief!”  (Mark 9.21-24) 
Plainly as recounted here, the father was not a militant unbelieving person. In the 
face of a requirement set out by Jesus, to separate the normally accepted course of 
events (that the boy may eventually and almost inevitably suffer some fatal injury), 
from the far more hopeful outcome offered by himself, the father struggled to grasp 
the possibility that the complete physical cure of his son’s condition was on offer. 
This short quotation is offered to illustrate that what is seen, is capable of being 
interpreted in a variety of ways. McGrath also makes this important point: 
…. apologetics is grounded in the resonance of worldview 
and observation, with the Christian way of seeing things 
being affirmed to offer a robust degree of empirical fit with 
what is actually observed – the “best explanation” of a 
complex and multifaceted phenomenon. This basic 
approach can be seen in John Polkinghorne’s discussion of 
the capacity of various world-views to make sense of various 
aspects of reality, using four criteria of excellence: economy, 
scope, elegance, and fruitfulness. Polkinghorne here 
invokes theism as a more powerful explanatory tool than 
naturalism, and holds that a trinitarian theism is superior to a 
more generic theism in this respect (McGrath, 2008, p.17) 
McGrath goes on to show that for some Christian people, a natural theology affirms 
an existing belief whereas for other believers it might seem to have some ‘apologetic 
potential’ (as has already been related above). A natural theology according to this 
schema does not constitute a ‘proof’ of God’s existence yet rather as the ‘best fit’ for 
observed phenomena (McGrath, 2008, pp.16-18). (We must be careful here not to 
translate ‘best fit’ into ‘best bet’ and alter a belief sincerely held in the truths of the 




McGrath however goes beyond the bounds of an intellectual assent to the claims of 
a Christian natural theology by saying: 
More recently, the waning of modernity has provided a 
congenial context for the liberation of natural theology, so 
that its deep intrinsic appeal to the human imagination may 
be realized. Natural theology is to be understood to include 
the totality of the human engagement with the natural world, 
embracing the human quest for truth, beauty, and goodness.  
We invoke the so-called “Platonic triad” of truth, beauty, and 
goodness as a heuristic framework for natural theology. 
When properly understood, a renewed natural theology 
represents a distinctively Christian way of beholding, 
envisaging, and above all appreciating the natural order, 
capable of sustaining a broader engagement with the 
fundamental themes of human culture in general. While 
never losing sight of its moorings within the Christian 
theological tradition, natural theology can both inform and 
transform the human search for the transcendent, and 
provide a framework for understanding and advancing the 
age-old human quest for the good, the true, and the 
beautiful. (McGrath, 2008, p.19) 
Now perhaps we might start to comprehend perhaps both what a natural theology is 
and is for: it is an answer to the wonder felt by those who take the time to 
contemplate the natural world (see also Wynn, 1999, p. 156 where we see this 
wonder presented as Christian worship, now shown to be a rational response to a 
’designer’ who provides a ‘causally effective summation of the nature of existence’, 
whilst also ‘Comprising a synthesis of the perfections which are manifest in 
creation’). There is something about the human condition that allows for a person to 
have an ‘intrinsic’ response to the glories of nature. [Intriguingly for the present 
argument, Pierre Laszlo (2003, p.12) tells us that ‘Chemistry …. might be defined 
from the wondering at change’, something we will have cause to reflect upon below. 
Speaking of the syntax used by this commentator, given that he says elsewhere in 
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the same article: ‘About ten thousand protein structures populate already this world’ 
(sic) I believe it safe to assume that the first quote might respectfully be emended to 
read ‘Chemistry …. might be defined as the wondering at change’, which assumption 
also fits the context.]. And for later use in this book we might also note McGrath’s 
apparently sympathetic acceptance of a distinctly platonic ideal.  
Thus in conclusion here, the natural theology I am developing takes the chemist’s 
‘wondering at change’, mixes it with the sense of beauty that they feel at what they 
have discovered and then directs these thoughts towards the notion that [a] God is 
responsible. Yet I have gone beyond this: it is not only that God is responsible but 
that the Christ through whom the Universe was made, can ultimately be perceived in 
those beauties of Creation. Thus the telos of the natural theology is the hope that it 
might become revealed theology, that God might graciously reveal Himself to such 
an enquirer. Such a journey however cannot start and end with natural theology. The 
latter as I am proposing it here starts for the chemist with questioning at the wonder 
and the beauty, and ends with a conviction that whilst they may not agree, at least 
the natural theological argument as presented is epistemically rational and 
intelligible. 
2.1.11 Christian Objections to Natural Theology 
In this book we are seeking to inform a natural theology with insights from the 
chemical sciences. Yet not all Christian authors agree that natural theology is a 
suitable epistemic strategy for an exploration of the Christian faith. It has already 
been noted that those in the Reformed Epistemology school avoid natural theology. 
Why might they think in this manner and in what way could these and similar 
objections to natural theology impinge upon this project?  
The Enlightenment sought to anchor knowledge in the efforts of the individual to 
rationalise and to reason. It wanted humankind to be free from - as it saw it, the - 
ancient hegemonies of religion and patriarchalism. In so doing it forced religion to 
conform to its methodologies and adopt a schema of rationality in its defence of the 
right to believe in God. As a result this ‘right to believe’ became the pressure to prove 
God’s existence, because the Enlightenment taught that only what one could prove, 
could test, was worthy of consideration. Thus a natural theology became the basis 
for such a proof of God’s existence. I have already indicated that this need to prove 
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God’s existence is not a fruitful object of this study because theologically such a 
proof would not and could not by itself be sufficient to lead to faith in Christ. This 
form or type of natural theology specifically is therefore not useful in this present 
book. From a Christian perspective, such an argument, even if it could be produced, 
would not result in ‘faith towards God’ (Hebrews 6.1), since salvation is God’s gift by 
grace (Ephesians 2.8) and is not attained as a result of a reasoned encounter 
utilising human arguments (see also 1 Corinthians 1.18-25 which would further 
appear to rule out salvation through reason alone).  
And yet this project affirms the desirability of support for many of the varied forms of 
natural theology as vehicles for alerting enquirers to God’s (possible) presence and 
actions in the world. 
Putting the arguments for a natural theology in this way - that it points people 
towards God - is an attempt to circumvent certain Reformed objections to natural 
theology. Consequently this section of the project is attempting to accurately locate a 
viable natural theology within our epistemic framework. As such we are only 
interested in reviewing these Reformed objections in so far as they permit us to 
attain that goal of identifying a natural theology. 
Michael Sudduth has provided a helpful survey of these objections. As he says 
‘reformed criticisms of natural theology have typically not targeted the project of 
natural theology as such but rather a certain construal of this project’ (Sudduth, 
2009, p.38). He goes on to tell us that Reformed thinkers (rightly in my view) reject 
any enterprise, as I have just remarked, which seeks to enable a knowledge of God 
that is achieved or obtained outside of the grace of God in Christ: they maintain that 
coming to faith in Christ is enabled at God’s initiative. Thus the crucial point here is 
that ‘grace and truth came about through Jesus Christ. No one has ever seen God. 
The only one, himself God, who is in closest fellowship with the Father, has made 
God known’ (John 1.17-18). Sudduth does not here place objections to the use of 
natural theology, voiced famously by Karl Barth (1946), and see also McGrath, 2001, 
pp. 267-272, in the context of the German Confessing Church of the 1930s where 
Barth was attempting to hold onto orthodoxy in the face of a National Socialist 
attempt to construct a religion of their own that might ‘deceive even if possible the 
elect’ (Mark 13.22). Colin Gunton delineates Barth’s objections rather elegantly:  
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Barth is rejecting the beliefs of those proponents of natural 
theology whose procedure presupposes that there is 
between divine and non-divine reality such community of 
nature that the knowledge of the former can be read off the 
latter without particular divine initiative (Gunton, 1978, pp. 
153, 154) 
And thus the argument here must employ a degree of subtlety: yes, Barth was 
emphatic in his rejection of natural theology but we need to accurately understand 
the milieu in which the discussions were taking place and the type of natural 
theology under consideration. In this manner, Barth conflated an acceptance of 
natural theology as being that which could be ‘decisive’ in someone’s decision to 
become a Christian, with Emil Brunner’s apparent acquiescence to the aims of 
various groups of National Socialists who were calling themselves ‘German 
Christians’ in the Germany of the early 1930s. As is entirely consistent with Barth’s 
own soteriology more generally, salvation is through Christ alone - only a revelation 
of Christ is decisive in that sense - and not arrived at in a religiously syncretic 
manner within German history as well. Thus as Christoph Dahling-Sander points out 
both through an analysis of Barth’s and Brunner’s published theological views on the 
matter (Fraenkel, 1946) as well as through a reading of Barth’s personal 
correspondence of the time, these matters ‘are thus not capable of being separated 
from each other’ (Dahling-Sander 1999, pp.12-13 and see also McGrath, 2001, p. 
281). This is unfortunate in our present discussions because as Barth himself makes 
clear ‘natural theology is always the answer to a question which is false if it wishes to 
be “decisive”. That is the question concerning the “How?” of theological and 
ecclesiastical activity’ (Barth, 1946, p. 128). As Richard Burnett explains, Barth uses 
‘theological activity’ in the sense of speaking of, interpreting, divine revelation 
(Burnett, 2013, p. 152). What it would appear rational to draw from this, is that Barth 
is saying that even the very act of speaking or considering natural theology as a 
means or mechanism for understanding or gaining knowledge of God is a profound 
error, where this is being constructed as a means of entrance into salvation. And as I 
have said earlier, I am in complete agreement with this. However to deny any 
involvement from natural theology in the movement of the person from non-Christian 
‘enquirer’ to an individual to whom Christ has revealed Himself, leaves the Christian 
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conversationalist without an answer when speaking about the facts of the natural 
world. 1 Peter 3.15 calls us to have just such an answer. 
Thus I contend that a natural theology should neither be born out of a fear of, or to 
do battle with, the surrounding culture yet rather as a reasonable response to the 
Divinely imprinted realities of the world around us, suitably ‘recontextualized’ as 
Sudduth implies in the same place. I say this since Sudduth appears to follow 
McGrath in suggesting that a purpose of natural theology is to act as a ‘rational 
preamble to dogmatics’. Constructed in this way a natural theology is primarily a tool 
of the Christian faithful: useful as a ‘dogmatically situated activity of rational reflection 
on the Christian God’ as well as a tool for the ‘apologetic deployment of theistic 
arguments’ (Sudduth, 2009, p.62). Developing and extending Thomas Woolford’s 
helpful analysis of Renaissance natural theological approaches, Sudduth and 
McGrath’s theologies might be characterised as pessimistic and post-fideal (meaning 
after having come to faith as a Christian) whereas in contrast I am advocating a 
more optimistic and pre-fideal use of natural theology (Woolford, 2011, p. 197). 
Consequently a solely post-fideal use of natural theology would not satisfy the 
honest non-Christian enquirer (since the apologetic arguments are being deployed 
for combative reasons and specifically not to invite anyone to follow Christ) and so 
do not have a great appeal in the current project. Furthermore it is unclear how such 
a natural theology could be ‘recontextualized’ (see above and assuming this term to 
mean ‘an enculturalised re-working to make it intelligible and acceptable to a 
contemporary non-Christian audience’) whilst at the same time be held for a 
Christian audience alone. Thus whilst I applaud the epistemic tools provided by 
Reformed reflection on Christian faith, it would be sad indeed if a natural theology 
could only be employed by the faithful either for personal edification or for refutation. 
Instead I suggest that a natural theology can be used to encourage the suspicion 
that the ability to appreciate the aesthetics of the created world, has arisen from 
beyond the physical realm, again in accordance with 1 Peter 3.15 as suggested 
above. 
A further component of the Reformed objection to natural theology has to do with the 
understanding that sin has so corrupted the vision and perception of the non-believer 
that such are utterly incapable of any appreciation of the Divine. This latter argument 
is based on a Reformed interpretation of the Christian scriptures and it is therefore to 
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these that we must turn in order to refute it. In the first instance scripture allows for 
the possession of a conscience by those who are outside the faith. This directs them 
to act in a way commensurate with God’s laws:  
For whenever the Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by 
nature the things required by the law, these who do not have 
the law are a law to themselves. They show that the work of 
the law is written in their hearts, as their conscience bears 
witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or else defend 
them, on the day when God will judge the secrets of human 
hearts, according to my gospel through Christ Jesus. 
(Romans 2.14-16) 
Earlier in Romans Paul affirms that ‘all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of 
God’ (Romans 3.23). Therefore we might reasonably ask in the context of a natural 
theology, can anyone perceive of God in the natural world, given that we are all 
sinners? And in the parable of the tax collector and the Pharisee we appear to have 
the answer. Here, for the benefit, as the scripture itself says, of all those who believe 
themselves to be righteous and in consequence look down on those they perceive 
not to be, God declares that the tax collector went home ‘justified’ (Luke 18.14). The 
question naturally arises ‘justified by whom’ to which the answer is plainly God 
himself. What is the reason for this? It is because: ‘for everyone who exalts himself 
will be humbled and he who humbles himself will be exalted’ as we read in that same 
verse. It is an attitude of the individual, the person, which is an enabler of justification 
before God, precisely not because of any ability on account of the person, yet rather 
because God counts an appeal to Himself to their credit. This appreciation or 
understanding of, the place of the attitude of the believer, would appear to be 
confirmed when scripture says further: 
because if you confess with your mouth that Jesus is Lord 
and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, 
you will be saved. For with the heart one believes and thus 
has righteousness and with the mouth one confesses and 
thus has salvation. (Romans 10.10) 
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Thus the ability to objectively perceive of, to apprehend, God as creator within a 
situation, has in part at least to do with the (subjective) attitude of the enquirer. The 
effect of sin is not to completely destroy the abilities of the non-Christian to perceive 
of God in the natural world as certain reformers and their followers teach, yet rather 
as Andrew Davison points out, to severely diminish or darken the human intellect 
such as to make the ability to perceive God in Christ in this way, less capable 
(Davison, 2013, pp. xiv-xv). From this, and with the Reformed objections in mind, it 
can be seen that it would be quite wrong to deny completely the ability of an enquirer 
to perceive of the divine within some aspects of the physical world. 
A somewhat more nuanced Christian objection to natural theology similarly relates to 
a Christian interpretation of this ‘unknown’ God, for if we suppose that God is 
‘unknowable’ (see for example Ps 139.17: ‘How difficult it is for me to fathom your 
thoughts about me, O God! How vast is their sum total!’) then surely, as Douglas 
Hedley relates, a natural theology becomes impossible (Hedley, 2013, p.582). Yet we 
are not left in any doubt on this point. In the final part to the prologue to John’s 
Gospel (John 1.14-18) we see this problem both stated and resolved: indeed no-one 
has even seen God and He is in this sense unknowable, excepting that in Jesus 
Christ, a man in history, God is indeed made known. This objection to a natural 
theology is in fact resolved through the proposal that it can only be viable when seen 
through the person and work of Jesus, ‘who is God’ (see John 1.18). 
2.1.12 Atheist Objections to Natural Theology 
We have already outlined above something of the framework of objections to 
Christian belief itself, demonstrating that these are not always based upon an 
objective search for the truth. Here we seek to look at such objections as they relate 
specifically to natural theology. 
Let us consider an example. A Christian and an atheist are each involved. Let’s 
assume for now that they are equally qualified and experienced in the fields under 
investigation. 
Both are members of a team that manages to synthesise a complex organic 
molecule possessing a large number (> 30) of chiral (fixed orientation in dimensional 
space at junction points) centres. The actions of this novel chemical compound on 
certain live animal test systems are described. The latter involves the compound 
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binding preferentially such that the progress of a certain disease is dramatically 
slowed. The process whereby this happens is described in great detail. 
The atheist will be satisfied that the explanation of the success of the process 
provides (accepting the contingencies inherent within the scientific method) a 
sufficient, cogent and rational account of the actions of the new compound and is 
satisfied that in demonstrating such a pathway, no theistic explanation is wanting or 
necessary. For an example of such a common generic ‘naturalistic’ approach see 
Matthew Bagger (1999, p.13), where interestingly any explanation beyond the 
physical must be untrue, because it is to him ‘unimaginable’. From this it will be clear 
that Bagger is - probably - unintentionally invoking Plantingan warrant to justify his 
scepticism. The Christian, possessing the same understandings, becomes 
overwhelmed with the coherence of the process. No amount of explanation can rob 
him or her of the sense that there must exist a further account of the reasons for the 
natural world to give rise to this level of success. The atheist will counter by providing 
a step-by-step inferred narrative of the development over history, of the framework 
for the process: the cells, the compounds, the overall chemical environment within 
the animals. The atheist believes such an account provides a sufficient explanation 
of the physical process: no further explanation is necessary to understand the origins 
of the framework. The framework itself was an inevitable result of the processes over 
many many millennia following the Big Bang which is itself inferred from other 
investigations within physics. Thus and again, no natural theology is needed since 
no explanation is required other than that provided through experimentation. 
Furthermore, no matter the level of complexity or degree of ingenuity observed in the 
natural world, an apologetic method which contends that all questions can be solved 
within the mechanism of explanation that has at its core the immense time-periods 
postulated currently for the age of the known Universe (currently thought to be in 
excess of 13 billion years), implies an attitude of scepticism which is unlikely to be 
dissolved by ever greater levels of observed intricacy. This mechanism of 
explanation here has as its locus, the atheists’ required leap of faith as already 
quoted above (Wilson, 1998, p.265). (We remember the work of Dembski quoted 
above which tells us that the observed levels of complexity in certain living systems 
where several sub-systems, each of which is itself highly complex, combine together 
to provide the overall observed functionality, preclude a naturalistic explanation for 
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their development). Christians, within the proposed natural theological conversation, 
and in combining aspects of both revealed religion - their experience of Christ in and 
through them in the everyday - as well as a nuanced natural theology being the joy 
of God’s sophia in Creation backscattered in the natural world of today, affirm within 
themselves ‘Christ the [living] hope of Glory’ (Colossians 1.27). The atheist and the 
Christian are respectively placing their faith in different places and objects. 
 
 
2.2 Theologies of Nature 
It is probably going too far to suggest that the two terms ‘natural theologies’ and 
‘theologies of nature’ are two entirely different disciplines that happen by accident in 
the English language to share names with a similar arrangement of letters of the 
alphabet, but at least that will enable the reader to acclimatise themselves to the 
notion that they really are two very different areas of study. 
Natural theology starts with the world as we might see it and aims to point us 
towards God. A theology of nature, as Ian Barbour explains, is a work of the 
Christian who seeks to take a known theological stand point and then interprets what 
we see of nature in this light and often then attempts to formulate proposed courses 
of action, resulting from these insights (Barbour, 1990, p. 26). There is not 
necessarily any point of contact between the two. Thus theologies of nature might for 
example ask such questions as ‘what should the Christian response be to the 
currently ecological crisis?’, or again ‘how might a feminist theology re-shape our 
attitude towards nature?’. Both disciplines might be accused of attempting to re-
shape orthodox Christian perspectives and understandings. Certain forms of natural 
theology might re-shape our understanding of God. Process theologies could be an 
example of these. A theology of nature which recognises the seriousness of current 
ecological concerns might for example wish to re-interpret traditional understandings 
of the apparent instructions in Genesis to ‘fill the earth and subdue it’ (Genesis 1.28). 
A theology of nature assumes that God is there, whereas a natural theology would 




Having said that there is not necessarily any connection between the two, questions 
of theologies of nature might well emerge from the sort of conversation that I am 
proposing in this book. Thus for example should our honest enquirer be at least 
interested in investigating the claims of the Christian faith further, their thoughts may 
turn to those Christians who have historically been responsible for the overuse and 
exploitation even, of the world’s natural resources. Such exploitative actions have 
frequently led to the oppression of local peoples and the permanent destruction of 
habitats and a consequent loss of species. The natural theologian might then be 
challenged to explain how those who follow this religion which claims to speak for 
and with a God of beauty as revealed in chemistry, could possibly be quite so greedy 
and rapacious. The very answer might well be to show our enquirer that there are 
indeed theologians formulating theologies of nature which enjoin Christians to 
respect that which God in His bounty has given us in nature; they might add that 
‘filling the earth and subduing it’ has to do with a God-directed stewardship of the 
earth rather than the nihilistic destruction of it. These latter thoughts would then be 
wrapped-up into, or packaged as a particular ’theology of nature’. 
Yet it is right and fitting to observe that the loci or focus of such a conversation has 
only arisen out of the desire to engage with God as well as those who apparently 
believe in Him and therefore in some sense represent Him on earth. Thus a theology 
of nature becomes a public enterprise once the relevance of the Christian Church is 
acknowledged. If the Church and the Christ it proclaims is seen as irrelevant, a 
theology of nature remains a private affair within the Christian community. From this 
it can be seen that politically, theologies of nature might be understood as part of the 
need to be seen as ‘relevant’ in modern societies. In this manner we are urged to be 
ecologically friendly and socially responsible in all aspects of communal life. 
Furthermore it might be argued that the existence and eagerness by local Christians 
to implement theologies of nature might itself be a useful apologetic tool in the sense 
that an outsider to the Church might legitimately conclude that they want to be part of 
a group that champions concern for the environment, for example, or to join a group 
of people who demonstrate their passion for a particular commitment in a practical 
way. This type of influence exerted on others should not be viewed with any form of 
cynicism since Church groups are often quite genuinely concerned about these 
issues and moreover their own economic power, whilst not always huge, does 
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nonetheless make a useful contribution to the progress of such ideas. In the way 
described, a theology of nature has become something of a natural theology. 
Similarly a person who becomes a Christian on account of such an influence might 
choose to continue to have that interest as one part of the outworking of their new-
found Christian faith, after they join a particular local Christian church. In such a case 
a natural theology has had some influence on a particular Christian’s own ‘theology 
of nature’. 
In neither of these cases, of the intermingling of natural theology and theologies of 
nature, could these be described as necessarily carefully worked-out and 
intellectually rigorous treatments of either discipline, but at least they illustrate where 
the two may become embroiled, one with the other.  
In conclusion then, a theology of nature would not be of great use in this present 




The form of the conversation that is the objective of this book, is one that conforms 
to the norms of natural theology in that it presupposes no special revelation of God 
and relies upon that which might be seen and perceived in the physical world. Yet 
this natural theology is not of the established pattern in that it does not seek to prove 
the existence of God. Instead the arguments put forward in this book by the natural 
theologian in their conversation with the chemist researcher are suggestive 
arguments. They seek to suggest that the human capacity for perceiving intimations 
of value, specifically in the perception in this case of beauty, has an origin in Christ. 
This natural theology is drawing our enquirer towards the point in our conversation 
where they may draw the conclusion - not reached through a logical evaluation - that 
God in Christ is the source of all that they see, evaluate and empirically test-for, in 
the natural world. 
A natural theology, in representing ‘more faithfully than the other traditional proofs 
the reasoning of the “ordinary believer”‘ (Wynn, 1999, p.3) should reasonably be 
expected to meet the ordinary [dis]-believer precisely at their point-of-need. One of 
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the points of connection between the epistemological position developed in chapter 1 
and the natural theology here in chapter 2 is the experience of such ordinary 
believers in the everyday. In chapter 1, I developed the form of reliabilism being 
proposed, by including the collective witness of a group of (ordinary) Christian 
believers or church as part of the process of establishing the correct environment for 
justified belief to arise. Here in chapter 2 those of this ‘church’ are being offered a 
natural theology commensurate with their needs. Chapter 1 shows how for example 
‘religious experiences’ perhaps in the perception of something as being beautiful, 
may rationally be said to be from God. In chapter 2 we find that the human 
perception of certain value constructs, including those speaking of beauty, may form 
part of a natural theology. Our epistemology speaks to our natural theology. For 
these reasons epistemologically, a natural theological approach offers the most 
efficacious strategy in our proposed conversation. 
The life of Christ intersects a natural theology in the here-and-now, causes to collide 
the living God in the face of Christ, with the story, the current life, of the enquirer: it is 
in Marshall’s terms both a pragmatic and a correspondence thesis. A natural 
theology consists in seeds of doubt imparted to the mind of the non-Christian 
enquirer, to the effect that their current naturalistic understandings may not be a valid 
account of existence after all. 
Furthermore, in the context of a conversation, our natural theology provides a 
rational explanation for the wonder felt by many at the uncovering of the fabric 
underpinning the natural world. It is a form - loosely perhaps - of the Design 
argument and allows links to be made between the worlds of science and the 
disciplines of Christian theology. As I have already said, the natural theology 
described here is not designed to lead an enquirer to the certainty of faith towards 
God in Christ through logical reasoning. Such a natural theology instead makes it 
more likely that a revelation of God towards them will be accepted. It is quite distinct 
from a theology of nature. This natural theology is overall accessible, life-affirming, 
outward-looking and engaged with and in the world. It is both optimistic and realistic. 
We have established an epistemology for justifying belief in the Christian God in 
chapter 1 and a natural theology of a type that fits with the epistemology in this 
present chapter. We now move to an exploration of chemistry in chapter 3 to 
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Chemistry and Natural Theology 
 
3.1 Appreciating Chemistry: the Historical Context and Contemporary 
Understandings 
The title of this project derives in part from one of the Gifford lectures ‘Reconstructing 
Nature: the engagement of science and religion’ which far from wanting to argue for 
a particular conclusion sought instead to reinvigorate the interaction between 
science and religion (Brooke and Cantor, 2000, p. x-xi) by re-examining past science 
as historians, through the lenses of more recently developed disciplines including 
psychology, sociology, linguistics etc. The authors reject any 'master-narrative', 
describing the views of the founder of the Gifford lectures as anachronistic. They are 
keen to stress how both science and theology change over time, as do the very 
subjects the founder urged the lecturers to address. They describe the context the 
Edinburgh lawyer Lord Gifford came from, as being 'highly religious'. In their first 
chapter the authors attempt to demonstrate that there is no hegemony of one over 
the other, of science as against theology. By their final chapter they are speculating 
on the effect on the future of their discipline, that of history and the historian watching 
the debate, of directed genetic change in the speculator, that is, the human agent. 
Thus the overall effect is to present an intellectual field that is shifting, as the field of 
view itself is shifting.  
Yet why should any of this matter in the current project which is enquiring whether 
chemistry might validly inform natural theology? 
In their conclusion to their Gifford lectures, Brooke and Cantor, having in their final 
discourse made some illuminating remarks on the potential role of chemistry and 
natural theology, observe: 
One reason for offering these chemical snapshots is that 
they expose some of the difficulties that arose in integrating 
an interventionist science [chemistry] with a contemplative 
theology, but also how the difficulties were overcome. In 
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contexts where the meaning and scope of 'nature' became 
progressively blurred, so the scope of a natural theology 
would become increasingly problematic. But what we have 
also seen is that one kind of theology might survive - the kind 
that sees in the alleged improvement of nature a 
collaboration between human beings and their Maker. 
(Brooke  and Cantor, 2000, p. 338). 
Following certain observations about the dependence of chemistry in the 18th 
century (and presumably earlier) upon medicine, Brooke and Cantor go onto suggest 
that chemistry ‘became less propitious as a resource for religious reflection’ (Brooke 
and Cantor, 2000, p.339). In reviewing the chemistry of the nineteenth and on into 
our own centuries, the authors continue in a somewhat forlorn manner. After hearing 
from the theologian Gordon Dunstan who suggests that human actions in the 
evolutionary process are necessarily acting with God, Brooke and Cantor remark: 
Were there still reputable scholars in the late twentieth 
century [when they themselves were writing] who would 
interpret that alignment as alignment with the purposes of 
God? Or was the rhetoric of a secularised natural theology 
totally and invariably secular? Our future historian would find 
that theological essays on the subject had not dried up.  
(Brooke and Cantor, 2000, p.340) 
These are not encouraging sentiments: rather than flourishing, theists are to their 
mind speculating in a manner that cannot be proven. Taken together, these remarks 
suggest that chemistry and Christian theology do not easily interact.  
As Brooke and Cantor have related, this has to do with chemistry seeming to tamper 
with nature. Of the practice of dyeing garments Tertullian wrote at some time 
between 190-220 CE in De cultu feminarum, Book 1.8: 
Quis enim est uestium honor iustus de adulterio colorum 
iniustorum? Non placet Deo quod non ipse produxit; nisi si 
non potuit purpureas et aerinas oues nasci iubere. Si potuit, 




[what legitimate honour can garments derive from 
adulteration with illegitimate colours? That which God has 
not produced is not pleasing to Him, unless He was unable 
to order sheep to be born with purple and sky-blue fleeces! 
If He was able, it follows He was unwilling: what God willed 
not, of course ought not to be fashioned]. (Tertullian, 2015)  
with thanks to Prof Dr Claus Jacob for drawing this to my 
attention 
Any transformation of an object into something else, something it was not previously, 
something ‘unnatural’, was to be avoided. And again, what might appear to be 
attacks on alchemists from for example the 14th and 15th centuries whether found 
variously in a papal prohibition or literature or again in the graphic arts, can today 
equally be interpreted as attempts at shielding the general populace from charlatans. 
Yet as Joachim Schummer says, the overall effect would have been to transmit the 
impression that these were matters best left well alone (Schummer, 2015). 
Yet by the 17th century, of the Irish polymath Robert Boyle (1627-1691), J.J. 
MacIntosh and Peter Anstey tell us: 
Boyle was one of the leading intellectual figures of the 
seventeenth century. He was a dedicated experimenter, 
unwilling to construct abstract theories to which his results 
had to conform (MacIntosh and Anstey, 2010, p.1) 
And then later in the same work: 
Boyle's scientific range was wide. Besides his well known 
work in mechanics, medicine, hydrodynamics and a wide 
variety of experiments with his vacuum pump, he was 
interested both theoretically and practically in alchemy …. 
where his interest seems to have been fuelled more by his 
constant desire to acquire knowledge of God and the world 
than by any desire for riches. (MacIntosh and Anstey, 2010, 
p.2) 




….. So that to prove the existence of God from the idea he 
has impressed on the mind is not to prove it really a Priori; 
since that idea is not the cause but the effect of the divine 
existence; though I am willing to grant that in a qualifying 
sense, this knowledge we have of God by this idea or stamp 
may be said to be a provision in regard that we obtain it not 
by the consideration of those effects or productions of God 
that are without us and made up the visible world. From the 
contemplation of whose vast extent, regular motions, and 
admirable contrivance; philosophers and other considering 
men have in all ages, as from so many manifest effects, 
inferred the existence of a first and divine cause and 
consequently have drawn their conclusion by that way or 
argumentation that all men allow to be framed a posteriori. 
(Boyle, 1660) 
Thus showing that Boyle derived his conclusions after investigation (or 
‘contemplation’) and experimentation. MacIntosh and Anstey also tell us: 
Convinced that Christianity was the religion instituted by 
God, Boyle was concerned that the Bible should be widely 
promulgated and he devoted time and energy to having it 
translated into a variety of languages …. (MacIntosh and 
Anstey, 2010, p.3) 
Here we have in one of the foremost minds of his age, a keen experimenter using 
fluids and reactants in a manner that would allow us today to call him a chemist of 
sorts, being also a fervent Christian. Allan Chapman (Chapman, 2008, p.20) says of 
him ‘an awareness of the mystical, Divine causality of nature formed part of the very 
essence of his intellectual being’ and that he made ‘scientific research an act of 
worship in its own right’ (Chapman, 2008, p.23) - something from which he perhaps 
differed but little from contemporary Christian researchers. Thus from an epistemic 
point of view we have a Christian believer, whom we presume was such from a 
relatively early age (meaning that he accepted certain Christian truths a priori), also 
able to engage in a certain scientific skepticism and so infer (scientific) propositions 
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a posteriori. It is the combination of these two positions which is most interesting, as 
we have already noted in the work of Foster above. 
In something of a pattern that continues to repeat itself in our own times, Chapman 
(2008, p.21) says of work in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by many 
investigators: ‘chemical thinking had in many ways become more diversified and 
labyrinthine as a result of all the new classes of phenomena - metallurgical, medical, 
botanical, and such - that were coming to light, and that were now begging a 
coherent explanation’. Of the sixteenth century he says that experimental chemistry 
exerted an ‘intellectual fascination’ - across Europe - over the men of that age 
amongst whom he lists in addition to Robert Boyle, the philosopher John Locke and 
the researcher Robert Hooke. 
That ‘intellectual fascination’ in our own century has altered somewhat. It is no longer 
the preserve of a few and no longer always the preserve of a single discipline. Trevor 
Levere suggests towards the end of his survey of the current state of chemistry 
‘Chemistry and physics ….. have blended into one another in several areas’ and ‘the 
way that chemists define their science in relation to other sciences is in the end a 
piece of territorial assertion’ (Levere, 2001, p.182). He rejects a reductionist 
approach - one which sees for example a science such as chemistry being reduced 
to mathematics and physics - either between chemistry and physics or between 
biology and chemistry and instead says ‘chemistry is the only science that now 
builds or creates much of what it goes on to study’. From the latter it is perhaps easy 
to see why Process Theology (which we discuss below) is thought by some 
contemporary authors to be a promising [theological] route into the science. In 
addition, given the apparent constant threats of reductionism, such a statement also 
adds detail to our definition of chemistry. In this manner, not only is chemistry about 
the science of transforming matter, it powerfully has to do with the creation of new 
materials to the extent that any process that does, may be called a ‘chemical 
process’. 
As Michael Weinberg, Paul Needham and Robin Hendry remark, now in the 21st 
century, chemistry is understood as the ‘study of the structure and transformation of 
matter’ (Weisberg, Needham and Hendry, 2011, p.1), and specifically as the 
‘transformation of matter from one form to another’, whilst continuing to recognise 
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that the discipline can also consist of ‘accounts of the nature of matter and its 
structure’ (Weisberg, Needham and Hendry, 2011, p. 46). As an illustration of the 
shifting sands of the discipline noted above, and perhaps as a start to understanding 
why many have found it challenging to integrate chemistry tightly into natural 
theology we might also note that ‘Chemistry at any given time is the product of a 
continuing history, subject both to evolution and on occasion to revolution’ (Levere, 
2001, p.17) and ‘Complexity, richness, and an economy of means give chemistry its 
intellectual appeal; utility and application, its universal relevance’ (Levere, 2001, p. 
ix). [Here the tension between Levere’s ‘complexity’ and an ‘economy of means’ are 
perhaps reflective of that desire to seek a theology that rejects a rigidity of outcomes 
and instead celebrates an unpredictable explosion of varieties: one that recognises 
intense complexity and yet is enabled to build models that in simplicity forge further 
understandings]. 
Thus we can see that the uncertainty which informs much of the current quantum 
mechanically descriptions of atomic and sub-atomic structures is shown to be 
present in practical ways in chemistry as well. The more mechanistic or positivist 
philosophical approach that might favour precise outcomes from precise 
mechanisms utilising precise inputs, simply does not reflect reality. Weisberg, 
Needham and Hendry propose the epistemic solution of eliminative induction to 
describe this method of reflecting upon mechanisms, where several mechanisms for 
the pathway achieving a new compound are proposed and as experimentation 
eliminates certain candidates, the ‘probability that one of the remaining mechanisms 
is correct goes up’ (Weisberg, Needham and Hendry, 2011, p. 50). This phrase is 
however problematic since the preceding discussions indicate that since several 
mechanisms appear from the evidence to all be ‘correct’, we should more correctly 
be speaking of correct mechanisms: either the same products are being arrived at 
via separate routes, or it is not possible to discern which single route is correct, even 
if that ‘singleness’ itself can be proven. Weisberg, Needham and Hendry also tie-in 
this epistemic solution to the explanations provided by mechanistic chemists only. 
This is probably excessively restrictive and any successful solution should in addition 
encompass theoretical speculations as well, especially given for example the 
differing ways of representing for benzene (see Appendix A for an introduction to 
chemical bonding). In this latter case certain ways of representing chemical 
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structures would favour a simplistic approach of alternate single and double bonds 





however more recent studies suggest six equal yet non-conforming quasi double-
bonds to be more accurate. (Again this latter alters immediately where there are any 
further groups of atoms appended to the ring). As a result if it could be ‘seen’, there 
would be six equal yet ‘more-than-single’, and ‘less-than-double’, bonds in a ring. For 
this reason, ‘non-conforming quasi double-bonds’ is possibly one explanation of what 
is apparent in benzene, as opposed to what the chemical physics might indicate: 
‘hybrid’ is another term used for a similar situation where the ‘quantum mechanical 
equations and laboratory chemistry both’ (Levere, 2001, p.179) yield a more 
nuanced reality: again chemistry appears to be not only crossing boundaries 
between chemistry, mathematics and physics but now and increasingly over the past 
decades simply encompassing these other disciplines where such overlap is 
conducive to a fuller understanding. 
This point is illustrated in the volume by Nancy Cartwright entitled ‘How the Laws of 
Physics Lie’ (Cartwright, 1983, p.164) in which she discusses this self-same 
compound benzene, as well as forms of a further interesting compound 
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dibromobenzene, whose structure may be represented such that the compound 
could be supposed to exist in two such forms:  
 
       
  or 
 
 
… the first or left-hand diagram representing paradibromo [or 1, 4 dibromo] benzene, 
and the second righthand image orthodibromo [or 1, 2 dibromo] benzene.  However 
in nature it is known in only one form, which suggests, depending on one’s point of 
view, that it is either both different forms at one-and-the-same-time or that it is one 
thing inaccurately described. What Cartwright does not say is that the rules used to 
propose the two alternate structures are used almost universally in chemistry 
education at various levels to great effect and have enormous predictive power - yet 
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in this case they apparently fail. However in a practical chemical sense, in terms of 
attempting to understand what one might use the molecule for in some follow-on 
experiment, the ‘erroneous’ structure works perfectly well. There is something of a 
competition between the ‘real’ quantum mechanical explanation which is exciting and 
interesting but tells us little and the ‘real-world’, prosaic, utility-based explanation 
which with some accuracy postulates the outcome of interactions between 
dibromobenzene and other reactants: the ‘truth’ of what is taking place is best 
described using multiple explanations each of which reveals part of the truth. 
Importantly, we have progressed from the situation where it was not possible to 
discern which single explanation was the whole ‘truth’, to the deeper truth, whereby a 
more complete understanding of a particular reaction or process cannot adequately 
be accommodated within in a single description, and instead requires multiple 
narratives (dare we say ‘parables’ or ‘similies’?) to illustrate all that can be known 
about it. 
Thus to re-use the language employed earlier: epistemic warrant for the particular 
‘truth’ of a proposed mechanism in a chemical process, may often come in the form 
of models, diagrams and analogies each offering part of the overall ‘truth’ whose 
exact nature is unknown and provisional yet where the repeated practice of the 
process, leads to the same or similar results.  
An important aspect of this latter is that by re-utilising the steps of a particular 
process with similar or related reactants (components of the process), similar 
products might result. Thus, simply put, if two overall reactions or processes (are 
ordered or) ‘look’ the same, there is a degree of epistemic warrant that they will 
produce similar outputs along similar pathways, this meaning that the truth of the 
mechanism of a given process might be inferred from similar processes. From this it 
can be seen that ‘similarity’ is a useful tool in providing ‘scientific knowledge 
generation’ in chemistry (Bengoetxea, Todt and Luján, 2014, pp.1, 17). Furthermore 
notions of what ‘similar’ means are specifically the product of the physical practice of 
chemistry and not solely, or at times even rather loosely, connected to theory. Yet to 
what degree is such knowledge derived from ‘similarity’ indeed ‘scientific’? 
Interesting whilst Bengoetxea, Todt and Luján qualify their words ‘knowledge 
generation’ with the word ‘scientific’, they also refute Quine (Bengoetxea, Todt and 
Luján, 2014, p.5) who held that to build knowledge upon ‘similarity’ was to stand 
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against the logic of mathematics and empirical scientific theory. Yet implicitly 
Bengoetxea, Todt and Luján’s work demonstrates that metaphysical appreciations 
within chemical research are capable of ‘knowledge generation’. As a result, 
‘knowledge’ need not necessarily be qualified by the word ‘scientific’, in an attempt to 
legitimise the former. That such metaphysical qualities can contribute to epistemic 
warrant in the sciences should come as no surprise given the prevalence of the 
belief in other sciences notably mathematics, that the aesthetic qualities of 
processes are also indicators of truth. And so it is reasonable to ask why if by way of 
analogy in chemical processes we have a mechanism for establishing similarity and 
thereby truth, this truth should be confined to the physical mechanism of the process. 
Surely such similarities could also contribute towards the elucidation of the 
underlying frameworks at play in the processes themselves? We will return to this in 
the case of chemistry in the next section, yet for now it is sufficient to appreciate that 
the process of recognising similarities, is indeed a useful tool in chemical research to 
discover the truths in underlying processes. 
Levere points out in the introduction to his wide ranging volume that the list of known 
compounds had up to the time of writing (2001) expanded by over seven million in 
thirty years. At the time of commencing my own MSc studies in the early 1980s, the 
synthesis of the antibiotic Erythromycin A had just been announced: an extra-
ordinary achievement of the step-wise assembly of an organic molecule with twenty-
four separate ‘junction-boxes’ each of which could exist in several different 
arrangements (or orientations in three-dimensional space), whilst still comprising the 
same components: yet the target (known) product would only allow for a precise and 
single arrangement of components around each junction-box. Since that time the 
effort to create molecules of such - and ever greater - complexity has exploded, now 
of course often utilising yet another set of differing techniques: genetic manipulation. 
Taken together chemistry is shown again to be a constantly shifting discipline, with 
the building blocks, these individual elements known to us, numbering only a little 
over one hundred and yet ‘their possible and actual combinations are so many as to 
seem infinite’ (Levere, 2001, p.ix). 
Natural theology has at times been known as a contemplative discipline (Brooke and 
Cantor, 2000, p.338) in that it calls upon (Christian) science researchers to evaluate 
that which is fixed and immutable within the physical realm, as being reflective of the 
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divine agency which lies at its genesis. For chemistry to inform a natural theology, 
the ‘natural’ must necessarily come to include not merely the objects of study (which 
chemistry manufactures itself) yet rather primarily the natural frameworks and 
mechanisms that give shape to the compounds and processes, so created - that 
constantly evolving ‘continuing history’ spoken of above. This must be so, since the 
‘fixed and immutable’ objects (meaning for example cosmic structures and certain 
laws of physics) which a ‘traditional’ and contemplative natural theology examine, 
are as we have seen not fixed and immutable in that same sense in chemistry. 
In conclusion then, contemporary chemistry is enormously successful and 
productive. As to what precisely it is: ‘Chemistry is what chemists do’ (Levere, 2001, 
p.182). Chemical knowledge is gained a priori as well as a posteriori; art and 
science: models, graphs, approximations and diagrams might all be blended in its 
descriptions of the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of a given process; the appeal is often more 
sensual than cerebral (Brooke and Cantor, 2000, p.314). Chemistry is constantly on 
the move and yet the building blocks stay the same. Intensely practical, it requires 
repetition, practice: forms of apprenticeship, before collected insights give rise to 
further successes. Epistemic warrant for a given underlying mechanism can be 
provided, utilising the experience of the practical and practiced researcher - 
experience borne of the knowledge of the context and thus such judgements are 
context-dependent (Bengoetxea, Todt and Luján,  2014, p.17) -, by analogy with 
other similar processes. I have suggested that such analogy should and could not 
logically be confined to that between similar physical processes, but also to the 
underlying ontological reasons or frameworks subtending the processes where such 
judgements again are being made by those familiar and appreciative of the context. 
It will not have escaped the reader that we are on very similar epistemic ground here 
to that elucidated by Plantinga and others. I have described in chapter 1 above, the 
importance of the reliabilistic ‘cognitive faculties functioning correctly’ in the provision 
of descriptions of ‘truth’ in the rational holding of Christian belief. We now discover 
here that there are similar mechanisms being attested to in the provision of ‘truth’ in 
the chemical sciences. The types of truth being attested to are both physical as well 
as metaphysical. They have predictive power and the results obtained thus, are 
repeatable. We have therefore refuted some commentators’ objections to forms of a 
strict reliabilism and expanded it to include not only, as Susan Haack describes it, 
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‘experiential anchoring and explanatory integration of the subject's evidence with 




3.2 Chemistry and Metaphysics 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In the preceding section I have sketched those points in early-modern to 
contemporary history where chemistry and Christianity have touched. In this section, 
I explore on what basis contemporary chemical endeavour and Christian theology 
may be in dialogue together and in so doing discuss the metaphysical within 
chemistry. 
3.2.2 Exploring Critical Realisms 
Here I build on a discussion above in which I affirmed that the language our chosen 
natural theology is described by, must be intelligible to both theologians and 
scientists. This language supposes a realist outlook on the world where humans are 
interacting with objects that exist independently of such observers. Such a language 
will be intelligible to the chemist researcher. Crucially, for the Christian or more 
generically the religious person Ian Barbour advocates an ‘experiential basis [for] 
religion, which is essential for renewed religious vitality in practice as for a defensible 
epistemology in theory’ (Barbour, 2013, 3064). The Christian should embrace just 
such a realist outlook, one that also retains a critical perspective in that it is 
constantly testing and making enquiries of those objects in the world. Thus in this 
book I advocate a form of critical realism. There are differing interpretations of critical 
realism (McGrath, 2004, pp. 141,143). McGrath is forthright in aligning himself with 
Roy Bhaskar's interpretation (McGrath, 2004, p. 139). The objective of this section is 
to explore some of these aspects of 'critical realism(s)'. 
My present argument deals in a form of duality in that I assert that there is a 
qualitative difference between the apprehension mechanisms employed by the 
Christian and the non-Christian. This will cause difficulties for many: natural theology 
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is about level playing fields in that no one entering into the debate may have 
recourse to any elements of a revelational tactic: all arguments must proceed purely 
from the basis of what can be seen, touched, perceived of, the natural world. This is 
quite correct and both conversationalists are thus on the same 'field'. This is plainly 
essential in order for Christians to be in relationship with the world they claim to be in 
love with. As Janet Martin Soskice remarks: 
We should not let the visionary nature of language [Soskice 
had earlier quoted from Isaiah 11] distract us from the reality 
of the call to right relation. The biblical picture is one in which 
reverence for and right relation with God entail reverence for 
and right relation with other people made in the image of 
God, and furthermore right relation with the rest of the 
created order. Consideration of our human nature and 
destiny must be consonant with good science and the 
understanding it can bring to our biology, our psychology, 
and our natural genesis. Yet this scientific understanding is 
framed, for the Christian, by the understanding that we are 
not just ‘natural phenomena’, but creatures in the literal 
sense-we have been created. (Soskice, 2007, pp.64,65)  
If the claims of the life, death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ are to mean anything 
to those adopted by Him, they must be based in reality, in relationship with the real 
physical world created through Him, and this relationship must have effect. Having 
earlier stated that he is ‘persuaded of the validity of a carefully nuanced critical 
realism in both science and theology (2004, p. 10), John Polkinghorne affirms the 
efficacy of such a reality: 
Belief in the unseen reality of God can properly be defended 
on the basis of the insightful understanding that it yields in 
relation to great swathes of spiritual experience, particularly 
in relation to the gospel record and its testimony of Jesus 
Christ, and in relation to the continuing worshipful and 




Thus, the critical realism I am speaking of supports a natural theology that is as has 
already been said, something entirely normal and normatively intelligible: it is there 
for all. 
The critical realism I advocate here differs from that proposed by Roy Bhaskar, 
favoured by McGrath, as we shall see. Bhaskar speaks for example of: 
…. the general relativity of our knowledge: viz. that whenever 
we speak of things or of events etc. in science we must 
always speak of them and know them under particular 
descriptions, descriptions which will always be to a greater or 
lesser extent theoretically determined, which are not neutral 
reflections of a given world. Epistemological relativism, in 
this sense, is the handmaiden of ontological realism and 
must be accepted….. Epistemological relativism insists only 
upon the impossibility of knowing objects except under 
particular descriptions…. Philosophers have wanted a theory 
of truth to provide a criterion or stamp of knowledge. But no 
such stamp is possible. For the judgement of the truth of a 
proposition is necessarily intrinsic to the science concerned. 
There is no way in which we can look at the world and then 
at a sentence and ask whether they fit. There is just the 
expression (of the world) in speech (or thought). 
(Bhaskar,1997, p. 249) 
Here, Bhaskar’s argument betrays the influence of Wittgenstein’s language game 
theory: truth is relative to the context in which it is promulgated. This makes 
Bhaskar’s thinking something akin to ‘epistemological-games’ in which truth is 
relative to the context in which it is promulgated. As for the ways in which such a 
critical realism might be used to interpret individual reality, Bhaskar remarked earlier: 
If science is to be possible the world must be one of 
enduring and transfactually active mechanisms; and society 
must be a structure (or ensemble of powers) irreducible to 
but present only in the intentional action of men. Science 
must be conceived as an ongoing social activity; and 
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knowledge as a social product which individuals must 
reproduce or transform, and which individuals must draw 
upon to use in their own critical explorations of nature.  
(Bhaskar, 1997, p. 248) 
It is clear from this quotation that according to Bhaskar we can have research and 
exploration in various disciplines, we can have as he indicates in the same place, 
‘mechanisms of the production of phenomena in nature’, yet these are intelligible 
only within each of their own respective intellectual domains.  
Such a critical realism in a strict sense would not allow me in this present book to be 
advocating a natural theology which leads the enquirer towards the God whose 
‘word is truth’ (Psalm 119.160; John 17.17). Instead we have as Bhaskar puts it, a 
dialectic of descriptive and explanatory knowledge, with no foreseeable end. As 
interpreted by McGrath, Bhaskar proposes the 'critical' faculty enacted by the human 
as having a layered structure. These layers are the processes the individual 
performs on their picture of reality as she/he gets to work on the mechanistic, 
natural, sense-mediated, impulses, of the world we all share (McGrath, 2004, pp. 
141-143). Thus Bhaskar's 'transcendental' realism is nothing less than the 
cumulative effect of the human's filtering mechanism of mind, being brought to bear 
on that which she/he encounters in the real world. As Bhaskar remarks, ‘science as a 
process is always entirely intrinsic to “thought”’ (Bhaskar, 1997, p. 185).  
McGrath makes use of Bhaskar’s approach to the sciences which refuses to reduce 
all ultimately to mathematics, which I embrace, although with the  insistence that our 
theological response is a posteriori, it would appear to leave little room for faith and a 
sacramentalism (and with that a clear acknowledgement of the Divine breaking-into 
the day-to-day experience of humans) which in my view would be a more adequate 
response to the totality of historical Christian experience (McGrath, 2004, pp. 152-
154).  
In chapter 2 I described McGrath's approach to Natural Theology as pessimistic and 
post-fideal, whereas it was necessary for a pre-fideal and optimistic use to be 
adopted for Natural Theology to function within my proposed conversation. A post-
fideal approach is by definition one that is epistemically relativist in a Bhaskarian 
sense, within that ‘fideal’ domain. Should we hold strictly to Bhaskar’s approach to 
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critical realism then a mutually intelligible conversation between differing intellectual 
domains or disciplines becomes difficult and the thesis of this book would likewise be 
in doubt. Thus I require a critically realist approach but not a Bhaskarian one. 
Within this book wherever the processes in chemistry are described it will become 
obvious to the reader that models and modelling play an important role and I draw to 
the readers’ attention variously, diagrammatic representations in chapter 3 and the 
role of mathematical modelling mentioned in the same place as well as the 
explanations offered in Appendices A and B. A given complex issue is not being 
reduced to a model or models, yet differing aspects of an overall truth are being 
individually explored through the use of these methods and then finally the whole is 
being reviewed and re-built within the person’s understanding to provide a richly 
layered tapestry of comprehension. Again such a degree of comprehension of this 
single complex issue is then open to revision when newer or improved models 
become available: the complexities are being constantly critically appraised in the 
light of continuing exploration. The reader can see such methodologies at work in the 
review of papers in chapter 4. 
Yet such ways of coming to an improved understanding of truths in science are not 
restricted to the sciences alone. In religious discourse Barbour says ‘Inherited 
models are for many individuals today almost totally detached from human life. The 
experiences which traditional models once interpreted are in large measure ignored 
or suppressed’ (Barbour, 2013, 3068) although crucially all that is being suggested 
by this is that the older models are not appropriate for their contemporary task and 
audience: the experiences themselves are not being disputed. Taking his brief from 
the theological doctrine of the Trinity, Polkinghorne says somewhat amusingly ‘Much 
of the writing on the Trinity is formidably technical in its character …. people speak 
of, begetting and procession, of foliation and aspiration, of perichoresis and 
appropriation, …. (at) times one is driven to wonder “How do they know?”’ 
(Polkinghorne, 2004, p.91). He then later in the same place suggests that both 
scientists and theologians at times make assertions beyond what our experience 
might allow for: we have ceased to be critical in our realism. And yet Polkinghorne 
earlier is firm in stating that he is wedded to a form of critical realism whilst not 
wishing to move away from the ‘grand scheme of Trinitarian theology’ (Polkinghorne, 
2004, p 10). 
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Thus we need an improved or altered set of models in order to achieve as Barbour 
says, ‘a greater awareness of the experiential correlates of theological concepts’ 
(Barbour 2013, 3071). From a religious perspective, the experience for example of 
the beauty of God could likewise be expressed as the experiential correlate of the 
theological concept of the beauty of God. In this way ‘the idea of models in the 
interpretation of such experiences may answer some of the difficulties in talking 
about God which are now felt so widely’ (Barbour 2013, 3079). As Soskice remarks: 
… in recent decades some theologians have regarded 
science not as an enemy but as an ally, and have called 
attention to strategies of scientific theory construction and 
model building in defence of their own strategies of theory 
construction and model building. As modern science has 
become more eloquent about its own limitations and the 
difficulty and tentativeness of any truth-claims, theologians 
have been emboldened to make comparisons with their own 
tasks. (Soskice, 2007, p. 54) 
Much of what the current book explores in terms of beauty as perceived within 
chemistry amounts to a re-drawing of such models for a contemporary audience. As 
will be seen below, in contrast to the beautiful art of old which can be seen and 
touched, chemical compounds and processes which can not be seen are being 
described as being beautiful by chemists themselves. Suddenly we have a language 
- that of beauty - which itself becomes something mutually comprehensible between 
science and religion or more accurately in this present book, between Christianity 
and chemistry. And at all times the position being adopted is critically realist.  
(I have already admitted above, that the theologian in the conversation is holding to 
a firm Christian Faith in their personal practice whilst conversing in terms devoid of 
revelation, when speaking with their chemist partner. Let the reader note at this point 
the distinction between acknowledging that there is a God and the fact of being a 
Christian. Christian Scripture is clear that it is possible for a being to know that there 
is a God, but to reject the Christian Faith (James 2.19). Where I use such terms as 
pre and post fideal, I am using them in respect of the Christian Faith and not in 
respect of an acknowledgement of there being a God. Thus a partial objective of the 
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conversation proposed in this book is that the chemist might come to understand that 
it is entirely rational - Barbour’s ‘defensible epistemology’ - to accept that there is a 
God, whilst at the same time not coming to a place of Faith in the Christian God on 
the basis of such reasoned arguments alone). 
3.2.3 Christ Perceived in Creation 
If chemistry is to inform a Christian natural theology, then it is necessary to show that 
any aesthetic response arising from either theology or (chemical) science, emanates 
from an encounter with the Christian God, and is not merely a ‘theistic' response, in 
the sense of an anonymous encounter with a nameless Numinous or Transcendent 
‘other’. Thus together with Polkinghorne I make a plea here for a natural theology 
that is not merely theistic but indeed Christian. He speaks in a memorable phrase of 
Einstein’s attitude towards God that ‘this attitude will not do for Christianity’, and that 
the ‘Christian God is the Ground of the hope of a destiny beyond death, both for 
human individuals and for the cosmos itself’. He, again memorably, rejects the 
‘semantic plasticity’ found in the writings of certain contemporary writers 
(Polkinghorne, 2004, pp. 93-96). Instead he advocates an overall theistic approach 
‘within the Christian context’ that draws ‘inspiration from the Bible, and in particular 
from the life and words of Jesus of Nazareth’ (Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 16): it must 
plainly be ‘of Christ’. 
Thus it is necessary to be clear who the Christ is: 
Do not let your hearts be distressed. You believe in God; 
believe also in me. There are many dwelling places in my 
Father’s house. Otherwise, I would have told you, because I 
am going away to make ready a place for you. And if I go 
and make ready a place for you, I will come again and take 
you to be with me, so that where I am you may be too. And 
you know the way where I am going.” Thomas said, “Lord, 
we don’t know where you are going. How can we know the 
way?” Jesus replied, “I am the way, and the truth, and the 
life. No one comes to the Father except through me. If you 
have known me, you will know my Father too. And from now 
on you do know him and have seen him.” Philip said, “Lord, 
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show us the Father, and we will be content.” Jesus replied, 
“Have I been with you for so long, and you have not known 
me, Philip? The person who has seen me has seen the 
Father! How can you say, ‘Show us the Father’? Do you not 
believe that I am in the Father, and the Father is in me? 
(John 14.1-10a) 
Hence from this passage and others we assert that Christ is God, yet quite plainly 
and again from this passage, is distinct from God known as ‘Father’. Elsewhere in 
scripture we know of God as ‘Spirit’. From this it is plain that there is a ‘three-ness’ 
within God, a ‘Trinitarian’ reality of God. And again, it follows that it is precisely the 
reality of the Trinity that must be being witnessed in any encounter in the natural 
world, if I contend that this world was created by God, which I do. Thus it is 
necessary to digress into Trinitarian theology, if only briefly, to explore the nature of 
the aesthetic experience that the scientist is seeing in their investigations. Having 
justified a natural theology theologically in Chapter 2, here I want to demonstrate 
what it is about specifically the Christian Trinitarian God that is being encountered in 
the natural world by those scientists who strive in this field. For this it will be 
necessary to move back into Christian revealed 'God-talk' to show the source of that 
which is revealed in the natural world. 
Christ is variously described in the Christian New Testament writings, as the One 
through whom all of creation emanates (Colossians 1.15-17), and together with this 
the One through-whom God created the eons or worlds - having the sense of 
creating both substance and time (see Hebrews 1.1-2).  
The manner in which the understanding of God as being Trinitarian came about, 
requires some explanation. At many places in the Hebrew Scriptures the Spirit of 
God is mentioned, yet in no place do we have a firm interpretation of the Spirit being 
of a differing personality or aspect of the Divinity. The Christian or New Testament 
scriptures, most especially in John’s Gospel yet elsewhere as well, declare the 
divinity of Christ. They also provide ample proof that this is what they knew to be 
asserting: the writers appreciated what their words amounted to (see for example 
John 20.31). Such proofs would appear to have been provided for those well versed 
in the Hebrew Scriptures such that they show Christ performing actions that could 
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only have been performed by someone who was God, in the understanding of such 
people. The effect was to create something of a happy confusion in that the early 
Jewish converts to the Christian religion, being fiercely monotheistic, were forced by 
such assertions to confront the reality that God was in heaven, and God was 
standing in front of them. Christ answered such confusion by stating that there was 
no difference in motivation and essence between the One He called His Father, and 
Himself. Furthermore Christ was careful to state that there was a hierarchy and that 
the Father was greater than Himself. 
In addition Christ spoke of the Spirit in new ways. He gave the Spirit’s Name, 
‘Paraclete’ and told of how there would be a sharing of something of Himself by the 
Spirit to his followers, the opening event of which Christian history knows as 
Pentecost (Acts 2). This afforded great power to the early Christian followers and 
caused considerable numbers of people to ‘be added to the number of’ disciples of 
Christ. 
As a result the early Christians witnessed absolutely to a monotheistic view of God 
and yet they were witnesses to three manifestations or persons of God, and indeed 
within God. Over the early centuries this witness became the doctrine of the Trinity 
as set forth in the pronouncement of councils of the early church. Such a realisation 
of relationships within God, naturally gave rise to thoughts of what the nature of 
these might be. Immediately it became clear that the Father and Son had a 
relationship of intense love shared with the Spirit. When questions arose as to how 
the Father could allow for His Son to experience such suffering in death, prior to His 
resurrection, parallels were drawn for example with the ancient account of Abraham 
and his son Isaac (Genesis 22) and the rightful treatment of a son by his father 
(Hebrews 5.7-10). 
The words of Proverbs 8 state: 
I love those who love me, and those who seek me find me. 
Riches and honour are with me, long-lasting wealth and 
righteousness. My fruit is better than the purest gold, and 
what I produce is better than choice silver. I walk in the path 
of righteousness, in the pathway of justice, that I may cause 
those who love me to inherit wealth, and that I may fill their 
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treasuries. The Lord created me as the beginning of his 
works, before his deeds of long ago. From eternity I was 
appointed, from the beginning, from before the world 
existed. When there were no deep oceans I was born, when 
there were no springs overflowing with water; before the 
mountains were set in place – before the hills – I was born, 
before he made the earth and its fields, or the beginning of 
the dust of the world. When he established the heavens, I 
was there; when he marked out the horizon over the face of 
the deep, when he established the clouds above, when the 
fountains of the deep grew strong, when he gave the sea his 
decree that the waters should not pass over his command, 
when he marked out the foundations of the earth, then I was 
beside him as a master craftsman, and I was his delight day 
by day, rejoicing before him at all times, rejoicing in the 
habitable part of his earth, and delighting in its people. 
(Proverbs 8.17-31) 
This passage when viewed in context, is speaking of the wisdom of God present at 
and in, the Genesis creation act(s). The point has already been made (in the context 
of this book) that a Christian view of these matters must be ‘of Christ’ and reflective 
of Him - simply a theistic view will not do. Since Christ is known in Christian tradition 
as both the power and wisdom of God (1 Corinthians 1.24), it is a simple matter to 
identify the properties of the wisdom of God spoken about here in Proverbs - that 
sense of extravagant joy and delight in admiring the creative act - as being 
signatures of the Christ through whom the Universe was created. By way of 
illustration of this point see for example Enid Mellor (Mellor, 1999, pp. 60, 61) who 
comments on how the ‘new testament writers are using Proverbs 8 to fill out what 
they want to say about Jesus’ and also J D Martin who is explicit that ‘many … 
regard the presentation of wisdom in Proverbs … as an hypostatis, an aspect of the 
Godhead’, (Martin, 1995, pp. 87, 88).  Furthermore, for where what is said of wisdom 
is being conflated with both the promised messianic king and with God, see Brown, 
Fitzmyer and Murphy, 1990, p.457. Yet from Genesis 1 it is plain that it was the Spirit 
present also at Creation. This apparent tension between the Son and the Spirit as to 
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which Person of the Trinity we should be referring to, had already been resolved and 
indeed dissolved much earlier by one of the Church Fathers, Irenaeus, who in his 
Book IV, chapter 20.3, of Against the Heresies remarks:  
I have also largely demonstrated, that the Word, namely the 
Son, was always with the Father; and that Wisdom also, 
which is the Spirit, was present with Him, anterior to all 
creation, He declares by Solomon: ‘God by Wisdom founded 
the earth, and by understanding hath He established the 
heaven. By His knowledge the depths burst forth, and the 
clouds dropped down the dew.’ (Irenaeus, 2015) 
He then goes on to quote parts of the same passage from Proverbs 8 given above. 
Earlier in this same chapter 20 of his book IV Irenaeus, having explicitly identified the 
Word made flesh with the Christ and the Spirit with Wisdom, explains that the same 
God who ‘made all things by the Word …. adorned them by [His] Wisdom’. And so 
we have the sense of the power of creating aspects of the physical world exercised 
by the Word and the power of communicating their properties being exercised by the 
Spirit. This accords well with Christ’s own explanation of the actions of the Spirit 
when he states: 
But when he, the Spirit of truth, comes, he will guide you into 
all truth. For he will not speak on his own authority, but will 
speak whatever he hears, and will tell you what is to come. 
He will glorify me, because he will receive from me what is 
mine and will tell it to you. Everything that the Father has is 
mine; that is why I said the Spirit will receive from me what is 
mine and will tell it to you. (John 16.13-15)  
God is being shown to act and then within God-self to communicate those actions; 
the Word in the flesh performed actions at Creation, performed actions whilst 
amongst us and then in history these truths are communicated by the Spirit. In fact 
this action of communication goes far beyond mere speech as we might see it. In 
this way the Wisdom of God is seen to be communicating the character of God as 
manifest in the actions of the Word of God in Creation, which are precisely these 
perceptions of glory, of wonder and of beauty when confronted by the physical or 
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natural world. These perceptions far exceed mere ‘feelings’: they are the gifting of 
the power to act on account of the realisation of whom it is that gave rise to these 
perceptions: God is revealed through ‘His two “hands”, the Son and the Spirit, [….] 
who made the world through them’ (Sherry, 2002, p. 4). It is worth noting that Jesus 
as a human being was always God from the moment of the Incarnation yet was only 
revealed and communicated to those around Him as the Christ, the Messiah, after 
the Spirit came upon Him at his baptism. It was after this event that the Gospels start 
to record the ‘signs and wonders’. It can be seen that God in Creation is revealing 
himself to people and becoming active as Cause, Maker and Perfecter (Sherry, 
2002, p. 5 after Gregory of Nazianzus). Perhaps many could make an artefact but 
only a ‘master craftsman’ can ‘perfect’ and ‘adorn’ it. 
I note the words of John’s Gospel 1.17-18: ‘For the law was given through Moses, 
but grace and truth came about through Jesus Christ. No one has ever seen God. 
The only one, himself God, who is in the bosom of the Father, has made him known’. 
From this it is plain that a Spirit-communicated and Christ-centric view of action in 
the creative sphere, is quite naturally accompanied by feelings of joy, of delight 
towards the One who created them, of a sense of artistry, of a delight in and with 
those in the world, and all of this is clear from the Proverbs 8 quotation. I am 
speaking here of the reaction of observers, people, to aspects of the creative power 
being exercised within the natural world. The descriptions here are quite distinct from 
for example the words of Psalm 19 which speaks of the grandeur of the created 
world. Now here in contrast we are naming the agency through whom these very 
artefacts over which we rejoice, were and are created: there is every sense in which 
these created entities are reflective of the ‘master craftsman’ who gave birth to them. 
Thus the created artefacts give rise to a sense of joy simply on account of the 
craftsmanship, the mark of the Maker, of the artefacts so created. And as we have 
already pointed out, this Person is the one who ‘is love’ (1 John 4.16) and is in this 
Trinitarian relationship of love, within God Himself. And since it is Christ who has 
‘made him known’, it is an attribute of Christ as communicated to us by the Spirit, 
that any sense of wonder or delight at aspects of the created world and its creative 
powers, is witnessed to, when those in it experience such appreciations. It is a 
reaction borne quite naturally out of the nature of whom God is, that both God 
Himself and those He has created, should experience a sense of joy, of marvelling 
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at, the craftsmanship of the artefacts in the created world, marvelling at the context 
of the ‘habitable earth’ which sustains these natural wonders. These natural wonders 
are many and various and include those seen in chemistry research. It is important 
to note that this conclusion has been drawn both when seen from a theological 
perspective as in the brief exegesis of the Proverbs pericope above, as well as from 
the reactions of scientists themselves (as noted in the work of Derkse above). There 
is a distinct separation between the Creator and created, yet we witness to a 
communication such that the source of Creation is being alluded to within that which 
is created. 
3.2.4 Which Critical Realism? 
In conclusion, I adopt a version of critical realism in response to the created world. It 
is ‘realistic’ in that it involves sensory interaction of and with the real world, an 
objectivity outside of oneself. It persists in being ‘critical’ in that this form of realism 
retains a sense of the contingent. The chosen approach to critical realism must allow 
for a causal link, however loosely revealed, between the God who created the 
Universe and the created artefacts (and their beauty) which show forth that creative 
action. There is therefore a rational explanation for the arising of a perception of 
beauty and this rational explanation amounts to a cause for the arising of such 
perceptions. Bhaskar explicitly rejects the existence of any such form of 
‘ontologically basic’ explanation (Bhaskar, 1997, pp.49,50), which plainly 
Polkinghorne, Soskice and others affirm, and appeals instead in the same place to 
‘generative mechanisms of nature’. From this it appears reasonable to suggest a 
difficulty at the heart of Bhaskar’s argument since if nature can support a fixed 
‘generative mechanism’ surely this amounts to an ‘ontologically basic’ explanation for 
whatever event is being described? In addition, surely a God who created the 
Universe could plausibly put in place just such mechanisms? And these perceptions 
are not epistemically relativistic precisely because they can be perceived by persons 
working in differing disciplines. 
The Christian is enlightened by the example of Christ and is thus emboldened to 
serve their neighbour in the messiness of the everyday. Their unfolding and at times 
unpredictable experience of the natural world constantly leaves them aghast at the 
new possibilities and indeed realities of creation. For both the Christian and the non-
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Christian such an unfolding experience includes any practice of the scientific method 
in realising these new possibilities, possibilities that are themselves falsifiable: 
…. why go to the trouble involved in doing science if one 
does not believe that thereby we are learning what the 
physical world is actually like? If you take this realist view, 
then unpredictabilities will not be seen as unfortunate 
epistemological deficits but rather as signs of an actual 
ontological openness to the future (Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 
79)  
This sense of humility in the face of the grandeur and mystery of what God has 
created - and is redeeming! - in Christ, should serve us well. Our minds, constantly in 
hope seeking God’s Spirit in guidance, our forever modelling and remodelling our 
responses. As a result and as Ian Barbour remarks, ‘Christianity should never be 
equated with any metaphysical system’, there being dangers in seeking to box God 
into our own view of things (Barbour, 1990, p. 30). For this reason it would appear to 
be entirely valid to abstract and re-use aspects of differing models, in a continuing 
quest to seek to answer that which ‘burns within us’ (see Jeremiah 20.9 and Luke 
24.32) whilst insisting that it is God who put the Universe in place. Barbour speaks in 
the same place of taking a position of ‘independence’ within an overall embracing 
attitude of dialogue when discussing the place of humanity within creation, and this 
would appear to be the most sensible form of realism; truly resting upon an 
evidence-based system of exploration.  
3.2.5 The Aesthetics of Chemistry 
Within this present section we are attempting to delineate the field within which 
meaningful discourse may be held between natural scientists and theologians. It 
appears that the ‘meta’ language of science as expounded in the Philosophy of 
Science may be most fruitful.  
McGrath argues: 
the Christian understanding of the ontology of creation 
demands a faithful investigation of nature. For this reason, 
the exploration of the interface between Christian theology 
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and the natural sciences is to be regarded as ontologically 
motivated and legitimated. Yet the Christian doctrine of 
creation is not limited by the demand that we see nature as 
creation; it has a highly significant Christological component 
(McGrath, 2001, p.24) 
In a section toward the end of this part of the project we shall return to this point that 
McGrath raises: where in our appreciation of the significance of nature as observed 
does our gaze turn from nature to the centrality of Jesus? And can we agree with 
McGrath that meaningful discourse between Christianity and the natural sciences 
holds significance only in terms of the nature of our existing? Is it not rather to do 
with an encounter between an individual and the person of Jesus? Indeed, is not our 
understanding of aesthetics shaped by an encounter with God in Christ (Psalm 27.4, 
Song of Solomon 2.1, Matthew 6.28, 29)? 
Before coming to any conclusions in this section it should be noted that McGrath 
makes much of the appreciation of aesthetics (McGrath, 2001, pp.234-240) saying 
for example:  
A strong doctrine of creation (such as that associated with 
Christianity) leads to the expectation of a fundamental 
convergence of truth and beauty in the investigation and 
explanation of the world, precisely on account of the 
grounding of that world in the nature of God. (McGrath, 
2001, p.240) 
This author would agree in large measure. However he then goes on in the same 
place to conflate the ‘nature of the Creator’ with the ‘ordering and regularity of 
creation’. We seem to have arrived at an appreciation of aesthetics which has to do 
with this same ‘ordering and regularity’. Surely if beauty is solely or largely about 
order and regularity it would be a poor subject of study indeed. 
Furthermore Alan Padgett rightly cautions that not all appreciation of beauty is the 
same:  
What counts as a beautiful solution in mathematics is one 
guide to a good answer to a problem, yet what counts as a 
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beautiful solution in chemistry is quite different. In both a 
kind of rational elegance is seen as a kind of guide to a good 
answer, but what counts as elegant in these disciplines is 
distinct (Padgett, 2012, p.94).  
Perhaps the following quotation from Roald Hoffmann will illustrate to the reader the 
way in which the aesthetic ideal in chemistry truly illustrates the arresting manner in 
which the human mind can transcend the physical and apprehend beauty in a 
remarkable and truly metaphysical sense, whilst being rooted in the physical world: 
I recently saw a beautiful molecule in the literature. The 
authors, E. Nakamura and collaborators (Nakamura, E.; 
Tahara, K.; Matsuo, Y.; Sawamura, M.: 2003, ‘Synthesis, 
Structure, and Aromaticity of a Hoop- Shaped Cyclic 
Benzenoid [10]Cyclophenacene’, Journal of the American 
Chemical Society, 125 (10), 2834-35), explained by way of 
introduction how they and others had long sought to make 
‘hoop’ type compounds, in which there is delocalization of 
electrons around a finite cylinder. Note the muddle of 
compounds (materials), molecules, and models in my, and 
their, language. (Hoffmann, 2003, p.3) 
Here beauty is said to be being represented in an entire confusion of attributes of the 
process: there is the physical that can be seen (the compounds and their physical 
presence), in the discreet output or product as a molecule (which can not be seen 
and only inferred from the sampling apparatus), in the ‘paper’ representations of that 
product (where the diagrams may, as is often the case, be drawn such that they are 
‘pretty’ and not) and finally in the language used to describe the result. The aesthetic 
ideal in chemistry is plainly borne out of the training, experience and contextual 
appreciation (the history of achievement to date and the professions’ hopes for the 
future) of the practitioners. There is an attitude which speaks of an ability to 
appreciate the wonderment as perceived. 
From what does this ‘attitude’ arise? How might the didactic process of acquiring 
scientific knowledge, sufficient for a lifetime of service, be described? Padgett is right 
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to compare two disciplines with distinctive rules and traits, and into which 
researchers are as-it-were inducted as apprentices:  
To learn a natural or human science is not simply to be 
trained in pure a priori logical reasoning or in universal 
axiomatic systems of deductive truth, but is closer to being 
apprenticed into a valuable skill which requires mentoring 
into a community of experts, a way of thinking, an angle of 
vision, and a specific labor. A student of any specialized 
science is thus inducted into a community of truth-seeking 
fellow scientists, whose reasoning is shaped by that tradition 
of inquiry ..... The epistemological values which are 
embedded in the contingent, historical, and humanly 
constructed sciences (academic disciplines) are not pure 
noetic truths – at least, most of them are not – yet with 
successful and fruitful sciences they should be given prima 
facie epistemic warrant unless there is some reason to 
doubt them. So the specific sciences are best understood as 
using both formal and informal logics (Padgett, 2012, p.94) 
The point being that it is as the human researcher plays with, elaborates upon, builds 
upon, those rules which have shaped their training in chemistry, creating and forming 
new methodologies, processes and products - it is under such circumstances that 
beauty is perceived: very much in the practical ’doing’ of it. Beauty can be shown (to 
the individual, to you) by others and then experienced oneself, yet it transcends 
explanation (Derkse, 1997, p.48).  
Chemistry has already been described as breaking down the barriers between 
nature and art (Brooke and Cantor, 2000, pp.315, 319, 329) and although the 
authors speak here of chemists ‘defying’ nature, elsewhere through Process 
theologies as discussed below, it could even be suggested that it is ‘deifying’ nature. 
Yet this discussion of defying and deification can be set aside if we start to see 
beauty as using our God-given faculties to interact with what God in Christ has 
provided: to create and renew, to interpret and codify, through a vision of this ‘beauty’ 
as our guide. Now there is no longer the need to distinguish nature and artifice in 
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scientific (chemical) research: the prejudice against chemistry as being ‘unnatural’, is 
set aside. 
And it is precisely an envisioning of this aesthetic sense and sensing, when we 
employ the language of beauty, which is of importance. It is not that we should all 
agree precisely on a particular aesthetic standard, or that the thing which is 
aesthetically pleasing in the arts has the same qualitative value as something 
perceived in the sciences. Indeed Schummer in part suggests that this is a lost 
cause (Schummer, 2003, p. 98). No, it is rather that there is a ‘something’ which 
participants can declare exhibits similarity between the artistic and natural scientific 
disciplines, which we can agree to call ‘beauty’ and which is not (simply) a feeling or 
an emotion, yet rather possesses true value and points to something beyond that 
which can be measured. (And of course we are using ‘similarity’ in the same sense 
as used in the preceding section). At times this sense of true value is expressed as 
that aspect of beauty which inspires and guides innovation, that is, the origin for new 
ideas (Schummer, 2003, p.99): it is thus in that sense real and concrete. In fact we 
must move beyond that sense of the beautiful which merely satisfies a need to see 
something pretty, to that sense of the aesthetic ideal which drives us toward ever 
greater achievement, an ever greater encounter with the thrilling truth of the real. 
This Schummer expresses in the same place as the ‘aesthetic experience 
[becoming] part or even a driving force of the research process’. Here the ‘research 
process’ is human endeavour expressed in chemical explorations, yet who would or 
could disagree that it is a similar desire to see excellence in the aesthetic realm 
which drives artists of all descriptions towards ever greater creations? (It is helpful to 
note that any response to perceived aesthetic excellence can be both subjectively 
and culturally mediated, demonstrating that our sense experience is the mechanism 
and the person is the interpreter, leaving the notion of the perception of beauty as 
aesthetic excellence, intact - Schummer, 2003, pp.81, 82). Once again it appears 
entirely rational to attest to the concrete reality and utility of the aesthetic ideal of the 
beautiful.  
Crucially for our present study, Schummer was attempting in this noteworthy paper 
to ‘investigate if certain parts of chemistry are comparable to the fine arts’ 
(Schummer, 2003, p.74) and it should not therefore, given that as he says the 
‘theories of art are rather divergent and frequently in too bad a shape for that 
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purpose’, surprise us when he says that ‘chemists’ claim to the beauty of certain 
molecules cannot be justified, because every attempt at developing an aesthetics of 
molecules finishes up in a blind alley’ (Schummer, 2003, pp.97-98). It is questionable 
to declare something to be impossible simply because it has not yet been done. He 
states on the following page, and I have already alluded to this above, that aesthetic 
experience guides and inspires innovative ideas in chemical research and that future 
work should explore ‘where and how aesthetic experience becomes part or even a 
driving force of the research process’ (Schummer, 2003, p.99). Plainly it is logically 
impossible for something to not exist and also to be a ‘driving force’ in something. 
Thus in summation of Schummer’s argument, beauty in chemistry exists and is a 
‘driving force’, we simply don’t know why or indeed how, if we go searching for an 
explanation in the fine arts. Furthermore whatever type of beauty we are talking 
about that is so fundamentally important that it orchestrates chemical research, it is 
not the same type as that seen in a fine painting or sculpture, but utterly crucially it is 
beauty and the chemistry is beautiful. (In passing it should be noted that this form of 
the beautiful exists in other more modern disciplines, including software design. 
Padgett above also speaks of beauty in mathematics and there is I would suggest 
even less likelihood of establishing a connection between mathematics and the fine 
arts on the basis attempted by Schummer). 
And what of the researcher, now as we can see so often driven by a sense of the 
beautiful, what of their response to that experiencing of the non- or un- scientific (if 
ignorance of the how and why can be termed ‘unscientific’) within themselves, as 
giving them that real urge to tap the aesthetic in their work? Frequently they respond 
with gratitude, respect, reverence and even adoration (Derkse, 1997, p.52) and as 
Derkse goes on to say in the same place, such responses can only be given 
meaning, can only be correctly understood, when seen in the light of those 
transcendental experiences of religious believers. These and other such ‘motivators’ 
come from a joy in revelling at one’s connectedness to those one cares about and 
loves. Not only is scientific language redundant at this point, it becomes subsumed 
into the exchange between God and those He has created as being reflective of all 
that we have been given to ‘rule and subdue’ (Genesis 1.28), indeed all that is there 
and that He has put there, for us to recognise Him by. Derkse does not go quite so 
far, however such a relational interaction between as he puts it, ‘person and Person’ 
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may now be shown to be what is at work in such reactions to scientific exploration 
and achievement. Derkse himself gives some weight to such conclusions through 
the conflating of these responses (that is the responses being described here, of 
perceptions of the beautiful) to those experienced in for example musical 
appreciation.  
In conclusion on this point we appear to have determined that the language of 
aesthetics, of wonder, pattern, form and simplicity (used within models to reduce 
complexity), of elegance [in the sense of the art of making a good choice (Derkse, 
1997, p.49)]: all these are seen in both theology and science. If we are to achieve 
any form of common language or understanding between theology and chemistry, it 
would seem that we can look here. More than this, chemistry as a scientific discipline 
is the discipline which powerfully demonstrates this ability to bridge any perceived 
gap; again it is the scientific discipline where-in that which is beautiful may often with 
ease, be apprehended. Yet caution must be exercised in transplanting the exact 
notions of aesthetic quality from one discipline to another - there is context-
dependency to consider as mentioned elsewhere. In this book I appeal to the human 
capacity to discern aesthetic quality in the practice of any given discipline, as a 
wondrous attribute. Derkse for example speaks of scientists experiencing certain 
traits as being ‘aspects of beauty’ (Derkse, 1997, p.48). This I assert is itself 
indicative of a metaphysical quality to human thought: humans can envision beyond 
that which is perceived. In addition I remind the reader that only certain aspects of 
contemporary chemistry are being surveyed. It is a very wide field of endeavour and 
not all aspects may equally or at all, show aspects of beauty to the enquirer. 
Yet even if the scientist, our ‘honest enquirer’, is enabled to discern a numinous or 
even a transcendent quality to perceptions of their work and exploration in the 
chemical sciences (the beginnings of a natural theology), they have little reason to 
suppose that such attributes come about as a result of the Christian God being 
demonstrated through such a natural theology. In this conversation between the 
natural theologian informed by chemistry, and their chemical scientist, how do they 
point the way to the Christian God? What forms of theology might be suitable? In 
what follows I will discuss the suitability of one candidate theology that has at times 
been implied: Brooke and Cantor speak of ‘a kind of process theology’ (2000, p. 
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315). From this it is clear that an aspect of the Whiteheadean scheme is in view 
given that it lies at the root of such thinking. 
3.2.6 Process Theology: a Child of Certain Strands of Process Thought 
In the discussion of natural theologies above, the components of such a theology 
that were commensurate with a rational epistemology, were set out. Natural 
theologies are part of the discipline of Systematics. A natural theology on its own, 
being as it is separate from revealed theologies, is not a complete systematic 
theology. A natural theology, if it is to be part of an holistic understanding of the 
Christian God must demonstrate a coherence with and a context within, such a more 
complete systematic theology. 
Amongst those authors where Chemistry has been explored, aspects of certain 
Process Theologies have most frequently been used to underpin the connections 
between Chemistry and natural theology. A brief exploration of what these Process 
Theologies are will now be embarked upon. There remains the whole question of the 
underpinnings of Process metaphysics and its suitability for establishing a coherent 
and meaningful view of reality. There is in this manner a considerable separation 
between the fundamental initial thought and the way that thought has been 
developed into various stands of metaphysics. These will be dealt with later. 
The beginnings of the philosophies associated with such theologies are most often 
associated with Alfred North Whitehead whose Gifford lectures of 1927-28 will form 
the basis of our initial understandings. Whilst I have used the term ’a systematic 
theology’ as the generic term for an individual coherent set of understandings of the 
Christian God which would then underpin a strategy for drawing the Chemical 
sciences into a partnership with natural theology, Whitehead uses ‘speculative 
philosophy’ as the ‘necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every 
element of our experience can be interpreted’ (Whitehead, 1978, p.3). This definition 
is at least helpful in that it is analogous to our own search for a systematic theology 
to underpin our natural theology.    
Process theologies deriving from this philosophy have developed considerably from 
their early beginnings making precise judgements about what contemporary 
philosophers and theologians mean, difficult. Donald Viney for example holds that 
Whitehead believed in the objective reality of God (Viney, 2014, p.4), but given what 
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follows it will be seen that this is in no way clear and certainly modern followers of 
this movement would certainly not believe in God’s concrete existence. As a result it 
will be necessary to collect certain common understandings or traits rather than 
expecting to find exact or precise definitions common to all Process thinking. 
The first and most important of these comes from Whitehead himself: 
the way in which the contemporary actual entities are 
relevant to the 'formal' existence of the subject in question is 
the first example of the general principle, that objectification 
relegates into irrelevance, or into a subordinate relevance, 
the full constitution of the objectified entity. Some real 
component in the objectified entity assumes the role of being 
how that particular entity is a datum in the experience of the 
subject. In this case, the objectified contemporaries are only 
directly relevant to the subject in their character of arising 
from a datum which is an extensive continuum. 
(Whitehead,1978, p.62)  
Thus Whitehead contends that the truth or reality of something has to do with its 
‘becoming’ within this ‘extensive continuum’, rather than any static ontological 
identity: ‘each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic process’ 
(Whitehead, 1978, p.215). A contemporary commentator, Rod Garner, puts it 
differently but says much the same: ‘change defines the surface of things, however 
much we crave the consistencies of habit and routine’ (Garner, 2011, p.86). 
Furthermore ‘god’ is often in Process thought also included as one of these forever-
changing ‘somethings’, and in consequence there can be no ‘god’ that is an objective 
reality or person or God outside of this temporal sphere. As Viney remarks: 
Implicit in traditional theism’s doctrine of creation are the 
ideas that God’s creative act and God’s knowledge of the 
world are non-temporal …. Process theism takes a contrary 
view that time is the process of creation. (Viney, 2014, p.4) 
In some Process thought ‘god’ is allowed to remain as an objective reality with which 
humans work in partnership to realise the constant development of the physical 
realm, and certainly Brooke and Cantor describe Priestley as thinking in this manner 
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(Brooke and Cantor, 2000, pp.326-329). Thus the notion of salvation in the sense of 
human progress and flourishing is perceived as being about humans working 
together with God in partnership: ‘Redemption, understood as the duty and joy of 
holding the world dear, is something we undertake in partnership with God, and all 
friends of God’ (Garner, 2011, pp.95-96). In fact Whitehead went so far as to say ‘It is 
as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God’ 
(Whitehead, 1978, p.348), which I imagine is an expression of some ultimate form of 
partnership. It is this aspect of partnership which is also a common trait in Process 
thought. 
The reader will immediately notice a confusion in precisely what a ‘god’ or ‘God’ is in 
this field. Is God an objective reality or a construct of the mind welling-up into a 
society (see Whitehead, 1978, pp.34-35); does God uphold the Universe He created 
or is He a fellow-traveller within this physical world or again some construct of the 
human mind and society? When Johanna Seibt (2013, p.1) describes Process 
philosophies in terms of the ‘role of mind in our experience of reality as becoming’ 
we start to understand that these ways of understanding the Universe around us 
have to do with objectifying the reality of collective human consciousness. In this way 
the only things that are apparently fixed are in fact ‘dynamic organisations that arise 
due to the continuously ongoing interaction of processes’ (Seibt, 2013, p.1), and 
societies are one such. 
It is plain why theologies deriving from Process philosophies might be thought useful 
in ‘exploring the space between chemistry and natural theology’ (Brooke and Cantor, 
2000, p.315): chemistry might indeed be seen as a partnership between the creative 
divine and humans creatively working with the tools the divine has provided. 
Furthermore in perceiving God as part of this physical world, revelatory theologies 
are circumvented (Viney, 2014, p.53) and there is no supernatural intervention into 
this natural world (Viney, 2014, p.6), thus fitting the definition of a natural theology. 
Such theologies however are never far from considerations of theodicy and the 
passibility of God: once chemistry can be seen to improve matters, questions of the 
harms it may also cause and the potential vulnerabilities of a God who allows 
humans to work in partnership with Him, are more readily entertained.  
In this regard, Arthur Peacocke remarks: 
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in recent years process theologians have extensively used 
the analogy in the form self:body::God:world ….. [Where] 
holistic conceptions of the human person which have arisen 
in response to scientific knowledge and which conceive the 
’self’ and the ‘body’ as two aspects of one total unity, then 
serve in combination with this analogy to facilitate a non-
interventionist way of thinking of God’s agency in the world 
…. (Peacocke, 1993, p.167) 
Hence a knowledge of God in the world is perceived by action through an agency. 
Later Peacocke goes on to state that whilst God may validly be perceived as the 
‘ultimate Reality’, God also gives this being ‘to all other, dependent realities that 
constitute the world’ and that in this sense God can not be unchanged through such 
a sharing and thus that the ‘dynamic divine’ is both becoming as well as being 
(Peacocke, 1993, p.184). In terms of an understanding of the nature of God as 
explained through the Christian scriptures, it again would be challenging to think of 
God as ‘becoming’ when Christ is described as being the same ‘yesterday, today and 
forever’ (Hebrews 13.8). Yet Peacocke later says that such an understanding of the 
‘becoming God’, provides the basis for the possibility and indeed hope that ‘the 
immanence of God in the world might display, in humanity at least, a hint of, some 
kind of reflection of, the transcendence/immanence of God’ (Peacocke, 1993, p.187). 
However from this, it is once again more difficult it would seem to sustain a natural 
theology that might speak of revealing or hinting at, the underlying presence of 
specifically the Christian God upholding and sustaining the Universe, having created 
it ex nihilo. Peacocke goes on to deny the physical resurrection of Christ (Peacocke, 
1993, p.281) since this is inconsistent with our understanding of what happens 
physiologically at death. The ancients were not ignorant of such detail (John 11.39) 
and yet on the basis of the evidence before them, chose to believe. Thus the 
language employed here of a Process Theology is not sustaining of an orthodox 
Christian faith: as Polkinghorne remarks ‘the process God does not seem to be the 
One who could have raised Jesus from the dead’ (Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 19). 
Process theology does not provide a bridge as utilised in this specific instance, 
between the natural sciences and the Christian Faith. It is important however to note 
that Peacocke is attempting to navigate a way through competing visions of God 
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where the one suggests God as invariant, unchanging Creator, infinitely good and as 
such incapable of walking and being alongside humanity, and the other a God who is 
touched by and through human suffering yet in consequence (according to the 
argument) is incapable of being that God supreme residing outside of the created 
world. 
In a preceding section in which some contemporary context to the study of chemistry 
was given, I remarked how a traditional natural theology cannot be applied to a 
physical science for which the objects of study are not fixed, not immutable, nor 
created ‘naturally’ in the sense of having arisen without human intervention. To 
some, Process thought could be applied here in that it is useful when framing a 
‘speculative philosophy’ around ever-varying objects or objects whose ontologies are 
best expressed in terms of their necessary changeability. This I find an unconvincing 
argument: chemistry makes use of often hidden yet still very real fixed laws or rules 
of combination and transformation, to create new compounds and associated 
productive processes. Each such ‘product’ then has application and utility conferred 
upon it precisely on account of its structure and attributes: properties which are in 
that sense immutable in their application. There is no need to invoke Process 
thought to accommodate a newly discovered efficacious compound, metaphysically. 
It might be useful to note in passing that whereas in this section I have been 
speaking of Process thought as it impacts theology, Ross Stein has made a case for 
describing  chemistry in Process terms from a purely secular view point (Stein, 2004, 
pp.5-22). Because Process thought sees itself as a systematic treatment of reality as 
already explained, to in a sense ‘qualify’ as a fully Process-driven analysis, a system 
must exhibit several traits: yes, Process thought sees the reality of a system as 
expressed in its dynamic properties as opposed to any static ontologies, yet it should 
in addition be shown to have an identity formed teleologically: what a something is, is 
what it is in its ‘becoming’. Many chemical systems exhibit a profoundly dynamic 
quality where relationships between individual objects are constantly being made 
and broken, and then re-made. The water in a dark closed container at 5 Celsius and 
one atmosphere of pressure is just such a system where hydrogen bonds between 
oxygen and hydrogen nuclei are constantly in flux. Yet overall it is simply a glass of 
water. It is not in any Process sense, ‘becoming’ anything other than a glass of 
water. It is perfectly true that, as Process thought teaches, it would be insufficient to 
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describe a glass of water as simply a collection of molecules of H2O and that it must 
be more fully understood as a dynamic series of interactions between such 
molecules: but it is not ‘going’ anywhere, it is not ‘becoming’ something other than a 
body of water; the full reality of that glass of water is fascinating but is more readily 
described as a series of repeating processes, repeating endlessly, rather than a 
process directed towards an end. This is a very restricted example, but the reader 
may also wish to explore so-called chemical Redox reactions where a manufacturing 
process does not fully move from starting materials to product and waste yet rather 
achieves an equilibrium where, dependent upon the physical context, more or less 
quantities of product co-exist with starting materials and waste: the reaction itself is 
constantly happening in both forward and backward directions (see Appendix B for a 
brief introduction). Again, although it is undoubtedly dynamic, it is not moving 
decisively in any one direction yet rather constantly cycling about an equilibrium 
point. Slight variations in temperature, pressure, the medium within which the 
reaction is taking place and the concentrations of reactants, can all affect the relative 
amounts of starting materials, product and waste at the equilibrium state. Thus and 
again, the identity of such a chemical reaction does not lie in what it is becoming, it 
lies in where it has arrived once an equilibrium state in the reaction is reached. The 
sense of wonder experienced by the human observer perceiving such a Redox 
reaction is in the physical arrangement of the laws of the natural world, which enable 
such mechanisms to be a reality in the first place. Yet again, in defence of Process 
theory, I believe it would be wrong chemically to describe a glass full of water as an 
object, or a collection of objects; its ‘being’ is indeed dynamic and any 
comprehensive chemical account of its reality could only be made in descriptions of 
the forever processes that are taking place in the glass. Thus I would not wish to be 
described as being ‘obsessed with describing reality as an assembly of static 
individuals whose dynamic features are either taken to be mere appearances or 
ontologically secondary and derivative’ (Seibt, 2013, p. 1), whilst cautioning that it is 
more challenging to describe the glass of water as ‘becoming’ something. 
In considering the life and work of Christ within Whitehead’s magnum opus it is I 
believe instructive to note that the text-string ‘christ’ occurs five times and only once 
as ‘Christ’ ,whereas ‘god’ occurs very many times across its more than three 
hundred pages. Whitehead first presented his ideas as part of the Gifford lectures of 
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1928. There is no sense here of expecting to have a personal encounter with Christ 
contemporaneously known as a person, who like us is of the earth and yet who is 
also Divine. Significantly on this point, Ian Markham in countering a ‘naturalistic 
world-perspective’ sketches a ‘different framework within which to view life’: 
We share the insights offered by scientists on the mechanics 
of the story, but see these mechanics as a part of a greater 
whole. The cause, the heart, and the hope of the universe 
are goodness and love. This is what a theist means by God. 
God is a being that causes all things to be, who has the 
characteristics of personhood in that s/he can decide, feel, 
act, and is good. It is an optimistic view of the universe. The 
universe on this account is not ultimately inanimate, but 
personal. (Markham, 1998, p.19) 
Markham at this point in the text adds a footnote ‘This account of God is heavily 
influenced by process theology’. It is a profoundly anthropomorphic view of the 
ontology of God where the word ‘personhood’, signifying a human quality, is being 
used to qualify the being of God. And this analysis is not only true of Whitehead but 
also of Charles Hartshorne, who arguably as Whitehead’s expositor made his 
thought more accessible. Of Hartshorne’s interpolation of Process theology it is said 
that it is simply another ‘rationalist dogma’ and that the anthropomorphism of such 
‘remains unconquered by philosophical abstraction, even if it is spread thinly 
throughout the system’ and that his (Hartshorne’s) theology is ‘irretrievably 
anthropomorphic’ (Gunton, 1978, p.222). And yet when Gunton speaks in the same 
place of the ‘utter lunacy’ of taking such ‘rationalist dogmas’ seriously I think he has 
gone too far: in the life of Faith there is so much more, indeed there is an entire 
dimension beyond, the notion that the Universe is simply a container for mere 
objects that arrived here by accident. To crush a serious attempt to recognise that 
this dynamism informs much of the natural world is unfortunate. Perhaps at this point 
it would be useful to distinguish between Process thought or metaphysics and 
Process Theology: there are useful insights to be derived I would suggest from the 
observation that objects are at the micro-level not fixed; that much of our experience 
speaks to us of a world in flux. Of those who have developed such ideas into a 
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theology, it is plain that these are not orthodox Christian as I have said, however this 
should not allow us to negate the import of that initial observation. 
In speaking of Process theology, note that this view of God as expressed so far here, 
is not Trinitarian: nowhere is the utterly necessary rȏle of the Incarnation even 
alluded to, nor the divine ‘personhood’ of Christ or the Spirit. Once Christ is 
recognised for who he is, questions of the degree to which God feels pain or whether 
he can be appealed to, or whether indeed God effects change in the physical world, 
can surely be addressed in the facts of his birth, life, death and resurrection.  
Yet for Markham it appears that purposefulness in Creation equates to personhood, 
with perhaps a hint of panpsychism being accorded to a ‘something’ of, in or about, 
the Universe. Yet as elsewhere in writings on this movement, it can be difficult to 
discern precisely what is being spoken of: elsewhere Markham speaks of process 
being ‘the means by which truth is discovered’. Further exploration reveals that 
Markham is speaking of the flourishing of community as Christians work-out their 
calling of service to a multicultural world. Christ is not mentioned: it is all somewhat 
hopeless (Markham, 1998, pp.125-129). 
There is no sense in which the chemist enquirer into the Christian faith, in dialogue 
with a Christian might get that sense Brümmer implied, of the ‘penny dropping’ and 
of having that personal encounter with a personal God who has an interest and 
involvement with them contemporaneously in their life. And so I conclude that forms 
of theology deriving from Process thought are not suitable candidate theologies 
when looking for chemistry to inform a natural theology. 
3.2.7 Attempting to Resolve the Paradox of Simplicity Over and Within 
Complexity: how Should Order be Understood? 
The natural world is essentially and fundamentally an entity of indescribable 
complexity, yet those who seek to probe its mysteries frequently resolve its 
intricacies in their given field through descriptions that revel in simplicity as a 
necessary and desirable virtue. Those who are opposed to theistic explanations of 
the origins of creation have, as is well known, at times preyed upon the apparent 
paradox of the God who gave birth to such overwhelming complexity being also 
understood in simplicity in Christ and His earthly ministry, as reported in the Gospel 
accounts. We have above proposed one solution to this conundrum in suggestion 
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that the phenomenon of pattern might be understood as a form of reductionist grid 
over complexity, to forge the similitude of simplicity. Yet we can not speak of pattern 
within God in any meaningful sense (although as we shall see, we can speak of a 
pattern in manufacture). Our previous description works well for natural phenomena 
yet provides no answer when trying to understand how God in transcendence 
mediates a bridge between the faith world which through God’s grace is permitted to 
know Godself, and the secular world which seeks for proof in some sense, of God’s 
existence. 
Thus whilst McGrath, as noted above, speaks of order in the natural world as 
indicative of the God who gave birth to it, any person who seeks to distinguish the 
man-made from the natural within any picture of the natural landscape, simply looks 
for straight lines and ill-fitting materials to distinguish that which humans have 
imposed, from that which has arisen of its own accord. Thus the order being spoken 
of is that of rule and mechanism and not one of physical expression, of shape. 
Interesting Polkinghorne places in apposition the contrasting views of cosmic history 
of ‘unfolding creative improvisation’ versus ‘divinely pre-ordained score’, and in 
Christ I would suggest that both are in play (Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 54). Later 
Polkinghorne goes on to resolve this very point:  
The Father is the fundamental ground of creation’s being, 
while the Word is the source of creation’s deep order and the 
Spirit is ceaselessly at work within the contingencies of open 
history. The fertile interplay of order and openness, operating 
at the edge of chaos, can be seen to reflect the activities of 
Word and Spirit …. (Polkinghorne, 2004, p.81)  
A natural theology arising from an anthropological or merely human appreciation of 
order (and so making use of the so-called ‘Arguments from Design’ - teleological 
arguments) is not wholly sufficient for an understanding of the place of chemistry 
within the natural world. Chemistry, as has been remarked above, makes things and 
delights in the making of them. It works with the natural order to manipulate that 
which is given in the natural world, the tools of reaction mechanisms and the raw 
materials, to create new materials for the use of humanity, as a sign of that 
‘ontological openness to the future’ spoken of by Polkinghorne and as quoted above. 
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Brooke and Cantor (2000, p. 314), together with other commentators, have remarked 
how this means that a chemico-theology has not enjoyed a ‘high-profile’, yet such an 
approach arises from a misunderstanding of the role of human-created or ordered 
artefacts including medicaments, in the forging and fulfilling of what is apparently the 
will of God. 
It is now necessary to digress briefly to demonstrate that the Christian scriptures do 
in fact sanction humanly orchestrated artefacts and efforts in the gifting of God’s 
blessings. The point of this digression is to show that it is wrong to disqualify 
chemistry solely on the basis that its endeavours rest on that which humans have 
made: 
• Towards the end of the Book of the prophet Ezekiel, 
where a lengthy vision of a restored Israel is set out, and the 
glory of the Lord which had previously been shown to be 
departing the Temple has returned, a river is described lined 
with many trees, the leaves of which are to be used ‘for 
healing’ (Ezekiel 47.12). This account is echoed in the final 
book of the Bible, Revelation (22.1-2). Thus in a time of 
perfection, it will still be necessary for people to be preparing 
plant extracts for medicines.  
• In the well-known account of a king’s healing, a 
poultice of figs was prepared (Isaiah 38.12) 
• If the preparation of food might be considered a form 
of chemistry, it should be noted that Christ ordered a girl just 
raised from the dead, to be given something to eat (Luke 
8.55). 
• And finally and perhaps most importantly, humans in 
Genesis 1 are told to ‘rule over the earth and subdue it’ 
(Genesis 1.26). This instance as well as the command to 
build the desert tabernacle according to a God-given pattern 
(see Exodus 25.9, 10) including the instructions for preparing 
for example the incense, would seem to indicate that 
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followers of God are expected to build and create new 
materials, based upon patterns which God has already 
indicated (see note to Genesis 1.26 in the NET bible). 
It is God’s insistence on people manufacturing according to a ‘pattern’ gifted by God 
which frees such efforts of humans to work with the materials given in the natural 
world, from accusations that this line of reasoning is merely Process thought by 
another means. The following of a ‘pattern’, indeed a God-given pattern in 
manufacture, would seem to be more closely allied to the saying of Jesus that 
‘without me you can do nothing’ (John 15.5). 
In contrast, an insistence on a natural theology being reflective of the order God 
placed upon the chaos He faced prior to Creation, speaks in favour of predictability 
within the natural world. Yet when faced with the complexity of that world, prediction 
becomes immensely difficult, something we suffer from every day in the coming of 
for example the weather, or earthquakes. Within chemistry, outcomes in experiments 
are often so sensitive to fluctuations in temperature, pressure, solvents and 
concentrations, that reliable predictions of outcomes are again immensely hard to 
make. There is great complexity, which we seek to rule over through the formulation 
of models, which in effect create patterns within complexity to give a degree of 
predictability. The science of chemistry thus attempts to inject a semblance of order 
or intelligibility through the application of rigorous conditions upon experimentation, 
thus controlling outcomes to a degree. And ‘even when we understand it we are still 
in wonderment’ (Lazslo, 2003, p12). This ‘wonderment’ then is a sense of the intense 
intellectual stimulation when confronted not by one’s own ingenuity, but by the 
intricacies of the natural systems which together uphold and inform each specific set 
of experimental conditions and then give rise to outcomes; perhaps also there is 
wonderment at what it takes to control experimental conditions to achieve certain 
outcomes: here the complex has been ‘simplified’, until the next challenge 
approaches. And now suddenly within this ‘wonderment’ those experiencing it do in-
part make use of that ‘bridge’ between these two worlds of understanding we spoke 






3.3 Beauty as Bridge 
Here I state the reasons for utilising intimations of beauty as a bridge between 
chemistry and a natural theology.  
As has already been said, such a theology must be described in language that is 
intelligible to those who do not yet know Christ by faith, such that it may reasonably 
be seen as a destination of their enquiries into any natural theology informed by 
chemistry. Furthermore such a theology must in addition be perceived as lying fully 
within the orthodox Chalcedonian confession of the majority of Christian traditions. 
Yet such a theology can only be seen in the distance: it might be held by the one 
putting forward natural theological arguments and yet following its arguments does 
not constitute - as we have said above - the sum total of a valid Christian faith for the 
non-Christian honest enquirer. The latter type of Faith is the gift of God and only in 
His gift: it is not in the gift of human reason. 
Pannenberg in explaining a particular issue in an introduction to systematics, makes 
use of a phenomenon within the natural sciences to propose a theological 
understanding of God’s actions in the natural world (Pannenberg, 1991, pp.46,47). 
The point here being that an element of a rational understanding of God - a theology 
or component of a (systematic) theology - is being reflected back onto a well-known 
phenomenon in the physical world. This is important because it suggests that 
theologians with some understanding of scientific methodologies might bring into 
play aspects of an understanding of the Christian God in order to validate a 
comprehension of phenomena within the natural world. Again it must be stressed 
that we are explicitly not suggesting that this amounts to mutual agreement - that 
scientists would see the proof they require and that those that are not of the Faith 
feel compelled to become Christians on that basis - merely that a mechanism for 
dialogue in explaining similar phenomena has been provided between the disciplines 
of science and theology. (It will be remembered that chemists have within their own 
discipline proposed that similarity be used in the same way: where research 
chemists agree that where two processes are similar they allow for similar 
predictions or inferences of outcomes to be made).  
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Thus it is rational to assert that, that which Christians theologians and chemical 
scientists - speaking collectively - both claim to be an appreciation of the aesthetic 
importance of a given entity within their mutual fields of study, - this ability - can be 
understood as a glimpse of the (Christian) Transcendent; the language is the 
language of beauty which as we have shown is mutually intelligible (even when they 
may not agree over what constitutes ‘beauty’). 
 
 
3.4 An Expanded Vision of Beauty 
3.4.1 Beauty in Art 
This section expands upon the understanding of beauty in order that when a 
definition is proposed below I can be confident that the given definition encompasses 
a view of beauty that is not too narrow. 
Whilst art is anecdotally taken to mean classically such artefacts as paintings, 
sculpture or buildings, or performance in music and dance and now latterly might 
include the moving image as well as performance, I have as yet said nothing of the 
‘artfulness’ of constructions in for example software or forms in plastic materials and 
even representations existing purely as fixed digital images.  
Consider the human response to for example a classical Greek sculpture of the 
naked human form, perfectly executed. Consider the case where the original in its 
life-size rendition is called ‘beautiful’ by an art critic and then the photographic image 
of that sculpture is seen by millions, many of whom pass comment for example on-
line, that they too consider it beautiful. Makers of touristic merchandise now 
reproduce that same form in miniature, many thousands of times. In all likelihood no-
one would consider these reproductions to be beautiful. Would a life-size replica in 
plastic or fibreglass be considered beautiful? Probably not or at least there would be 
a question hanging over it. From this example it can be seen that beauty has to do 
with not only perceptions of shape, proportion, skill of execution but also novelty - a 
sense of uniqueness. One Rolls-Royce motorcar might be considered beautiful but 
forty in a row might not [and Edith Wyschogrod (2003, p. 82) addresses the tensions 
in this issue]. Consider a painting. Sitting in front of it for the first time, leaves the 
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visitor mesmerised. Forced to sit in front of it for hours at a time, their attention might 
begin to wander. Yet if that same visitor chose to gaze on the object several times a 
week over a period of time, their engagement with it is renewed on each occasion. 
Beauty has to do with shape, proportion, skill of execution, novelty and a fluid 
constant re-engagement by the watcher over whatever it is that is being observed. 
The person in life, in conversation, in communication, is considered beautiful this 
morning, this afternoon, tomorrow, but their static image will tire after a while. An 
appreciation of beauty is not static, it is a precession of the conscious mind as it 
engages with the beautiful; it is a moment-by-moment apprehension and then re-
apprehension of the beautiful, almost as though the moment is being renewed 
constantly: 
The judgement of beauty, it emerges, is not merely a 
statement of preference. It demands an act of attention. And 
it may be expressed in many different ways.” (Scruton, 2009, 
p. 15)  
and it is both the sense that there is a real something ‘out there’ as well as a whole 
variety of ways in which that existent beauty is expressed, that I wish to emphasise.  
Beauty is therefore about a something that ‘reaches to the underlying truth of a 
human experience’ - it is ontologically real as part of the full or complete process that 
probes the entirety of a human event: it is indeed ‘rationally founded’ (Scruton, 2009, 
pp. 129, 197). It is noticeable when it is absent and whilst it may be exhibited by the 
apparently statically beautiful (for example a painting or a sculpture) it is in fact part 
of the constantly living and probing nature of the human condition, and as such 
always in motion. For this reason and as I have already said, because the static 
image of the beautiful may tire after some time, yet that any re-engagement with the 
beautiful, can similarly re-awaken the sense that one is engaging with the beautiful, 
apprehensions of beauty are necessarily dynamic. There is the observer, the one 
pronouncing a judgement that something is beautiful, there is the ‘something’ being 
declared beautiful, but there is also the sense, the explanans, the living moment and 
typology, that holds that consideration in being. This must be so, else we should 
expect there to be one day a chemical injection, drug or treatment, that the moment 
it is effective would see all things perceived, as being beautiful. Anecdotally I assert 
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that this is most unlikely ever to happen: the movement of a footballer, solid cultured 
objects and forms, mathematical equations, song, images, memories of 
conversations, the shape of a smile, the list is very long and all have at times been 
considered beautiful. It is not the entity under consideration itself but the manner in 
which it is perceived that gives rise to the evaluation that something is beautiful. The 
observer is in a veritable conversation with the observed, and both are affected by 
the relationship. The one is now called ‘beautiful’ and the other is transported in 
his/her appreciation of that beauty. At times this may give rise to pleasure, or to a 
sense of wonder, or to awe bordering on fear or again other responses, emotions 
even, but as Graham Ward remarks, the beauty of it is a ‘thing’ of itself which then 
gives rise to a response: ‘beauty is an operation, a co-operation; it is not a property 
but the animator of the properties of an object’ (Ward, 2003, p. 38). 
An object declared to be ‘art’ is subject to beauty as the ‘animator’ of its properties, 
as Ward tells us above. Art therefore is a revealer of beauty, although by no means 
the only such:  
Art …. stands on the threshold of the transcendental. It 
points beyond this world of accidental and disconnected 
things to another realm, in which human life is endowed with 
an emotional logic that makes suffering noble and love 
worthwhile. Nobody who is alert to beauty, therefore, is 
without the concept of redemption - of a final transcendence 
of mortal disorder into a ‘kingdom of ends’. In an age of 
declining faith art bears enduring witness to the spiritual 
hunger and immortal longing of our species. (Scruton, 2009, 
p. 188) 
In showing that chemistry may be beautiful or more accurately a conveyor or 
portrayer of that which is beautiful, it plainly does also enable someone who is ‘alert 
to beauty’ to stand on the ‘threshold of the transcendental’. Derkse makes the same 
point as I note in chapter 2 above. In addition Scruton here makes the connection 
between art as something static (although its appreciation as I have said is not) and 
the motion of all humans towards the eternal. It is therefore reasonable on this basis 
 
143 
alone to expect perceptions of beauty to lead people towards the thought that there 
may be a God. 
 
3.4.2 Beauty as ‘Other’ 
It is now necessary to expand my treatment of beauty by discussing beauty as 
transcendent or ‘other’. This is so because as we have seen in the discussions on 
chemistry and as we will see again in a review of contemporary chemistry research 
papers below, when chemists speak of beauty it is frequently not about something 
which can be seen but about something that is interpolated through various 
measuring or modelling techniques. 
If beauty were like other things we know, we experience, we can manufacture, it 
would not be beauty. Beauty is gift as well as mystery; it is if not wholly unique then it 
is uniquely given at each place and moment where beauty is received as gift. As 
Edward Farley implies, it is 'other': 
a distorted egocentrism would use beauty to allay the 
anxieties that come with self-transcending temporality 
precisely because beauty in the reality of its atemporality 
points away from the temporal self to an 'other' (Farley, 
2001, p. 92) 
Farley also leads us away from the aesthetic way of life which in fact subverts 
Christ’s beauty and denies that beauty has to do with things which are simply pretty: 
if beauty is there for one's use, if it is something to be 
'experienced', then it must simply give pleasure. And to be 
oriented only to beauty's pleasure is to suppress the pathos 
that comes with the chaos, destabilisation and the mystery of 
beauty. These elements are present both in the classical 
view of beauty as harmony and in the Edwardian view of 
beauty as benevolence. To make ‘pleasurable experience' 
beauty's point suppresses ..... beauty and, like Philistinism, 
reduces beauty to the pretty…. 
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To make beauty everything, to press for its gifts, is to lose 
beauty … 
... aestheticism is a child of the distorted imago  
[To replace beauty with aestheticism means] the 
abandonment of beauty as an ordinary and relative good for 
beauty as something able to be secured and found 
(Farley,2001, p. 92) 
This is most important for if beauty were something that was only accessible by the 
privileged few (for example those leading an aesthetic way of life), or perhaps only 
by those who had access to some private gnosis or again only by those of a 
particular degree of taste, it is difficult to understand how the perception of 
something as beautiful could have Christ, who came to call humans from every ‘tribe, 
language, people and nation’ (Revelation 7.9) as its source. 
Having established that beauty speaks of the ‘other’ and is accessible to all, James 
Fodor shows that it can disclose new ways of seeing: 
In both its verbal and nonverbal forms, great art discloses a 
world that is startlingly new and strange—at least in contrast 
to the world most humans are accustomed to inhabiting. 
Many of us pass our days in a state of enchantment, 
absorbed in a world of illusion, fear, evasion and self-
deception. Art interrupts and unsettles these ‘normal’ 
patterns of seeing (Fodor, 2008, p.193). 
From this it can be seen how important an 'agent' such as chemistry is, as a vehicle 
for displaying beauty, since the place of its finding is so often also ‘chaotic and 
destabilising’, and certainly frequently ‘startling new and strange’. As for this 
strangeness, some of the papers discussed in Chapter 4 demonstrate a clear degree 
of ‘underdeterminedness’. The degrees of uncertainty often associated with 
discerning precisely what it is that one has found in chemical research, lend 
themselves to such a conclusion, as does the air of mystery surrounding where 
one's current position will allow one to go next. 
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Thus from an entirely different manner of approach we have similarly been able to 
establish that to discern beauty within one’s journey, in whatever part of one’s 
journey, is to have encountered the transcendent, the religious and the ethical as a 
result and to have touched God in some way as that ‘Other’: 
The Spirit continually draws us forth in acts interpreting the 
mystery of that which, in being itself, is also an intimation of 
the mystery of otherness. That at the heart of the beauty of 
God lies a profound irony, that irony might be understood as 
an intimation of divinity, leaves each of us suspended in so 
much that is understood (re-cognized) while not being 
grasped. Suspended in the experience of seeing through a 
glass darkly, laboring in an ineradicable hope, and glimpsing 
in the beauty of God that there is nothing, then, that cannot 
be redeemed (Ward, 2003, p. 65). 
This remark then neatly not only describes the telos of our conversation with our 
non-Christian friends and colleagues but also validates our hope that God might 
graciously reveal Himself to them in the beauty that they have in hope, encountered 
in their investigations; a beauty that is a signifier of Himself; a beauty that is indeed 
true and at its root similar, whether it is encountered in fine art, nature, chemistry or 




A survey of chemistry has been provided including aspects of its history, an 
understanding of some of its methodologies and an indication of where the discipline 
touches upon metaphysics. In addition, part of the objective of this chapter was to 
mark-out something of the contrasts between the natural science of chemistry as 
opposed to those of mathematics and physics. It would be rare to speak of for 
example ‘theoretical mathematics’ since the practice of research in mathematics is 
frequently entirely theoretical. Yet ‘theoretical chemistry’ is an important and 
flourishing branch of the discipline. For all that and in direct contrast to mathematics 
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and to a lesser extent of physics, chemical research has largely to do with the 
physical act of experimentation, with the practice throughout one’s time as a 
researcher, of using the techniques and expertise acquired in a time of 
apprenticeship. So much of chemistry relies on the physical ‘doing’ of it. Adequate 
explanations often rely on a dynamic synthesis of a priori considerations usually 
developed by theoretical chemists, together with models, similarities, experience and 
inference practiced by those who engage in the physical work. The results of the 
research frequently elicit a sense of wonder and of beauty. This latter is arrived at 
not merely because of that which can be apprehended by the physical senses, 
usually sight and smell, although in the case of plastics and modern fabrics through 
touch as well, but often is appreciated internally as a response to compounds and 
processes which can not be seen but only inferred. 
A theological accommodation has been established which is suited to a view of the 
natural world as worked-with in the chemical sciences. Such a view is also shown to 
be compatible with living in the contemporary everyday: a living that allows us to 
work through uncertainty and disappointment as well as with wonder and beauty, 
fully cognisant of the ‘rock from which we are hewn’ (Isaiah 51.1, Romans 9.30-33). 
We have seen how the language of aesthetics allows for mutual intelligibility 
between scientists and theologians in that it is recognised that in speaking of 
perceptions of beauty, they are speaking of the same thing. In order to facilitate a 
fuller exposition of beauty leading to a definition in chapter 6 below, I have also 
expanded our present vision or understanding of beauty through a brief survey of its 
apprehension in other disciplines.  
Foster’s and other’s work as explained in chapter 2 have allowed us to accurately 
peg our natural theology as being not deist but specifically Christian, through a 
revelation of the love of Christ mediated in the here-and-now through the Spirit, as 
being that which is visible in the wonders of creation (Proverbs 8.30). Such ‘wonders 
of creation’ enable the natural theologian, using a particular expression of the 
argument from design, to rationally make the case for the hand of the Divine, being 
visible in the embedded frameworks shaping the natural world. Thanks to Derkse’s 
insights it is possible to recognise the simplifying insights of the human mind making 
sense of the undoubted underlying complexities seen in nature. Throughout we 
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concur with the work of Plantinga as developed and then extended in chapter 1, 
about the importance of clear thinking in the discernment of warranted truth. 
We are now ready to explore certain recent research papers in chemistry, with a 
view to showing how in practice certain of these features of the discipline find their 





A Selective Survey of Current Organic Chemistry 
Research 
4.1 Purpose of the Survey 
The role of the aesthetic in chemical research has been explored elsewhere in this 
thesis and as such there is no need to prove its influence. This book is seeking to 
explore the usefulness of chemistry in a natural theology and whilst it might arguably 
have been possible to outline such a contribution from published sources it is 
nonetheless of interest to explore how the current use of language in chemical 
research supports aesthetic considerations most notably estimations of beauty. Of 
course what is of particular interest is that whereas perceptions of beauty in for 
example the graphic arts, architecture or music are immediately available to the 
senses, those in chemistry are not. In the latter case the entity or the process which 
is being assessed is largely or often invisible, with perhaps colour or smell betraying 
something, but of course nothing (except perhaps hints) of structure. Other 
characteristics of chemical research have been described and it would also be useful 
as part of this present survey to illustrate these with examples from current research. 
Such characteristics include the use of many and varied sampling and analysis 
techniques to provide a full description of the chemical event or structure in contrast 
with other scientific disciplines notably mathematics or physics where the 
descriptions are more usually in terms of equations. The practise of chemical 
research has been shown to be akin to that of craft as much as science and this 
remains true as the examples show. Certain of the research papers sampled here 
involve the creation of entire sets of related or similar compounds where analogous 
target structures or other related characteristics gave the researcher the impetus to 
attempt analogous processes to synthesise them. This latter illustrates the use of 
similarity in chemical research as being truth conducive. 
 
 
4.2 The Selection Criteria 
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By way of explanation for the proposed selection criteria, please let the reader note 
that the author's MSc was in the area of reaction rates in organic chemical reactions. 
This is an area of research known as Physical Organic Chemistry. The MSc course 
itself also involved some presentations in the area of organic chemical synthesis. 
The particular reactions being studied were performed using relatively simple 
compounds in stand-alone reaction vessels i.e. they were not part of any biological 
system. The purpose of the MSc research was to test the boundaries of certain rules 
that had previously been put forward as governing such reactions. 
In order to ensure that any research papers utilised in this current book are easily 
accessible, they have been chosen from the Royal Society of Chemistry online 
resources. This will ensure that the published research is peer-reviewed, 
authoritative, with the subject matter being non-trivial and in that sense reflective of 
current research concerns. 
It would seem sensible to include papers from a variety of nationalities and research 
centres, as far as this can be determined i.e. not all from a single research group or 
detailed area of research. 
Summary of Criteria 
Taken together the criteria for selecting recent research papers in chemistry to be 
included in this volume are: 
- Publish date not before 2013 
- published and available online by www.rsc.org 
- no more than 15 papers 
- in the area of organic chemistry research and as far as possible concerning the 
non-biological synthesis of new compounds and/or involving a physical chemical 
component 
- involving a variety of researchers 
- not requiring any other selection criteria other than those outlined here. 
 
4.3 The Papers 
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A set of contemporary chemistry research papers will here be referenced and 
discussed. 
1. Koch, et al. (2015): 
It would appear to be a report of the highly successful use of a novel new catalyst 
delivered in the very dry language of such chemical research. The use of such a 
catalyst delivers both environmental and cost benefits. Further examination 
illustrates the excitement felt by the team with their work, as well as their 
disappointments and surprises. It must not be forgotten that all such work is carried 
out on ‘the shoulders of giants’ in that it is almost always the development of 
previous work, techniques and practices and in this particular case this fact is 
demonstrated by references to those who have gone before as well as earlier 
research papers. One might validly ask what there is that might be unexpected or 
surprising about such work given the huge amount that has gone before. Yet here 
there is both surprise and failure. The physical arrangement of the diagrams and the 
ways that the graphics are arranged on the page illustrates the use of pattern, 
symmetry and dissonance, in the pictorial illustration of results. 
 
2. Cordonnier, et al. (2014): 
This research reports on a novel solution to a particular problem in this branch of 
synthetic organic chemistry. Within a multistep creation process certain types of 
product traditionally have required sub-components of the product to be created very 
early in the stepwise process. This latter is necessary because these particular sub-
components require highly reactive conditions for their manufacture and should 
these methods be used later in the process, work done to add more sensitive sub-
components later in the process, could easily be undone. The target or product 
compounds are not being created because of an immediate need. This present work 
is pure research where similar target compounds already exist and are well-known 
biologically active compounds. Thus it makes sense to attempt to develop novel 
methods of synthesis avoiding the traditional pathways which are unduly restrictive. 
There is within the writing of the paper, a readiness to appreciate earlier 
experimenters’ work in this area, variously describing it as being ‘elegant’ and 
‘impressive’. Steps within the overall process are described at times as going 
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‘smoothly’ or ‘uneventfully’, both terms anecdotally one might not expect to find used 
to describe simple chemical processes, which after all may be perceived or inferred 
but not seen. 
The chemical reaction mechanisms at work in the individual steps of the multistep 
process are at times described as though they are known accurately and at other 
times the phrases ‘likely due to’, ‘possibly due to’, and ‘potentially due to’ are used, 
indicating that there is a degree of confidence but insufficient proof. 
The collaborators are not slow to probe and investigate further when for example 
their reactions yield unexpected results. They engage in this exploration I would 
suggest, irrespective of the success of their main work, perhaps demonstrating that 
this work is a voyage of discovery. At one point the accurate prediction of a likely 
result caused the researchers to speak of their ‘delight’. In a final remark they speak 
of the ‘rich reactivity’ found within their particular specialism. 
The paper is noteworthy for its lack of use of complex quantum mathematical 
modelling tools in the elucidation of mechanistic pathways, a common feature in 
several of the papers being considered here. 
This paper, though admittedly complex, provides ample illustration of the aesthetic 
appreciations at work in current chemical research. 
 
3. Hancock, Kavanaghab, and Schiesser (2014): 
This paper is noteworthy for its particularly rich use of aesthetically-charged 
language. The writer almost immediately express ‘astonishment’ at the growth in 
their particular specialism; the level of activity here is described as displaying ‘waves 
of intense activity’; pitfalls are described as ‘demons’ and successes as leading to a 
period of ‘prosperity’ in which the specialism ‘blossomed’. In common with papers 
elsewhere, work by another researcher is praised for its ‘elegance’ and established 
common processes are described as previously finding a ‘comfortable home’ in the 
‘toolbox[s]’ of such workers, leading to the creation of ‘shiny new toys’. 
This paper also demonstrates a sustained attempt to relate current experimentally 
derived data (meaning completely a posteriori) with results obtained from previously 
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constructed computational models, to validate the proposed chemical process 
mechanisms. Such models have in the past been created out of other experimental 
work allowing an inference to be made about the possible mechanism of a new 
process, where the model and present experiment are in close agreement. This 
latter is illustrative of the tendency noted above in current chemical research to allow 
for similar results across experiments and experimenters, to be used to infer, a 
similar reaction mechanism by inference. 
 
4. Kaufmann, et al. (2014): 
This paper details the creation of a sequence of, as the researchers admit, 
‘fascinating’ compounds whose overall shapes may be likened to a tripodal needle 
and thread. Each of the three ‘needles’, which are actually joined at the top of their 
shafts to form a single compound, threads through a separate circular structure on 
another single compound. These compounds are composed at the extreme micro 
level out of various chemical subcomponents. It is little wonder that the researchers 
report that all of this is ‘quite remarkable’ which of course it is. Their language 
betrays the wonder at their achievement. The reactions themselves are quite 
lengthy: one is reported to have taken over two weeks. In contrast some of the other 
reactions described in the papers being surveyed were taking place in timescales 
less than a thousandth of a second. 
As might be expected anecdotally, the two parts of such compounds, the pin-
compound and the receptor compound can be made to move closer together and 
further apart, by the introduction and removal of further reactants. Such motion, as 
outlined by the researchers, could form the basis for a molecular engine. The degree 
to which all of the reactants move in a concerted manner at the introduction of these 
further reactants is described by the researchers as being ‘highly interesting to 
assess’. 
In addition to the considerable and noteworthy success of the synthesis itself, the 
diagrammatic presentation of the report is very fine. 
 
5. Li, Huanga and Wang, (2014): 
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This paper whilst it continues to a degree the theme established in the other reviews 
of the researchers expressing pleasure and delight at their success, also addresses 
another aspect of current chemical research: the way in which it demonstrates the 
quoted maxim of ‘chemistry being what chemists do’. There is no a priori shaping of 
the pathways to successful syntheses of the target compounds and indeed at one 
point the workers state plainly that a given attempt failed to produce any product 
compound at all. The paper does demonstrate an unrelenting drive to achieve 
success in synthesising a range of similar compounds with various approaches 
being attempted before the desired results appeared. This is very much empirical 
science very starkly drawn. The researchers show themselves to be true artists in 
their field with a fine sense of what elegance in method means. This they achieve 
themselves. 
 
6. Berger, et al. (2015): 
This paper is included here as a perhaps more extreme example of how multiple 
models or methods of description and analyses are deployed to give a more 
complete picture of either a single process or series of product molecules. In this 
paper many such techniques are used including nuclear magnetic resonance, x-ray 
crystallography, mass spectroscopy, ultra-violet absorption spectral data and 
fluorescence spectra. Further, the paper also contains graphics representing the 
proposed molecular orbital shapes at certain points in the products. In this way 
chemistry is shown to be quite different in character to either mathematics or 
physics, and in-spite of the sophistication of the techniques employed a single 
reductionist description of the entities involved seems ever further away.  
In contrast to some of the other papers reviewed here, this group of researchers is 
very well resourced and has access to many analysis techniques. This illustrates the 
point made elsewhere that the breadth of current chemical research is very wide.  
 
7. Tuna, Sobolewskib and Domckea, (2014): 
It has elsewhere been alleged that chemistry can not contribute towards a natural 
theology because the route to a natural theology is via metaphysics. Since, as 
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alleged, there is no metaphysics associated with chemistry ergo, there can be no 
natural theology associated with it (Fraser Watts 2014, private communication). This 
present paper illustrates the challenge presented by such assertions in that on two 
occasions statements with clear metaphysical implications are made (see the 
relevant quotations given below), and no comment is passed. Thus whereas I have 
elsewhere amply demonstrated the metaphysical content to be found in chemistry, if 
the commentator chooses to ignore it, the lack of theological insight is not surprising. 
The two instances in this paper are as follows and relate as the authors say to the 
‘molecules of life’: 
The fact that the spectra of the energetically most stable 
conformers or tautomers are often not observed is a clear 
indication that ultrafast (sub-picosecond) radiationless 
excited state deactivation processes prevail. It has been 
argued that these ultrafast excited-state quenching 
processes provide biological matter with a particularly high 
degree of UV photostability (p.39) 
and: 
The quenching of deleterious photochemical reactions by 
ultrafast internal conversion is believed to be decisive for a 
high intrinsic photostability of DNA bases as well as amino 
acids and peptides with aromatic chromophores (p. 39) 
Both of these statements might reasonably be expected to elicit a passing reference 
as to the process by which such extraordinary provision to protect living matter from 
UV damage, came to be present, yet such comment is absent. It might be argued 
that this research is not concerned with such matters however such a conclusion is 
brought into question in the calling of glucose, being the molecule being studied, one 
of the ‘molecules of life’ elsewhere in the paper. 
 
8. Lang and Smith, (2014): 
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This paper is concerned with the accurate modelling of distances between the atoms 
of individual elements involved in compounds and solid structures. This ‘bonding’ is 
important because as the paper points out:  
Covalent and ionic radii are used in structural chemistry and 
molecular modelling. Reliable data of ionic or covalent radii 
(or internuclear distances) can serve as a rough guide to the 
magnitude of steric effects, how reactions may occur and on 
the stability of compounds. (p.3355) 
There is very little aesthetic language in this paper however it is noteworthy in this 
present study because of: 
- The combined use of empirical, estimated and theoretical (a priori quantum 
mechanically derived) data, to create substantial tables of bond lengths;  
- The demonstration in a specific instance of how an aesthetically pleasing result 
was eventually shown to be inaccurate:  
The ‘‘free electron/electron sea’’ model, although very 
elegant and convincing at the time before many 
sophisticated experiments were made possible to test it and 
before quantum mechanics was firmly established, is shown 
to be inadequate. We consider that ‘‘band theory’’ provides a 
correct ‘‘theoretical description’’ of metallic structure. (p. 
3367) 
This is an example spoken of elsewhere how beauty need not necessarily give rise 
to truth. More generally it is noteworthy how this information about bond lengths is in 
almost universal use across huge areas of chemical research and yet as the authors 
note: 
There is a proliferation of different series/sets of ionic and 
covalent radii in the open literature. Goldschmidt and 
Pauling used different methods to estimate ionic radii in the 
early part of the twentieth century. Amongst the various sets 
of ionic radii, one produced by Waddington is fairly 
commonly quoted and a widely known set is put together by 
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Shannon and Prewitt and later on improved by Shannon. 
However, it was pointed out that there are some impressive 
discrepancies between these sets and they do not fare well 
on certain statistical tests. Observed radii differ substantially 
from the commonly known sets of radii with a few 
exceptions. (p. 3355) 
From this we understand that in spite of the fundamental importance of this 
information, the fact of much of it being inaccurate, has little bearing on the vibrancy 
of the industry. Once again the importance of the empirical nature of much chemical 
research, of it having a ‘trial and error’ approach, is shown. Chemists are engaged in 
an exploration of the possible, continually adding to human knowledge and 
achievement simply by applying the hard-won skills of artisans and crafts people in 
the manipulation of techniques and starting materials. Having created new 
compounds or established new techniques, these are then poured into or applied to, 
new explorations. As a result there is a constant unfolding of, a revealing of, what 
nature can produce if the requisite conditions are met - and only if these conditions, 
these rules, are met. It is this that invalidates the fears of Brooke and Cantor (2000, 
pp.315, 319, 329) that chemists might be seen as creating ‘unnatural’ things, by 
themselves and without recourse to the Creator: yet researchers can only create 
what Creation and its Creator will allow to be created. 
 
9. Nguyen et al. (2015): 
The possibility of creating a new compound with a novel structure that has 
nonetheless no immediate uses is often sufficient cause in the chemical sciences to 
pursue the goal.  
Imagine a football consisting as it does, of panels of six and five sided flat shapes. At 
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(See Appendix A for an introduction to the typographical representation of bonds). 
The diagram here is a cage of 60 carbon atoms and such ‘Fullerenes’ are known to 
exist in various sizes. It is obviously desirable to attempt to create similar compounds 
using other elements instead of carbon. Because of the unique properties of carbon 
certain of these fullerenes are remarkably stable compounds existing simply as black 
dust under normal conditions. Such stability is not found for all such fullerenes and 
this present paper discusses the use of certain metal atoms to ‘stabilize and modify 
the structure and properties of the resulting doped cluster’ made in this case out of 
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the element boron. The use of the word ‘cluster’ indicates that not only cages are 
being created but also tubes and sheets. It is with such tubes or sheets that the utility 
of these compounds increases. The paper discusses the ‘extremely rich structural 
features’ of these compounds and states that the workers engaged in an ‘intensive 
search’ for new compounds, thus expressing some of the excitement associated with 
these explorations. This paper also amply demonstrates an aesthetic appreciation of 
the compounds themselves. 
 
As an aside, of the original C60 carbon ‘version’, the original Buckminsterfullerene, 
Peter Walhout has to say: 
With a backdrop of aesthetic theory now in place, let us 
explore a specific example of sublime beauty in science. 
Richard Smalley, together with Harold Kroto and Robert Curl, 
received the 1996 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for discovering 
C60 (buckminsterfullerene, or “bucky balls” as they are 
affectionately known). C60 is a new allotrope of carbon in 
which sixty carbon atoms bond together to form a molecule 
that looks exactly like a soccer ball, with single carbon atoms 
making the vertices of the five- and six-sided panels that 
make up the surface of a soccer ball. Shortly thereafter a 
similarly shaped C70 appeared along with many other types 
of this new class of molecules now known simply as 
fullerenes. Included in this class are the famous carbon 
nanotubes, which can be thought of as graphite rolled into a 
narrow tube. All of these are undeniably beautiful, owing to 
their symmetry and unique shape (Walhout, 2009, p. 769) 
A Nobel Prize having been awarded for this discovery, surely none in the chemical 
sciences can be ignorant of the beautiful within chemistry? 
 
10. Yu, et al. (2015): 
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This paper presents an extreme proliferation of compound names in their modern 
prolix forms. Yet at its most simple it represents a highly effective and novel 
methodology for the creation of a particular class of biologically useful materials, 
using Gold as a catalyst. The materials in question are relatively small compounds 
and are frequently used as precursors in further reactions. The researchers speak of 
being ‘inspired’ by their previous results to ‘fine tune’ a particular aspect of their 
process, which ‘to [their] delight’, yielded the reported results. As is not uncommon 
and indeed as reported also in this survey of papers, these researchers then set-
about modelling further experiments to determine if their novel methodology could be 
more widely employed, not only in the specifics of their initial reaction, but also more 
generically across this class of compounds. In this context ‘more widely employed’ 
means being utilised for the addition of a greater variety of groups to the initial 
reactants. A table is reproduced in the paper to show all the various groups tested. 
Not all were successful. Where the new reaction conditions were not successful, the 
outcome plainly was not predicted and in fact consisted of somewhat of a mixture of 
products. The researchers attempted to determine the key process pathway and 
conclude that the reaction is ‘presumed’ to proceed in the way they state. The 
reasoning employed by these researchers which motivated them to proceed in the 
manner they did in their ‘fine tuning’ is not outlined, however given that it uses an 
established methodology (reported as ‘Ellman’s tertbutylsulfinimine chemistry’) it is 
rational to assume that it came about as a result of an appropriate ‘apprenticeship’ in 
chemical methodology. This apprenticeship would then have given to these 
researchers a set of practiced paths to tread when requiring certain outcomes. 
This paper in summary demonstrates indeterminacy, the importance as explained 
elsewhere of the didactic process of ‘learning the practice of’ chemistry, of non-
formal reasoning leading to a successful outcome, and finally a keen sense of the 
aesthetic not so much in this case in the product, but more in the ‘beauty’ of the 
process. 
 
11. Ilichev, et al. (2015):  
This paper shows apparently an almost complete absence of any aesthetic 
motivation and is reviewed by way of contrast. It describes the creation of large 
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complexes consisting of organic components combining with very large and rare 
metal ions, whose overall structures are then characterised using in the main X-ray 
crystallography and luminescence. Nonetheless it is notable for the use of reported 
colours of the various compounds as one method of characterisation. In addition the 
diagrams of the compounds are presented in such a way as to emphasise their 
pleasing structures and mutual arrangement of sub-groups. This paper is notable for 
the presentation of various theoretical models of energy transfer between various 
parts of large complexes. These are declared to be able to predict various outcomes 
until changes in structures cause the models to fail and news ones to be proposed. It 
is these energy transfers which give rise to the observed colours and luminescence. 
Perhaps this paper could be cited as an example of those being confronted by 
obvious beauty then refusing to acknowledge it. 
 
12. Prati, et al. (2015): 
This paper illustrates a form of inductive reasoning. These researchers had enabled 
a particular methodology to work before in one particular set of cases: might it work 
more generally? This paper also illustrates an attitude to experimental activity in 
chemistry perhaps in the past associated with alchemy: different processes were 
attempted simply for the sake of trying them, without any reporting of the reasoning. 
Once again this illustrates how chemistry is often very much about the ‘doing’ of it, 
empirically trying differing methodologies in pursuit of a result, rather than the 
carrying-out of a carefully planned, logical sequence of steps, previously predicted to 
work theoretically. 
As for the detail, the researchers report the effectiveness on particular reactions of 
introducing dust-like particles of gold and ruthenium set into supporting matrices of 
variously carbon and a type of glue. These processes make use of what is known as 
the ‘catalytic’ properties of these metals, where it appears they enhance and at times 
enable reactions by modifying the chemical reactants immediately prior to a reaction. 
Thus these catalysts are not products or precursor compounds and in fact are 
unchanged in the overall process. It might be helpful to envisage them working 
rather like a crowbar in the opening of a box or door: the crowbar is itself unchanged 
but radically improves the possibility of some form of result. The catalyst appears to 
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take hold of and then ‘offer-up’ the reactant to each other, increasing their latent 
reactivity. 
In addition to simply trying out different options in an attempt to gain a successful 
outcome, the paper also illustrates that the precise structure of these matrices 
holding the metal dusts in place, was not known and had to be elucidated. This 
illustrates the principle of indeterminacy in both reaction pathway, structure of the 
catalysts and likelihood of outcomes. 
 
13. Zurek and Wojciech, (2015): 
This is a remarkable paper. Unlike several of the others surveyed here it is quite 
lengthy. It displays in places a metaphysical approach to its investigations, its scope 
is broad and it makes several sweeping statements and promises. In that sense it is 
visionary. It suggests an aesthetic sense on the part of the researchers who 
scrupulously avoid the use of any such language excepting to say that in some 
places, findings are ‘exciting’. 
Epistemically this paper is significant since it appears to champion prediction based 
on theoretical understandings. Why should it be ‘exciting’ that ‘theoretical predictions’ 
are ‘guiding experiment’ (p. 2917)? Surely results may be exciting, as we have seen 
in other papers above, whether predicted or not? Is the power afforded through the 
ability to predict outcomes, more to be desired than the power that comes from an 
ability to create and measure? The researchers here also make reference to an 
experimentally verified prediction of several years ago in a related field that has little 
bearing on their present work, showing that this ability to predict outcomes features 
strongly in their value-system.  
Some explanation about energy minima might be useful in understanding this 
complex paper. If someone were asked to predict where a free-rolling ball-bearing 
would come to rest in a geography of a pair of hills separated by a deep valley, there 
would be no hesitation in declaring that it would be found at the lowest point of the 
valley. If the floor of the valley were to start to rise there would come a point where 
the ball bearing would roll off the now-raised valley and move past the former ‘hill 
top’. Conceptually, mathematical modelling of chemical systems can be used to 
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predict stabilities in systems that are under stress: it may for example be possible to 
predict that at certain temperatures and pressures, new forms of familiar materials 
could be discovered to exist, simply because the modelling predicts certain energy 
‘valleys’ at those points. This paper uses such understandings in its modelling. 
However in-spite of the importance to these experimenters of the reductionists 
powers of mathematical predictability, experience is also acknowledged by one of 
the researchers, to be an important factor in directing experimental pathways (p. 
2919). 
 
14. Rong, et al. (2015):  
Having now reviewed several papers and understood something of the beauty and 
elegance which may be seen in the workings of various chemical systems, I here 
review a paper where the reader may decide for themselves whether something 
wondrous is being described. Most will be familiar with the action of tuning a radio to 
search for differing programs: each is being transmitted on their own wavelength and 
each becomes accessible as the circuitry is ‘tuned’ to receive a particular carrier 
signal. Thus a single piece of apparatus is used to listen to a variety of 
transmissions. Plainly it would be advantageous to be able to create new chemical 
compounds in a similar fashion: using the same procedures but with ‘tuneable’ 
reactants to create different compounds (see Appendix B). 
The researchers have demonstrated the creation of such a set of reactants that are 
made active through irradiation with simple visible light. These processes take place 
in the presence of such reactants that act as catalysts, meaning that they are 
themselves unchanged and may be recovered and re-used. Although the 
researchers themselves do not make use of any overtly aesthetic language in this 
paper, the images are displayed in a particular way showing the reactants at their 
best: symmetry is well displayed. 
The paper describes a series or set of catalysts all belonging to the same overall 
structure, with a central metal atom of Iridium surrounded by complexes of other 
groups and atoms. It is as these surrounding complexes are subtly altered in their 
constitution that differing ‘strengths-to-react’, so-called ‘redox potentials’, are 
achieved. The result is that for example it is reasonable to assume that catalysts of 
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this general type when introduced into a reaction could do more or less ‘oxidising’ on 
a given input compound, depending on how ‘strong’ the redox catalyst is. On p.144 
the researchers remark that novel uses for these new catalysts are currently being 
investigated. I would suggest that the entire design that this research paper 
proposes and in part demonstrates, is suffused with a certain elegance and beauty. 
The general criticism, mentioned above, of chemistry in relation to a natural theology, 
that it is of little use as it ‘makes things’ is again called into question once chemical 
research is studied in this detail. It is plain that the researches are struggling or 
wrestling with, that which is entirely ’natural’, in the sense of being a ‘given’ by 
nature. There is no sense in which for example these workers are creating new rules 
of nature; they are uncovering news ways in which the unseen laws that regulate the 
created world, may be manipulated for the stated aims. 
 
15. Dattatraya, Balu and Raghavender (2015): 
A casual survey of published research papers will demonstrate the enormous 
quantity of work being performed by chemistry departments in the Peoples Republic 
of China. In attempting to show that the aesthetics of chemistry are not limited to one 
region of the world’s research laboratories I present this paper submitted by a 
chemistry department of an Indian University. Many research departments or groups 
will specialise in a particular area. These researchers are no exception and have a 
particular interest in establishing routes to the synthesis of so-called indenes for 
which the base compound consists of a six and a five member carbon ring fused 
together. This series of compounds are known in the wild and the synthesis of one 
such andirolactone has been achieved several times in recent years yet not without 
some complex procedures. In this paper the researchers report how they have been 
enabled to manufacture this material via a new method, which they describe as 
being ‘concise’ (p. 161) and in very good yields. The compound in question exists in 
a pair of stereoisomers, these being compounds with the same atoms connected to 
each other in the same manner but with different spacial arrangements (see 
Appendix A). They used a catalyst which because of its toxicity was not thought 
desirable and are now investigating whether they can achieve the same results using 
the same methodology but with a better catalyst.  
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The researchers achieved their results through a process of exploiting a series of 
‘happy misfortunes’ where a path that they had been expecting to work, produced 
unexpected results. They went on to exploit their new discovery and to their ‘delight’ 
discovered that it had the desired result not only in the one area they had hoped, but 
also more broadly (p. 160).  
This paper therefore, together with the others reviewed here, demonstrates that the 
ability to appreciate and to experience delight in the workings of chemistry might be 
expected to be a human quality more broadly and not be culturally mediated. It is 
also pleasing to note that the intensity of effort required to both become a practiced 
researchers as well as an innovative exploiter of whatever ‘nature’ lays before the 
investigator, is also a trait that is found widely across the discipline. 






In this diagram, each ‘corner’ represents a carbon atom. 
 





Where the two items in the top right of the diagram in red/dark grey are oxygen 
atoms and those in lighter grey, carbon. The reader will note, and after reading 
Appendix A, that double lines in this representation are accompanied by a flat or 








The objective of this small survey of contemporary papers in chemical research has 
been illustrative, so as to provide examples of what has been mentioned elsewhere 
in the text and particularly in chapter 3. The excitement felt by researchers in 
uncovering new process, compounds and pathways is plain in most of the papers 
surveyed perhaps exemplified by that of Hancock, Kavanaghab, and Schiesser. Yet 
such excitement can be found amongst researchers in many fields of human 
endeavour not just chemistry. What characterises such expressions of success in 
chemistry in particular? I would suggest that it has to do with an uncovering of 
variously: aesthetic qualities to processes and products, an unfolding degree of 
orderliness and ‘fixedness of process’ and also that satisfaction of honing one’s skills 
as an experienced researcher such that intimations of possibility coupled with the 
skills of an experienced practitioner, produce pleasing results. Other scientific 
disciplines yield results where there is something existing waiting to be discovered 
but in chemistry, novel processes designed by researchers give rise to novel 
outcomes which are nonetheless not random but conform to some pattern which 
might at the start be only dimly discerned. 
There are intimations also of various value constructs. For example, Koch, et al. 
(2015) and the group of Dattatraya, Balu and Raghavender (2015) place value on 
such characteristics as low cost, low environmental impact, a more concise process 
in comparison to the existing. Kaufmann, et al. (2014) describe something which 
mimics on a very small scale - an engine - that which is currently only commonplace 
on the large scale, thus placing value on miniaturisation. Chemistry might in these 
instances been seen as perfecting or improving upon existing mechanisms in ways 
which lend themselves to being thought of as more elegant or aesthetically pleasing. 
And of course these discoveries of that which is pleasing in this way, are not one-offs 
but fill the lives of such researchers. 
Such patterns spoken of in the first paragraph above together with an aesthetically 
pleasing mechanism elucidated after possibly years of training, can result in the 
discovery of an extended pattern such that whole new groups or classes of 
compounds or processes can be uncovered. The work of for example Yu, et al. 
(2015) and Nguyen et al. (2015) describe such research in uncovering a sequence of 
similar compounds. The latter group also illustrates the propensity for researchers at 
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times to explore simply for the sake of the beauty of doing so and with no immediate 
use of the compounds discovered in sight. 
The experienced researcher has a varied and ever-expanding ‘toolbox’ of individual 
tools available to variously plan their research, to sample and elucidate the 
mechanistic pathways taken by reactants and to discern what their results are. Such 
a host of tools gives rise to a collection of descriptions so that pathways in a reaction 
can be described in possibly several ways using for example diagrams on paper, 
energy levels in mathematical equations and the movement of particles between 
reactants. Smell, touch and colour of products at times continue to be used to 
characterise outcomes. Different proposed pathways are not always exactly known 
and can be ‘believed’ or ‘presumed’ to be being employed in a given reaction, for 
example. Such underdeterminedness enhances the sense of beauty at the 
discoveries being made and contributes to intimations of elegance and wonder at the 
processes uncovered. 
Simply because something is to an observer beautiful or elegant or a source of 
wonder might not lead the researchers to acknowledge that. The work of Tuna, 
Sobolewskib and Domckea (2014) illustrates this. There is the implication that those 
who want to be excited about their work, that those looking to appreciate the beauty 
and wonder in what they have discovered will frequently find it, yet equally that those 
who refuse to perceive this, will not. This sense of having to be open to the Divine 
action in the natural world in order to see it, is something that will be explored in the 
next chapter ‘On God and Beauty’. By referring to ancient authors I will show that 





Whilst admittedly not a large survey, it has nonetheless been possible to 
demonstrate several key points within this reading: 
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• The use of similarity and elegance to successfully predict successful 
outcomes, this meaning that these were ‘truth-conducive’; 
• The importance of a form of apprenticeship in the career of the chemical 
researcher; people who through practical experience have learned how to do 
things correctly, so as to be prepared for success; 
• Chemists giving many examples of the use of aesthetic judgement in the 
appreciation of their work; the word ‘beauty’ is not used, but the way this 
appreciation is reported suggests nothing less than an often profound 
appreciation of the beautiful; 
• Examples of underdetermined-ness in process where how the researcher got 
there is of less importance than the fact that they did, within acceptable 
environmental considerations; 
• Examples of the use of both modelling as well as multiple sampling 
techniques, to provide an overall, yet frequently still inexact, view of the 
process; 
• Examples of the use of both empirical and non-empirical study, being brought 





On God and Beauty 
5.1 Introduction 
The argument of this book as stated in the introduction is that aspects of the natural 
science of chemistry as currently practiced, may inform a natural theology. In order 
to present a coherent argument it has been necessary to present the basis upon 
which knowledge may be justified in chapter 1, followed by discussions on the 
particular natural theology I am seeking to make use of, followed by 
characterisations of contemporary chemical research and concluding with examples 
taken from recent research papers in chapter 4. The required link between 
contemporary chemical research and the particular chosen form of natural theology 
has been the apprehension of beauty in both areas of study. The perception of 
beauty has been shown to be evident in aspects of contemporary chemical research.  
The task in this section therefore is to review historically what has been said on 'God 
and Beauty' so as to be able to locate our present discussions within the overall 
Western historical tradition on this subject. I addressed this subject from a scriptural 
standpoint in chapter 2; here I propose to offer this brief analysis upon the dual 
bases of the Platonic and the Aristotelian systems. 
Any discussion on God and beauty is distinct from reflections on, for example, what 
beauty is, whether it is objective or subjective, whether it belongs to the object being 
called beautiful or whether it is purely 'in the eye of the beholder'. It becomes instead 
an interpretive study as to the particular author's attitude towards estimations of the 
transcendent. Where the views of several authors are compared, it is easy to portray 
estimations of beauty as a confusion or a series of dichotomies. As Crispin Sartwell 
relates, ‘it seems senseless to say that beauty has no connection to subjective 
response or that it is entirely objective’ (Sartwell, 2014, p.3). Interestingly in view of 
this present book, Sartwell portrays beauty as the result of the relationship between 
subject and object in which aspects are ‘juxtaposed and connected’; it both invites 
and requires, exploration and inquiry (Sartwell, 2014, p.12). As a result the 




There seems to be no doubt that experiences of beauty can 
lead the spirit to God and confirm people in devotion, and 
that therefore the aesthetic dimension is one that must have 
a place in the communication of religious truths. (Viladesau, 
1999, p. 104) 
Viladesau is here expressing much of the hope of this book: that an experience or 
perception of beauty can lead any human spirit towards God and that those who are 
already Christians might be confirmed in their devotions. As a result I contend that it 
is rational to make use of this mechanism to communicate the truth about God to 
those who seek Him. I am of course also attempting to take this further in showing 
that it is specifically the Christian God who is communicated in beauty and in his use 
of authors such as the Apostle Paul, Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar 
amongst others, there is every indication that Viladesau also has this in mind. From 
the reference to authors so widely spaced in time, it can be seen that any 
development in views over time is less important than the positions themselves. It is 
not that there is in any sense unanimity on this question however those positions 
which are ancient are no less important than those ideas developed more recently. 
 
 
5.2 The Two Streams 
In our contemporary culture, if one were to offer a lecture series with as topic ‘On 
God and Beauty’, then in the part entitled 'Plato and Aristotle', those attending the 
lectures would want to be told precisely what Plato and Aristotle thought about 
beauty. Why choose these two philosophers? If it is possible to define the 
inheritance of the major philosophical threads to this debate: ‘On God and Beauty’, 
then I offer the premise that two of the most significant threads are based, one on 
the thinking of Plato and the other on Aristotle. Writers so disparately separated in 
time and inclination as Pseudo-Dionysius, von Bathasar and even Whitehead inherit 
broadly from platonic ideals in discussions on beauty whereas of course Aquinas, 
Kant, Barth and I would be bold to suggest A J Ayer, are more aristotelian in outlook. 
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The differences in their understandings of ‘On God and Beauty’ have less to do with 
what they said or thought, than with how they went about arriving at them. The 
methodology is, in this specific area of enquiry, which is not to say elsewhere, of 
greater importance than what their pronouncements were and those of their 
intellectual descendants, are. Their ways of reaching conclusions differed. Broadly, 
Plato sought to equip his students and us his readers with the type of questioning 
mind needed for elucidation, fully recognising that his conclusions were always open 
to further development. Aristotle, utilising a most powerful intellect and indeed 
physical abilities as investigator, sought to teach us his ways of enquiry and then to 
tell us how things actually are, given the results of his extensive work. Both 
approaches allow for and credit, intellectual rigour and extensive study, but only one 
approach enables Beauty to be fully beautiful, whereas the other wants to limit or 
even shun beauty as marginal, enticing but almost corrupting, as a form of emotion 
rather than an aspect of the factual. One approach fits encounters with Beauty and 
the beautiful into an overall valid picture of existence and the other keeps it firmly 
under control lest it overwhelm, confuse and in some sense pollute, a cold 
intellectual rationality. One expects solid answers and describes it a failure when 
such are not forthcoming. The other, having established a basis for thinking, is 
content to question. Much of the thinking on God and Beauty can be validly 
interpreted through these two aspects or trends or families, of thought.   
 
 
5.3 The Aristotelian Stream 
What writings of Plato we have are in the form of dialogues, never referring to the 
author's opinions, but forever leaving us with questions. Aristotle's investigations in 
all manner of disciplines were prodigious and he not only expects to deliver answers, 
he also gives them. In book 13, part 3, of The Metaphysics, Aristotle remarks: 
Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the 
former always implies conduct as its subject, while the 
beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who 
assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the 
beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and 
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prove a great deal about them; if they do not expressly 
mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or 
their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing 
about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and 
symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical 
sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these 
(e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many 
things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of 
causative principle also (i.e. the beautiful) as in some sense 
a cause. (Aristotle, 2016) 
Hence, as Oleg Bychkov explains, it would seem reasonable to understand that 
according to Aristotle, beauty is something perceived through the senses: 
It is also well known that according to the Aristotelian view 
on the nature of cognition adopted by Aquinas, the source of 
all forms for the intellect is sensory perception (Summa 
Theologica I.84.4) and not the Platonic Ideas, the 
Neoplatonic celestial “separate substances,” or the “agent 
intellect” if it is understood as a separate substance. The 
human intellect, according to Aquinas, does not require any 
special divine illumination. True, God initially gives humans a 
sufficient capacity for thought, so one can speak of a God-
given “natural illumination” or our pre-existing capacity to 
recognize truth. There is a pre-existing harmony between 
bodies, the senses that perceive their material forms, and 
the intellect that is able to abstract immaterial forms from 
them. Yet, since the intellect is supposed to understand 
universal natures as existing in particulars, it must turn to the 
senses. The intellect needs the body for cognition in order to 
enable the senses to extract forms from other bodies. Thus 
the material part of the human being in Aquinas is absolutely 
essential: according to Aquinas (at least professedly so), the 
human being is not two things but a unified soul-body 
compound. (Bychkov, 2014, pp. 3-4) 
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I am acutely aware that these two quotations from Aristotle and Bychkov, are very 
widely spaced in time, separated by many centuries. The influences from one to the 
other will be obvious. Moreover the essential point is that we can by pure reason 
come to understand what beauty is and how we interact with it. There is no need to 
consider that beauty might have an origin outside the human condition. Furthermore 
the contrast between Platonic ideals is also drawn. One looks to the heavens for 
answers and the other to our intellectual abilities and to the ‘earthly’ for elucidation. It 
is surely not too much of a leap to arrive at Immanuel Kant’s view which was 
essentially that beauty was largely a subjective quantity informed by something 
called ‘taste’ in the viewer. As he says in chapter 1, 5.203, of the Critique of the 
power of judgment: 
In order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we 
do not relate the representation by means of understanding 
to the object for cognition, but rather relate it by means of the 
imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding) to 
the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The 
judgment of taste is therefore not a cognitive judgment, 
hence not a logical one, but is rather aesthetic, by which is 
understood one whose determining ground cannot be other 
than subjective (Kant, 2000, p. 89) 
And again, he adds a note in the same place: 
The definition of taste that is the basis here is that it is the 
faculty for the judging of the beautiful. But what is required 
for calling an object beautiful must be discovered by the 
analysis of judgments of taste.  
In 5:204 and 205 Kant further asserts that beauty has to do with desire, pleasure and 
the like and that it has nothing to do with the ‘stuff’ of the thing, but has merely to do 
with what the human thinks of it.  
And how does all this come about? It appears reasonable to assume from what Kant 
tells us in the same volume in chapter 61, 5.359, that this is because humans are 
simply made that way: 
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One has good reason to assume, in accordance with 
transcendental principles, a subjective purposiveness of 
nature in its particular laws, for comprehensibility for the 
human power of judgment and the possibility of the 
connection of the particular experiences in one system of 
nature; where among its many products those can also be 
expected to be possible which, just as if they had actually 
been designed for our power of judgment, contain a form so 
specifically suited for it that by means of their variety and 
unity they serve as it were to strengthen and entertain the 
mental powers (which are in play in the use of these 
faculties), and to which one has therefore ascribed the name 
of beautiful forms (Kant, 2000, p. 233) 
As we have seen elsewhere in this book, that might have been a valid understanding 
of the beautiful, until beauty quite obviously could be used to predict outcomes in 
experimentation: 
An aesthetic intersubjective acceptance based on harmony 
with existing scientific understanding also plays a role, and 
beauty is a reliable guide for reason in the search for new 
scientific truths. (Walhout, 2009, p. 774) 
From earlier discussions in chapter 4 above as well as here, it can be seen that the 
contention that beauty has nothing to offer except pleasure, amounts to a 
reductionist view of what conflations of shape, form and order might do to the psyche 
of those humans educated in similar appreciations of ‘taste’ - which together Kant 
calls ‘beautiful forms’ -, can be set aside. 
Thus in terms of God and the beautiful, such is mere subjectivity under these 
schemes of thought. It can not be an objective communication from God, as the 
central thesis of this book requires, because it only relates to physical ‘things’, has to 
do with that which causes pleasure, and is ruled by individual ’taste’. As seen in this 
manner, beauty must be kept at arms-length and be feared. 
This manner of viewing beauty, if it were true, has its entirely rational conclusion in 
the thinking of A J Ayer: 
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As we have already said, our conclusions about the nature 
of ethics apply to aesthetics also. Aesthetic terms are used 
in exactly the same way as ethical terms. Such aesthetic 
words as ‘beautiful’ and ‘hideous’ are employed, as ethical 
words are employed, not to make statements of fact, but 
simply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain 
response. It follows, as in ethics, that there is no sense in 
attributing objective validity to aesthetic judgements, and no 
possibility of arguing about questions of value in aesthetics, 
but only about questions of fact …. We conclude, therefore, 
that there is nothing in aesthetics, any more than there is in 
ethics, to justify the view that it embodies a unique form of 
knowledge. (Ayer, 1936, p.118) 
It would be interesting to explore in what way the word ‘unique’ was being used here. 
Did Ayer consider that he was opposing ethics and beauty as together forming a 
‘unique form of knowledge’ or were each separate (but then surely they could not 
severally be ‘unique’?). No matter: his sense is clear, considerations of beauty 
specifically have to do with emotion and emotion can not lead to ‘fact’ or 
considerations of value. Yet he reaches this conclusion only because he has already 
decided that beauty as a concept has little to do with generating truth.  
Perhaps astonishingly yet similarly Karl Barth also cautions his readers that beauty is 
neither ‘a leading concept’ nor a ‘primary motif in our understanding of the whole 
being of God’ (Barth, 1957, p. 652). Yet also in a somewhat similar and I would 
venture aristotelian championing of human capability, he decries any action that 
would lead to ‘a blind spot in our knowledge’ of God (Barth, 1957, p. 650). Barth tells 
us that God's trinitarian nature is the basis of His power and dignity and the ‘secret of 
His beauty’ (Barth, 1957, p. 662). Reading this, it appears rational to say that Barth is 
attesting to God being beautiful on account of His being Triune and that a 
communication of God's beauty arises on account of His glory, power and dignity - 
but that beauty is not a leading concept! Moreover Barth is quite rightly fearful lest an 
aestheticism should come ‘to have and keep the last word’ as it would become an 
idol, yet it is not obvious why anyone reading his text and revelling in God's beauty 
would or could rationally uncouple the aesthetic from the Divine which feeds it. As a 
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result God's beauty could not possibly be construed as 'the last word' and is instead 
something that follows from who He is. Talk of 'last words' in Barth's texts does have 
echoes of his objections to natural theology: Barth does not want to detract in any 
way from God's self-revelation of Himself and neither would I as God's Beauty can 
not be a stand-alone concept separate from the God who projects it. 
Barth's tortured reasoning is underlined when he says in the same place that were 
God to loose dignity and the ‘power of real divinity’ God would no longer be beautiful 
- but beauty is still not a leading concept in our knowledge and understanding of 
God! Far from not being a leading concept I would affirm in contrast that to 
experience true beauty is indeed to have had a foretaste of the full presence of God, 
which seems apophatically to be precisely what Barth is implying but steadfastly 
refusing to say. Thus a sensation of a 'something' being beautiful acts as a signifier 
of the presence of God being communicated to us. As a light shining from a doorway 
is a comfort to a weary traveller on a lonely road to the effect that their lodging place 
for the night is not far off, so too a perception of the beautiful tells us that Someone 
else is, in making themselves known, open to being communicated with. 
In a highpoint of Christological logic, Barth goes on to say that ‘in the name and 
person of Jesus Christ’ the beauty of God is revealed ‘in a special way and in some 
sense to a supreme degree’ and that we only know this to be so ‘from the existence 
of the Son of God in His union with humanity’ (Barth, 1957, p. 662). Barth strongly 
implies through his use of quotations that his understandings on these points are 
informed by Aquinas (Summa Theologica I) which observation completes the 
aristotelian strand of thinking on God and beauty, in making it somewhat circular. 
 
 
5.4 The Platonic Stream 
Yet let us stay with Barth for just a little while longer as we now explore the platonic 
strand to thinking on God and beauty. He accuses both Augustine and Pseudo-
Dionysius of expounding ‘the beauty of God as the ultimate cause producing and 
moving all things’ (Barth, 1957, p. 652) but as we shall see in the case of Pseudo-
Dionysius, what Barth has succumbed to is his insistence on not having 
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discrepancies in his knowledge of God. Such knowledge pace Barth, is in fact open-
ended, hidden, dark, mysterious and in Christ radically transforming - overturning 
and reversing - of our earthly concepts so that in Him we can expect to ‘take every 
thought captive to the obedience of Christ’ (2 Corinthians 10.5) whilst similarly being 
un-knowing of ‘what we will become’ (1 John 3.2-3). In order to approach the un-
approachable God we must relinquish any insistence that humans can probe all 
mystery. Having mentioned Pseudo-Dionysius and a potential misunderstanding of 
his thought it is to him we must now turn. 
In surveying discussions of God and Beauty what is communicated, notwithstanding 
the comments on Barth above as we shall see, is a certain awe in the face of God's 
beauty, as Pseudo-Dionysius recounts in On the Divine Names chapter 4 section 13: 
And in truth, it must be said too that the very cause of the 
universe in the beautiful, good superabundance of his 
[God’s] benign yearning for all is also carried outside of 
himself in the loving care he has for everything (Pseudo-
Dionysius, 1987, p. 82) 
He goes on to say in the same chapter and section 14: ‘for in the end what is he if 
not Beauty and Goodness’ (Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987, p. 82). 
Compare this from Barth: 
In this self-declaration, - the unity and differentiation - 
however, God’s beauty embraces death as well as life, fear 
as well as joy, what we might call the ugly as well as what 
we might call the beautiful. It reveals itself and wills to be 
known on the road from the one to the other, in the turning 
from the self-humiliation of God for the benefit of man to the 
exaltation of man by God and to God (Barth, 1957, p. 665). 
And again from Augustine in his The City of God, Book XI, Chapter XVIII: 
For God would never have foreknown vice in any work of 
His, angel or man, but that He knew in like manner what 
good use to put it unto, so making the world’s course, like a 
fair poem, more gracious by antithetic figures. Antitheta, 
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called in Latin opposites, are the most elegant figures of all 
elocution: some, more expressly, call them contra-posites. 
….. Thus as these contraries opposed do give the saying an 
excellent grace, so is the world’s beauty composed of 
contrarieties, not in figure but in nature. (Augustine, 1973, p. 
327) 
By re-using the thinking alluded to by Augustine in the same place utilising words 
from the Biblical Apocryphal book Ecclesiasticus (‘against evil is good, and against 
death is life’), there is at least the suspicion that Barth consulted both. The beauty 
that is revealed through God in Christ is shown to be arresting, in a series of radical 
opposites. 
As a result Kevin Corrigan and L. Michael Harrington speak of Pseudo-Dionysius 
feeling the need ‘to push language forms to their breaking points, and then to see 
what we cannot say about God’ (Corrigan and Harrington, 2015, p. 22). Pseudo-
Dionysius makes use of such opposites as signifiers, that lead our human linguistic 
consciousness to entertain the otherness of God through the forced consideration of 
words about God which are plainly almost absurd (Corrigan and Harrington, 2015, p. 
10). In this way and amongst many such examples Pseudo-Dionysius says that God 
is both nameless and ‘has the names of everything that is’ (Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987, 
p. 56). As a result we can validly subscribe to a radical ‘open-endedness’ about our 
knowledge of, and the possibility of encounters with, God, where for example to say 
with any sense of finality that God ‘is’ something, is to in effect shut-off further 
exploration and meditation. They are telling us that this makes Pseudo-Dionysius a 
dangerous writer but I think this is taking matters in the wrong direction: Pseudo-
Dionysius upholds a strong Christology with profound insights into the Trinity and 
enjoins a strict liturgical practice (Corrigan and Harrington, 2015, p. 27). He insists 
that we must ‘use only what scripture has disclosed’ when using words of the ‘hidden 
transcendent God’, that is, when thinking theologically (Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987, p. 
50). As concerns the beauty of God, these authors remark that Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
view of the ‘visible created Universe’ upheld a ‘vivid sense of the aesthetic and 
imaginative beauty of the sensible universe, pervaded from the perspective of divine 
beauty by interrelatedness and harmony’ (Corrigan and Harrington, 2015, p. 28 and 
see also Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987, pp. 54, 55). Thus whereas Barth speaks of 
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warnings and fear in our embracing of God’s beauty, Pseudo-Dionysius looks for it 
everywhere and exhibits no fear embracing it, because God is all and in all 
(Colossians 3.11). 
Pseudo-Dionysius takes us on a form of journey into an ever-closer relationship with 
God in Christ, unbounded by our preconceptions and yet retaining the orthodox 
Trinitarian Creedal formulations and wedded to traditional liturgical practices and 
scriptural interpretations. [Corrigan and Harrington re-interpret or extend Pseudo-
Dionysius’ writings at this point to apparently permit inter-religious dialogue, but this 
amounts to a contemporary extension rather than a re-interpretation of his writings. 
Yet upon Pseudo-Dionysius’ words alone, his theology enables a divine reading and 
re-reading of both nature and word, laying us open to God’s sacred works and 
indeed Person (Corrigan and Harrington, 2015, p. 26)].  
And it is into such a radically new landscape that true beauty transports us, a 
translation that ‘belongs to the very origin of Christianity’ and through which ‘Jesus’ 
figure stands out in his encounters and conversations’, and as a result of which ‘the 
Unconditional breaks through, casting a person down to adoration and transforming 
him into a believer and follower’ (von Balthasar, 1982, p. 33). Beauty as a sudden 
interruption to the ordinary and the every-day has such force that when in 
combination with talk of the radical Other that is God, could manifest itself as either 
ecstasy or ruin depending on the observer's view of reality: ecstasy for the person 
suddenly finding themselves in God's presence and ruin for any thought that stands 
against the Divine:  
Both the person who is transported by natural beauty and 
the one snatched up by the beauty Christ must appear to the 
world to be fools, and the world will attempt to explain their 
state in terms of psychological of even physiological laws 
(Acts 2.13). But they know what they have seen, and they 
care not one farthing what people may say. They suffer 
because of their love, and it is only the fact that they have 
been inflamed by the most sublime of beauties - a beauty 
crowned with thorns and crucified - that justifies their sharing 
in that suffering. (von Balthasar, 1982, p. 33) 
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Let the reader note how here von Balthasar is speaking of potentially two groups of 
people both being transported by beauty: the one (possibly non-Christian) being 
moved by the natural world, and the other (Christians, no-doubt through Divine 
revelation) being ‘snatched-up’ by Christ’s beauty. Von Balthasar speaks of both 
groups being ‘inflamed’ by the one beauty which is that ‘crowned with thorns and 
crucified’. We are then urged, against Barth’s warning, to cross: 
the boundary between the realm of nature and that of grace 
…. The form of the beautiful appear[ing] to us to be so 
transcendent in itself that it glided with perfect continuity 
from the natural into the supernatural world (von Balthasar, 
1982, p. 34). 
The role of the beautiful here is being shown to be powerfully transcendent in 
mechanism: it is as though the sight of the observer is being drawn away from the 
sight of the natural world and its beauties, towards Christ as its source. This is plainly 
at odds with the attitudes expressed by for example Barth or indeed by McGrath 
elsewhere in this book. How are we to resolve these apparent tensions? Does not 
the resolution lie in the effect the encounter with the objective (a perception of beauty 
in this case), has on the subject? If and when God in Christ, encountered as beauty 
in the natural world does indeed lead to the person coming to Christ, becoming a 
Christian, then surely it would be deeply wrong to deny them entrance into the 
community of the faithful (see Acts 10.47)? And when this world seeks to subvert the 
beauty of Christ revealed in the world that He made, perhaps in a form of alluring yet 
ultimately perverting aestheticism that Barth warns against, then we ‘suddenly come 
to an astonished halt and conscientiously decline to continue on that path’ (von 
Balthasar, 1982, p. 37). 
The reader will now appreciate the mechanism of the beautiful if read in the platonic 
sense, as representing a truer reality than the world or earthly concreteness on 
display. God’s nature, so closely bound to God’s beauty, gives the force, the 
motivating power behind, in truth the love, which can so radically transform the 
individual who encounters Christ. 
As Whitehead himself remarks, it is this seeking of the ‘forms in the facts’ within 
Platonic philosophy’s ‘abiding appeal’ that allows his Process philosophy to become 
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one of the more radical expressions of Platonism (Whitehead, 1978, p. 20). With this 
methodology then, Whitehead’s schema acknowledges the transcendental: 
if we had to render Plato's general point of view with the 
least changes made necessary by the intervening two 
thousand years of human experience in social organization, 
in aesthetic attainments, in science, and in religion, we 
should have to set about the construction of a philosophy of 
organism. In such a philosophy the actualities constituting 
the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the 
ingression (or 'participation') of other things which constitute 
the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence. 
The things which are temporal arise by their participation in 
the things which are eternal (Whitehead, 1978, pp. 39-40) 
From this it is clear that in a Process Theological view, beauty perceived in a 
temporal sense can indeed be a signifier of the eternal beauty in God, owing to the 
beauty we can see participating in the eternal, which we can not.  
Any tensions, for that is what I would suggest they are, between an orthodox 
Christian Faith and a Process Theology, are indeed recognised to exist in von 
Balthasar’s writings, as Gerard O’Hanlon observes: 
The challenge to the traditional axiom of divine immutability 
in Process Theology is based on the philosophical principle 
which affirms the primacy of becoming over being. It is 
fascinating to note that the issue arises in Balthasar in a very 
definitely theological context, and moreover within a 
Christology and theology 'from above' in which the 
philosophical component is respected and given its due but 
in which the theological retains a certain priority and 
normativity. (O’Hanlon, 1990, pp. 10-11) 
Yet these tensions have already been collapsed in the person of Christ: 
The Son, then, as Word of the Father reveals and expresses 
the Father. More specifically, too, it is especially through the 
 
183 
obedience of his life and death that the Son carried out this 
saving revelatory role .... the high point of this obedience lies 
in the event of the cross .... and so it is this event, at the 
centre of the revealing and dynamic 'figure' of Christ, which 
is also at the centre of Balthasar's theology and from which 
all else is interpreted. The cross is the exposed place in 
which love appears at its most extreme and as most itself 
(O’Hanlon, 1990, p. 10) 
In summary then, it is possible to recognise some helpful elements in Whitehead’s 
approach to God and Beauty, most notably the recognition of an eternal truth 
underpinning in some manner, that which is perceived in the temporal. Our gaze 
nonetheless, as O’ Hanlon reminds us, must remain centred on the figure of Christ. 
Beauty is not merely indicative of a Whiteheadean underlining eternal ‘thing’ but 
reveals the dynamic figure of the Christ. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
For well over 2000 years a person’s attitude to perceptions of beauty has provided a 
window into their willingness to entertain variously:  
• the possibility of the transcendent breaking into their temporal existence 
• whether one is content to live with and within mystery and wonder (including 
that mystery and wonder uncovered through scientific research) or whether in 
contrast one holds that everything in the physical world must be both 
explained and explicable, and have a purely temporal explanation 
• One can live without notions of beauty clouding one’s rational vision yet it is 
likely to be a poor interpretation of the complete reality. That there is a 
something called ‘beauty’ that can captivate, stun or even transport those who 
are willing to see it for what it is, is an assertion perhaps many will concede. 
That it provides sight of the Christ who saves, is in God’s gift by grace alone, 
but what is certain is that the potentiality of that soteriological witness, is 
within the grasp of all who choose to reach out. 
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• It may however be possible to leave this brief thematic survey of ‘God and 
Beauty’ with a more helpful synthesis of these two positions or streams. 
Perhaps I have drawn the lines too starkly: Aquinas as an interpreter of 
Aristotle is almost certainly one of the greatest of Christian writers and whose 
analyses are frequently still being turned to today whereas in contrast 
Whitehead, who considered himself a platonist, was not an orthodox 
Christian: truth appears to lie in both positions. Earlier I remarked how Derkse 
tells us that science has the task of decomposition for the purposes of 
comprehension and recomposition in order to make use of it all. In the same 
place I reported how Bulkeley implies that a certain destructiveness 
accompanies that decomposition which is then transformed into a renewed 
and expanded ‘capacity for surprise amazement and curiosity’ in this 
recomposition phase of any sustained encounter with the detail of the natural 
world. Perhaps this then is a more helpful way of seeing the flow of historical 
comment on ‘God and Beauty’: by all means dive into the detail and attempt 
to explain as much as you can, but always remember to come back to an 
overview. The plain and simple fact is the wonder of it all: what God has made 







The objective of this book is to show that chemistry can indeed rationally inform a 
natural theology. In this final chapter I will draw together the arguments mapped-out 
in the preceding chapters to demonstrate how this might be achieved. The 
discussion has proceeded as follows: it was first necessary to establish an 
epistemological position on the basis of which it is rational to believe in the Christian 
God. Following this I explored natural theology as a mechanism for demonstrating 
this rationality to those who are not Christians. Within this second chapter I also 
developed a particular form of natural theology that I proposed was a best ‘fit’ for the 
discipline of chemistry. In the third chapter I familiarised the reader with aspects of 
chemistry both historical and contemporary. This was expanded to reveal the 
metaphysical in chemistry. I also began to show how beauty can act as a bridge 
between the natural theology and the practice of chemical research. A closer 
inspection of beauty was here also necessary to show how aspects of its perception 
are specifically attuned to the ways in which results of chemical research are seen 
by practitioners. A small survey of contemporary research papers emphasised those 
aspects of chemistry and beauty already alluded to. A discussion of God and beauty 
in the fifth chapter, in addition to illustrating how God has been shown to be related 
to beauty, also detailed how the obvious beauty present in creation can and is 
ignored by commentators: an openness to beauty is required in order to perceive the 
Divine in creation. 
We are now almost ready to draw matters together. There remains a gap in the 
discourse which needs to be resolved and this concerns beauty itself. Whilst I have 
written in some detail on the subject in both theological and chemical terms, what 
has been lacking up-to-now has been a definition: how can I make use of the 
perception of beauty as both bridge between a natural theology and chemistry and 




6.2 Defining Beauty 
In finally being able to come to a definition of beauty that not only encompasses 
forms of art and music but also more modern pursuits such as computer software  
creation and most importantly here the efforts in and products of, chemical research, 
I am in part reliant upon Wynn’s statement that: 
… God is not simply a powerful individual whose purposes 
are good, but a uniquely concentrated expression of what it 
is to be. On this view, the goodness and beauty of the world 
provide a clue not just to God’s benevolent intentions in 
relation to the world, but to the goodness and beauty of the 
divine being itself…. If asked what the world basically is, our 
reply [should be] ‘a locus of value’ (Wynn, 1999, p.196) 
Importantly Wynn does not say that the beauty of the world is or equals the beauty 
of God, but that it provides clues to the beauty of God. He speaks of God as ‘Beauty 
and Meaning and Love’ (Wynn, 1999, p.186). Having earlier in his book explored 
notions of resemblance ‘in order to spell out the sense in which the world represents 
God’ Wynn then goes on to explain the nature of the relationship between the ‘thing’ 
that is perceived to be beautiful and its ultimate source in God as one of 
complementarity rather than resemblance (Wynn, 1999, p. 179). Wynn explains his 
use of complementarity as follows: 
… we may suppose that if one part of such a work [he is 
speaking of a work of art] were to be removed, then the 
character of that part could in principle be inferred from a 
knowledge of the remainder of the work …. We sometimes 
suppose that there is one thing and one thing only which is 
able to complete a work of art. Let us call the relationship 
which binds one part of a work of art to the thing which is 
able uniquely to complete that part the relationship of 
complementarity (Wynn, 1999, pp. 179,180) 
Crucially for the definition which I propose below, Wynn implies a form of separation 
between the beauty we see and the God who is its source, whilst maintaining the 
connection in complementarity: 
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…. one part of an aesthetic object may represent the rest of 
the object. Notice that in such cases, the representation 
does not turn upon resemblance: there is no necessity that 
the complementary element should mirror (or be mirrored 
by) the element which is already in place. Nor is the 
representation like the merely conventional representation 
which is characteristic of linguistic denotation. Nor yet is it 
like the relation of symptom to cause. Instead, it has to do 
with the way in which one object may uniquely identify 
another by virtue of the aesthetic relationship which unites it 
to this further object. (Wynn, 1999, p.180) 
In seeking a rich exposition of complementarity, I turn now to a schema prepared by 
Richard Kearney which 'attests to ways in which the sacred is in the world but not of 
the world', the sacred inhabiting the secular but not being identical with it, although 
crucially both needing each other, as our description above from Wynn affirms 
(Kearney, 2011, p.152). And such phrases are plainly reminiscent of Christ’s 
command to be in the world yet not of it (John 17.14-18; see also Romans 12.2). 
In illustrating this notion, Kearney speaking of the moments throughout history when 
people make a break with 'ingrained habits of thought and open up novel possibilities 
of meaning' and in so doing suspend 'received assumptions' to enable us to be 'open 
to the birth of the new' (Kearney, 2011, p.7), proposes three as he says 'arcs' or 
perhaps more meaningfully, components of such moments. These he terms the 
iconoclastic, the prophetic and the sacramental (Kearney, 2011, p.152). Plainly 
Kearney is not thinking of chemistry being brought into a natural theology and yet for 
the illustration of the idea of complementarity in the implementation of new ways of 
thinking about beauty, his text is helpful. In this way, iconoclasm 'unmasks 
mendacious and illusory idols' and stands in protest against them (Kearney, 2011, 
p.153). This I would suggest, accurately reveals the manner in which a purely 
aesthetic way of life, beauty for beauty's sake without thought to its origin, is 
ultimately ruinous. This I would contrast with my account of beauty which, in 
revealing Christ as its source, is life enhancing and affirming. Secondly the prophetic 
component 'lets symbols speak of new things still to come', as Kearney says in the 
same place, in an 'hermeneutics of reaffirmation', gaining back 'a living God after 
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forsaking an illusory one'. This in my present book speaks powerfully in favour of the 
use of models and other symbology in the building of a critically realist view of the 
often unseen realities, that lie at the heart of much chemical exploration and indeed 
certain Christian theological mysteries. It rejects an insistence on a dogmatic fixed 
order of things as though this were more comforting and instead embraces an 
‘ontological openness’ as Polkinghorne expresses it, quoted in chapter 3 above. 
Thirdly and finally the sacramental which is recovered in the 'lived world of suffering 
and action', 'complements [this] prophecy of promise with concrete attention to 
embodied divinity' (Kearney, 2011, p.153). 
Thus in his use of a certain parallelism to equate his earlier 'iconoclasm' with 
'concrete attention to embodied divinity' and in his use of 'the prophetic' paralleled 
with a 'prophecy of promise’, Kearney’s treatment can be extended to include: 
 a recognition of what he calls - perhaps inelegantly - 'sacred enfleshment' 
(Kearney, 2011, p.7), which I take to mean concrete examples of what Paul is 
speaking of when he talks of God's eternal power and divine nature being clearly 
seen in what has been made (Romans 1.18,19) - embodied divinity indeed; 
 a certain humility in the face of all we do not know and therefore having 
recognised the 'indispensable significance of a moment of dispossessive 
bewilderment', to 'surrender inherited sureties and turn towards the Other - in wonder 
and bewilderment, in fear and trembling, in fascination and awe' (Kearney, 2011, 
pp.8,11); none of which sounds very far from the emotions expressed in the 
discoveries made and reported upon in chapter 4 above and elsewhere, and 
accurately expresses the hope, the prophetic promise, of the conversation that lies at 
the heart of this book. 
 
Thus I have extended Kearney's exposition to propose ways in which God in Christ 
can break through those previous 'certainties' of old, perhaps certainties on both 
sides of the argument: those of scientific or naturalistic positivism on the one hand 
and religious dogma on the other (or as Kearney puts it, a way 'that precedes and 
exceeds the extremes of dogmatic theism and militant atheism' 2011, p.166). And so 
finally to borrow from Kearney and to extend his use of understandings of the secular 
and sacred: I am not saying that complementarity means that the beauty we see in 
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nature is God yet rather that God is visible in and through the beauty perceived in 
the natural, and crucially that it is bound-up with the natural world and that the 
natural world is thus pointing towards God ('the sacred is [not] the secular; ... it is in 
the secular, through the secular, toward the secular. I would even go so far as to say 
the sacred is inseparable from the secular, while remaining distinct’: Kearney, 2011, 
p. 166). And in being inseparable yet distinct as described, such an explanation of 
complementarity neatly chimes with that of Wynn above. 
 
Returning now to Wynn: he does not give a definition of beauty but in doing so here I 
make use of this notion of complementarity in order to achieve several outcomes: 
• I am proposing that the beauty being perceived is part of the mechanism of 
the particular argument from design that I am advocating. As part of a natural 
theology, as I have already stated, it can not prove God’s existence but 
merely indicate or point at, the Divinity. Beauty functioning as ‘complementary’ 
maintains the duality I spoke of in chapter 2 above whilst still being linked to 
its source in the Creator. 
• In line with the completion of the account of beauty offered in section 5.2 
above I hold that love of the ‘thing’ that is perceived to be beautiful forms part 
of that apprehension of beauty. Yet I am not convinced that I ‘love’ the things a 
molecule is made from or consists of, like the example of Buckminster 
Fullerene given above in chapter 4, in the sense of being ‘in love’ with the 
carbon from which it is made. There is something I am loving as a result of my 
finding it beautiful, but I don’t ‘love’ a chemical. Again beauty functioning as 
‘complementary’ to the ‘thing’ found to be beautiful is a more satisfactory 
resolution to the problem of loving the ‘thing’ itself. 
• In chapter 2 I discussed what it was that invoked the notion of beauty as 
expressed for example in Psalm 73 and elsewhere, and came to the 
conclusion that a perception of beauty arose as a result of understanding that 
one was in God’s Presence. It was not that one enjoys visiting a spectacular 
(religious) building or appreciates the interior decor or fittings, but that one 
had been gifted the sense of being in the Divine Presence. Beauty functioning 
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as complementary or ‘in complementarity’ , again here resolves the potential 
confusion of being in love with or of finding beauty-in, a ‘thing’, for example a 
building, as opposed to the Divine who made Himself present to the person 
within that building or space. Thus the given definition addresses the tension 
at the heart of beauty as both ‘event’ or ‘being’, to use Westermann’s 
terminology. 
 
I should now like the reader to consider the multi-vocal term ‘shape’. We might speak 
for example of a statue or any solid physical object as having a ’shape’ in three 
dimensional space. In being crafted it is usual to speak of ‘shaping’ an object. In 
musical performance it is usual to also use shape as a verb in speaking of ‘shaping a 
phrase’ in the music. A chemical compound has a shape both as a two dimensional 
diagrammatic representation and as a three dimensional form in space even though 
it cannot be seen. Although not commonly used, if I were to speak of the shape as 
the design of a piece of software, that would be largely intelligible even though 
plainly I am not speaking of the shape of the typeface on the computer screen but 
the manner in which the functionality has been assembled. In a painting or any other 
form of image I could quite readily speak about the shape of for example a face or of 
clothing even though it is only being rendered in two dimensions. One might speak of 
a person’s emotions for example shaping an interaction or indeed being shaped 
through an interaction. Note how if for example I discover that I find a particular 
statue beautiful, I am responding not to a love of marble but rather to what my 
interaction with, and interpretation of, the surface of that marble effects in me. I am 
therefore interacting with something that is real, that I am envisioning as being 
beautiful.  
 
Thus overall the word ‘shape’ speaks about an envisioned surface with which the 
observer interacts. This surface might be static as in the plastic arts or dynamic as in 
music and dance; it may be physically solid or perceived in the mind. When used in 
this manner, ‘shape’ does indeed speak of something real in the sense of some 
event exterior to the person having given rise to the perception of the surface: we are 
not speaking about an object seen in a dream. If this multi-vocal use of the word 
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‘shape’ is accepted I offer the following definition of beauty whilst keeping in mind 
Wynn’s use of the notion of complementarity discussed above: 
 Beauty is the perception of a shape as invoking sacred wonder: a 
shape complementary to a subject who holds it in value and with love. 
 
The reader might note some elements of this definition before I go on to demonstrate 
its use: 
- the definition is plainly in two parts; 
- a perception of beauty extends beyond the first part of the definition, which only 
relates to the pleasing shape in and of itself; 
- ‘sacred’ is used in a manner consistent with Kearney’s usage of ‘sacred’ as quoted 
above: it is that aspect of a process or object or an event which though plainly part of 
the physical world nonetheless appears unique and in some manner separate from 
the mundane and everyday; 
- ‘wonder’ as used in the definition, is that aspect of a process or object or an event 
which causes the person perceiving it to halt and gaze as though unsure of the 
ultimate provenance of the sensation being perceived; 
- the definition is extended into the second part to include the subject that the beauty 
in complementarity belongs to and without which it would not be complete. In so 
doing the definition recognises the transcendental nature of the perception of beauty; 
- the shape and the act of perception are both dynamic elements of the definition: the 
shape may only exist fleetingly and the beauty of it is only perceived actively from 
moment to moment; 
- the subject which in complementarity projects or is responsible for, the perceived 
beauty, is in a Christian understanding Christ in creation. Where Christ is not 
understood in this way, it is that transcendent aspect of humanity which creates the 
wonder and mystery frequently, as I have explained above, felt by for example lovers 
of music or chemical researchers; 
- the ‘locus of value’, to re-use Wynn’s terminology, is expressed by the subject; 
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6.3 Conclusion  
I shall now re-visit certain key points in the overall argument to check that the given 
definition of beauty is fit for purpose. Theologically I have moved my version of the 
design argument as expressed in Chapter 2 away from an appreciation of Creation 
as strictly ordered or as Wynn says ‘lifeless and machine-like’, towards one which 
‘may be grounded in an evaluatively rich conception of the world’ (Wynn, 1999, 
p.196). Such a more complex appreciation of the character of Creation accepts that 
its development is contingent and entertains a greater level of in-determinedness in 
outcomes. In its use of the frameworks set within Creation, chemistry should not be 
seen as ‘unnatural’; those who make things do so according to rules and laws which 
the Creator put in place. In this manner, overall the character of the natural theology 
being used is revealed to be aligned with the everyday experience of life. 
The definition of beauty given above allows it to be acknowledged as such in all 
manner of disciplines and in all manner of endeavours, including as was discovered 
in chapters 3 and 4, in chemistry. The appreciation of beauty was then expanded 
upon in this present chapter. The given definition is well able to encompass the 
challenge of the unseen beauty within chemistry. In this way, beauty might be 
perceived variously for example in the elegant design of a chemical process, in the 
design of a particular molecule or in the unfolding of a principle from the particular to 
the general. Examples of each of these are found in chapters 3 and 4 above. Thus 
the perceiving of beauty in aspects of chemical research is an accepted part of the 
discipline. 
Also in Chapter 2 and then affirmed again in chapter 3, I showed that the ultimate 
source of beauty is Christ through whom the world was Created. I asserted that the 
wonder and sense of beauty perceived in the artefacts of the world arises quite 
naturally from Christ who gave them existence. The world was created through 
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Christ and this world is a ‘locus of value’ as Wynn remarks: the beauty perceived in 
the world arises as a result of the value Christ in love places in it. It is thus rational to 
conceive of such value as having some aspect of complementarity to Creation. 
Through the work of Wynn and in consideration of the definition of beauty, it has 
become possible to rationally provide clues to link the beauty perceived in Creation, 
in the natural world, with the Divine agency through whom it was brought into being. 
Again the beauty that is Christ, partly hidden yet still shining through the fabric of 
Creation, requires a definition that can be powerfully, realistically and convincingly 
present in the mind of the beholder whilst still not be present as evidence for His 
existence. In this manner the duality in the presentation of the natural theology is 
maintained: both the natural theologian and the chemist perceive the beauty present 
in the result of the chemical research. The Christian draws from it encouragement for 
their lived-in Christian Faith and the non-Christian is left wondering at the Source. 
Once again the offered definition of beauty appears to be able to maintain such a 
duality and keeps the beauty discerned as actual and real.  
The given definition of beauty insists as does Wynn, that the world is this locus of 
value since beauty is found in the world and that beauty is itself an 
acknowledgement of inherent value in the ’shape’ that is discerned to be beautiful. 
Again I reiterate the question at the heart of this book: can chemistry inform a natural 
theology? Chemistry has been shown to have a metaphysical quality; chemical 
research and its products, can be seen to be entirely natural; a transformational 
ethos in the preparation of new compounds, does not preclude an appreciation of the 
laws and rules embedded within the natural world. A lived-in or lively Christian faith 
does not deny the role of evidence in the elucidation of ever-greater mysteries within 
Creation: indeed it encourages it. The challenge of increased and increasing 
complexity and knowledge of and about the natural world, does not threaten such a 
revelation of God to the individual: instead it recognises that knowledge is always ‘in 
part’ and our understanding of it ’in part’ (1 Corinthians 13.12). 
Humans have an ability to place the form of simplicity over the reality of complexity 
and in so doing forge models and ways in which to advance knowledge for the good 
of all. This forging creates opportunities within research to discover an ever greater 
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incidence of plainly wondrous artefacts and intimations of this ‘beauty beyond our 
imagining’. 
As presented in this book there is ample evidence for the perception of the beauty of 
God theologically as well as the perception of beauty within certain aspects of 
chemical research. In relying on Plantingan warrant to convert belief into knowledge 
as expounded in chapter 1, the epistemological position put forward here privileges 
these ‘perceptions of beauty’ in both theology and chemistry as knowledge. In 
theological terms this knowledge amounts to an acceptance of Christ as the source 
of that beauty. In matters of chemistry such knowledge credits beauty as an 
objective reality and as an aide to further advances in research. The perceptions of 
the beautiful in chemistry have the same source as beauty in other disciplines 
although in a natural theological sense are presented as mysterious and ‘other’. 
The particular form of critical realism proposed in this book, hints of links to such 
perceptions of beauty with the Creator who shaped it. A form of the Argument from 
Design as the particular vehicle for the natural theology being used here, calls after 
Wynn’s and Kearney’s insights, for a rich holistic appreciation of Creation that at its 
core exhibits beauty in many and varied ways, as a complementary aspect of it being 
crafted by its Creator. Such complementarity in the artifice of Creation does not allow 
for exact detailed predictions as to the outcomes of all research into the workings of 
the natural world yet at every turn does reveal, for those who as we discovered in 
Chapter 5 are willing to entertain it, the hand of the Creator in all its beauty. 
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Appendix A: Some Notes on Chemical Structures 
 
Several diagrams of chemical structures appear in this book. This short appendix is 
intended to give the reader an insight into what is being signified in these diagrams. 
 
1. The chemistry in this book is restricted to organic chemistry, a sub-discipline 
concerning those substances built-up largely from carbon. This appendix only relates 
to such carbon based structures and their visualisation. 
2. As will become apparent to the reader, chemistry and the visualisation of its 
reactants is best comprehended through the use of multiple points of view, which 
may include mathematical equations, models and diagrams offering a variety of 
information at differing levels of detail. In this way, the same physical chemical 
compound (the structure of which obviously is unseen) may be represented by and 
through a set of diagrams each of which presents not only a different image of what 
the compound might look like if it could be seen, but also varying levels of efficacy in 
predicting and illustrating the outcome of reactions in which it may take part. 
3. For the purposes of this illustration, an atom is a single physical entity 
representing an individual instance of an element. The element is therefore the class 
name for a group of identical physical objects. The term ‘element’ is familiar to many 
and includes for example: gold or silver, carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, argon etc. There 
are a little over 100 of such elements and all chemical compounds are composed of 
two or more of these in combination. Elements exhibit properties and as a result of 
segregating or grouping these properties, it has become apparent that there are 
groups or series of such elements. The well-known ‘Periodic Table’ is an attempt at 
classifying elements into groups of similar elements. Most organic compounds are 
composed of a very much restricted group of elements, typically carbon itself, in 
combination with hydrogen, sulphur, nitrogen; the so-called halides including 
chlorine, bromine, iodine and fluorine; certain lighter metals including sodium, 
lithium, boron and aluminium and then certain heavier metals which form peculiar 
not-to-say exotic bonding models with the other non-metallic elements listed here 
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and such metals include iron, chromium, copper and even heavier elements such a 
platinum. 
4. Atoms within chemical compounds, and carbon is no exception, become bound to 
other atoms through the process and phenomena of bonding. There are roughly two 
categories of bonding (although that statement is fraught with dangers) and for the 
organic compounds we are considering we should restrict ourselves largely to that 
class of bonding known as ‘covalent’. This involves a process usually characterised 
as the sharing of one or more electrons that were originally bound to a single atom, 
such that they would appear to wrap themselves around the atoms within the bond. It 
is therefore less of an attraction-type ‘glue’ and should be seen more like ropes. 
Covalent bonds vary depending on the numbers of electrons being shared and the 
atoms involved in the bond. This then affects the distance between atomic centres, 
which itself has a bearing on the nature and energy of the bonding interaction. 
5. Organic compounds, meaning those with a ‘backbone’ composed of one or more 
carbon atoms, have ‘shapes’ that are rarely planar in the sense of flat like a sheet of 
paper. Depending on the type of (covalent) bonding within the compound - and the 
one compound may have differing types of bonding in different parts of the molecule 
- it becomes possible for the same collection of individual atoms to be arranged 
within a compound in possibly many different ways. The resulting set or group of 
compounds may in turn exhibit remarkably different properties: they may differ in 
smell, colour, state (i.e. whether gaseous, liquid or solid at a given temperature and 
pressure), toxicity etc. 
6. Bonding between carbon atoms is frequently described as being single, double or 
triple, referring to the numbers of electrons being shared in the construction of the 
bond. It is interesting to note that a string of carbons linked by single bonds is 
shaped somewhat like a three-dimensional saw-tooth, whereas double and triple 
bonds are planar i.e. flat. This has important implications for the way in which the 
properties of a compound are expressed in the physical world. 
7. Readers will be familiar with the concept of physical structures that are apparently 
the same, yet cannot be superimposed upon one another. The most obvious being 
our hands: our two hands are plainly the same and yet cannot be superimposed 
upon one another. Chemical compounds may exhibit this ‘handedness’ in a variety of 
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complex ways, such that for example one version of a compound is a useful 
medicine and the other a largely worthless chemical - yet both would appear to have 
the same atoms joined together in the same pattern, yet are mirror images of each 
other. It is this ‘stereoscopic’ effect, this ‘handedness’, that is used throughout the 
chemistry of living things to construct an enormous variety of ‘lock and key’ pairs of 
complex proteins wherever a receptor ‘lock’ in the body requires a chemical ‘key’ to 
open it, for example in order to record a particular stimulus. 
8. Colour as a phenomena expressed by chemical compounds occurs because of 
the manner in which light interacts with that compound. It should be remembered 
that a compound may exist in a variety of forms. Frequently white light is modified in 
its passing through for example a solution of a compound, through the removal of 
certain component wavelengths. At other times light is modified through its being 
transformed as it hits the surface of a compound. Carbon compounds containing 
triple carbon bonds are particularly known for often exhibiting colour as are carbon 
compounds containing metallic atoms. 
9. The phenomena of isotopes is already well known in general where a particular 
element is known in a variety of ways through variations in numbers of constituent 
particles within the atoms of that element. Thus an element may engage in a 
particular chemical reaction on account of being of that element and yet the resulting 
compound may exhibit differing properties because the precise isotope of the 
element differs. Perhaps a particular well known example is deuterium being an 
isotope of hydrogen. Being a ‘type’ or an isotope of hydrogen, it will form water when 
reacting with oxygen, known popularly as ‘heavy water’. If it should however be 
ingested in any quantity it is a poison since the bonding that ‘heavy water’ enters into 
is subtly different to that formed by ‘ordinary’ water, to the extent that e.g. enzymes 
in the human body fail to react as they should. 
10. Thus variety within chemical compounds may be expressed in a great number of 
ways: through combinations of atoms, their individual arrangements in three-
dimensional space, the isotopes being used, the types of bonding as well as the 
local context the chemical finds itself in. The science of for example Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging now routinely used in medical science to see into the human 
body in a completely non-invasive manner, relies on a particular property of the 
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hydrogen within common water to alter very slightly depending on the local context. 
In another field, many - often successful - attempts have been made to construct 
chemical compounds purely with the aim of achieving novel shapes such as for 
example footballs, cages, cylinders or crowns.  
11. A word on notation: a carbon carbon single bond may be written thus C-C; a 
double bond with two lines between: C=C, and a triple with three. Please remember 
that these simple binary structures exhibit different arrangements or structures in 
physical space. A structure written for example thus C-N represents a single bond 
between a carbon atom and a nitrogen; C-S would be involving sulphur. At times 
bonding rather than be shown with a solid single line between atoms, might be 
displayed with a dotted line. This is particularly the case where the bond can not be 
easily understood to be a ‘simple’ single or double bond, but where the electrons 
involved within the bond may not be as tightly localised. This is particularly the case 
in bonds involving metallic atoms but also in circumstances where the physical 
structure is unusual and might allow electrons to be perceived as being more 
dispersed. Benzene is a popular example: a ring of six carbon atoms would it 
appears, allow the electrons to be understood as a dispersed ‘cloud’ surrounding the 
entire molecule. It is a fascinating compound exhibiting neither entirely single nor 
entirely double bonds but something in between. 
12. It will have become clear to the reader that chemical research is an area of both 
great variety as well as great complexity. As knowledge has grown, the behaviours 
of reactants within individual reactions are frequently well understood yet these are 
then combined in novel ways to produce the astonishing variety of compounds 
known today, a variety that is expanding constantly. Thus there is ‘order’ in the 
sense of known rules and circumstances being used reproduceably. Yet the targets, 
as in new materials, may be elusive and a number of paths to them may have to be 
tried before a successful reaction path is identified. Thus the human is making use of 
predetermined patterns but taking control of them in novel ways, and there is at 
times great unpredictability in terms of all the parameters of the outcome. 
 
Appendix B: A Brief Introduction to Redox Reactions 
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Anecdotally it might be expected that in a chemical reaction between several input 
compounds, several outputs or products might result: the reaction starts with a stable 
set of compounds, runs to completion and yields another stable set of products. 
Frequently however this is not the case. Certain sorts of so-called Redox reactions, 
the name being a conflation of the words oxidation and reduction, consume 
quantities of inputs and then depending on various factors, may or may not run to 
completion. At a certain point both input compounds and product may co-exist: the 
reaction can be run forwards and backwards by altering the reaction conditions such 
as temperature, concentration of reactants and gaseous pressure. 
This might be thought a distinct disadvantage however it transpires that redox 
reactions play a pivotal rȏle in many life processes. One of these for example is 
mammalian respiration. The process by which oxygen is used for respiration is 
tuneable through the acidity - known in chemistry as the pH - of the blood. The 
reader may wish to reflect on the behaviour of their own bodies when once they have 
engaged in exercise: the additional carbon-dioxide in the blood causes the blood to 
become more acidic which in turn triggers a series of reactions designed to expel the 
excess carbon dioxide and replenish the blood with oxygen. The blood then returns 
to a less acidic state: the process overall is reversible it is true but indeed at the level 
of the individual chemical reactions in the blood, these also are reversible. Plainly the 
bodily organism is capable of adaptation to environmental and other influences in 
short timespans.  
Each redox process involves a movement of electrons with one part of the reaction 
loosing them and so becoming oxidised and another gaining them and so becoming 
reduced. Environmental factors directly influence this flow across the very many 
groups that might be involved in any redox reaction. Such groups might be relatively 
simple and consist of single ions or electrically charged metal atoms, or they might 
consist of large bonded structures consisting of many atoms arranged into very 
considerably sized, yet still electrically charged, groups. Within such large structures, 
the arrangement and types of these electrically charged groups or ions, make an 
enormous difference to how they behave in redox reactions. Elsewhere I have 
spoken of energy maxima and minima using the example of a ball bearing rolling 
about a surface. It might be helpful to think of redox systems also moving to a 
minimum energy consistent with the particular set of environmental conditions. It is 
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possible to draw-up tables predicting how pairs of ions will behave in a redox fashion 
should they ‘meet’ each other in such a reaction. Thus for example a particular 
charged group might habitually react in a particular manner when faced with another 
reactant. However if this reactant is altered to a ‘weaker’ or ‘stronger’ one, the redox 
reaction may not commence at all. It will rapidly become clear to the reader that 
reacting systems can be designed to be ‘tuneable’ depending upon what differing 
arrangements of atoms are grouped into a basic process-flow or structure of a 
reaction design. One could envisage for example in the mammalian body, a slight 
alteration to say an oxygen receiving compound, rendering certain enzyme systems 
ineffective.  
From the perspective of this book, the very design of such systems, most especially 
those related to life-chemistry but often even ones we might design ourselves, could 
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Chemistry Informing a Natural Theology 
 
The Abstract (in English) 
The central argument of this book is that aspects of the natural science of chemistry 
as currently practiced, may inform a natural theology. The task is framed within a 
hypothetical conversation between two persons: the one putting forward the natural 
theological argument and the other a researcher in chemistry. The purpose of 
framing the discussion in this way is so as to form and shape the type of natural 
theology: it should veer away from merely the abstract, the theoretical and be 
capable of engaging with the world as encountered. Given the objective and the 
chosen route, this book then has to overcome several hurdles: natural theology as 
an epistemic device is not perhaps currently greatly in favour as a way of explaining 
or arguing for the rationality of, the Christian faith; chemistry has up-to-now not been 
thought efficacious in forming or informing a natural theology; modern chemistry is a 
very rapidly expanding and broad discipline practiced across many different cultures 
and in a large number of academic and industrial contexts: what aspect of chemistry 
is so central or core, that it might be used generically to feed into a natural theology? 
In chapter 1 and section 1 I evaluate various strategies current in contemporary 
religious epistemology including variously a form of fideism, prudential 
methodologies, the epistemic value of religious experience and importantly the study 
known as Reformed Epistemology. I also briefly explore older strategies including 
Foundationalism. Reformed Epistemology, extended here as a modified form of 
reliabilism, I show to be particularly important and useful in this present book. This 
particular epistemic strategy allows humans to arrive at certain truth claims on the 
basis of properly functioning mental faculties working within an environment directed 
to this purpose. The community of the faithful as the Christian Church has in my 
modified strategy, the task to enable such a conducive truth-forming environment. 
In chapter 2 having arrived at the now developed epistemic strategy in the preceding 
chapter, I proceed to investigate the efficacy of natural theology in reaching the 
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objectives of this book. Given that there are many types of natural theology I 
investigate which might function with chemistry. I then describe those aspects of 
contemporary chemistry which might then in turn allow it to be amenable to a natural 
theology. These aspects are established to be the inherent contingency in describing 
mechanisms and processes within chemical reactions as well as the sense of 
wonder and indeed beauty experienced by chemical researchers at what they 
discover. Beauty, or rather the sensation of perceiving something to be beautiful 
becomes then in this book, the core aspect of the practice of chemistry which 
enables the discipline to be bound into a natural theology. 
Any chosen natural theology will necessarily have a particular vision of the God it 
seeks to elucidate, in mind. In the first part of chapter 2 I highlight aspects of the 
natural world which demonstrate its contingency, indeterminacy and variety. I 
therefore propose some alterations to existing Arguments from Design in order that 
these aspects can now be accommodated.  
These aspects are shown both here and later in chapter 3, to be inherent in chemical 
research and its elucidation as well, thus further enhancing the 'fit' between theology 
and chemistry as practiced. 
If beauty is to be the chosen bridge between theology and chemistry it is also 
necessary to show in what way God is beautiful and this is especially important given 
that the Christian scriptures do not anywhere say for example ‘God is beauty’ in the 
way that they do say ‘God is love’. A brief survey of scripture is undertaken to 
demonstrate that the Hebrew scriptures do in fact ascribe beauty to God, using not 
one but several words and frequently as a result of humans experiencing a sense of 
the Divine beauty when in God’s presence, for example in worship. 
The past objections to chemistry informing a natural theology have to do with 
chemistry making things and it thus being more challenging to describe God being at 
work in that which humans have themselves created. In order to answer such 
objections to chemistry informing a natural theology I here also widen that which 
might be considered ‘natural’ and show that it is the frameworks themselves which 
we must see as having Divine origins. I challenge the oft-presented sense that 
complexity must frequently inform arguments from design and also commence the 
process of demonstrating certain similarities in aesthetic appreciation between the 
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academic disciplines of chemistry and theology. The study of the natural sciences 
frequently has the effect of enforcing an ordering over the complexity of the 
discoveries made and chemistry is shown to fit that model as well. 
Also in chapter 2 section 2, I clearly draw the distinctions between theologies of 
nature and natural theology in order to further confirm the selection of natural 
theology as the most favourable epistemic strategy for my present study. 
The type of natural theology that I select for this book differs from enlightenment 
versions of this theology in that it does not seek to prove the existence of God but 
rather to lead the genuine enquirer towards the Christian God. Since it does not seek 
to prove the existence of God it is not intended to be the basis of faith to the one who 
professes to be a Christian. As a result the putting forward of this type of natural 
theology involves a duality: the Christian using it acknowledges that the Christian 
faith is a life lived as a result of revelation and so lies beyond the reach of natural 
theology, yet that same person can with complete integrity expound such a natural 
theology which omits the language of revelation. Such language is intelligible across 
the disciplines of chemistry and theology. 
In concluding this chapter I affirm that the chosen form of natural theology provides a 
rational explanation for the wonder felt by many in the uncovering of the fabric 
underpinning the natural world. Overall the natural theology is based upon a version 
of the argument from design yet not one making use of, as has already been 
remarked, complexity or intricacy but rather upon the human apprehension of beauty 
as a type of value construct. In contrast to many expositions of natural theology, the 
approach adopted here is deemed to be accessible and engaged with the world as 
lived-in. 
In chapter 3 I turn the focus towards chemistry itself and start with a short historical 
survey beginning with its origins more in alchemy than the practice of chemistry as 
understood today. I begin by illustrating the view often held perhaps four or five 
centuries ago that the practice of chemistry was delving into things that were best left 
alone; that there was something potentially evil about a science that sought to 
tamper with nature. I then proceed to show that for at least one leading renaissance 
researcher the exact opposite was true and that by derivation contemporary 
chemical research could equally be seen as uncovering the very wonders that the 
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Creator has put in place, and as such that chemical research amounts to a form of 
Divine worship.  
In repeating the words of and commenting upon contemporary commentators’ views 
of the progress of chemistry, I start to illustrate how the study of a discipline which 
exhibits indeterminacy requires and indeed encourages a theology which is true to 
humanity's experience of everyday life. In this way a potential 'chemico-theology' 
rejects simplistic mechanistic explanations for processes and instead encourages 
the adoption of a basket of narratives each illustrating some aspect of the overall 
truth, whilst recognising a level of contingency in any such overarching story. 
Using a small number of diagrams of chemical substances I show how this 
contingency is entertained even at that level, with the diagrams each representing 
only part of the overall picture of the given chemical compounds. 
I also here commence the process of illustrating the role and power of similarity in 
chemical research and of how this mechanism can also be seen at work in the 
epistemic strategies that informed the selection of a suitable natural theological 
approach discussed above. The result is that the reader sees not only some of the 
underlying metaphysics in chemistry but furthermore sees the connections with this 
previously adopted epistemic position. 
Chapter 3 contains a wide-ranging discourse on a number of topics that together 
reinforce the links between the metaphysical and the chemical. I start with a 
discussion of critical realism. The adoption of a suitable realist strategy ensures that 
chemists and theologians can meaningfully discourse together, yet for reasons I 
show, not all contemporary critically realist strategies are suitable for my present 
purpose. As part of delineating the chosen critical realism I make explicit the 
essentially Christo-centric nature of the overall project by demonstrating how it is 
Christ in the Trinitarian relational structure within God, who animates beauty in 
Creation. The overall strategy of the modelling of reality in the light for example of 
the doctrine of the Trinity is shown to also be at work in the explananda of chemical 
research. Thus the critical realism that is adopted, in the way it spans more than one 
discipline, in its insistence upon the use of symbol and model, moves away from the 
epistemic relativism of some commentators and towards an ontological openness to 
the future.  It retains both a sense of being truly 'realistic' in the way it works with 
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objects exterior to the self, as well as being 'critical' in holding to the contingency of 
research and indeed the everyday. 
In reviewing certain research reports of the beautiful as seen in chemical processes, 
I demonstrate that these have a metaphysical quality. Such apprehensions of beauty 
are common to both theology and chemistry. I further point out that a natural 
theology is not in and of itself a full systematic theology and that it is necessary to 
widen our gaze to embrace a narrative about God within which the chosen natural 
theology sits. As part of that I mention that the movement known as Process 
Theology has up to now been seen by certain commentators as the most promising 
vehicle for allowing chemistry to participate in natural theology. I demonstrate that 
since it is not an orthodox Christian theology it cannot form the basis of the 
systematic exposition of the faith that I am looking for. 
It has already been mentioned above that chemistry was not thought useful in a 
natural theology in that it makes things and that such things or compounds could not 
then be said to be 'natural' in the sense of 'God-given'. I demonstrate how such an 
attitude is unwarranted by the biblical text and that indeed the opposite is true: God 
enables human beings to deliver benefits for their neighbours through the creation of 
artefacts wrought from ingredients the God-created environment provides. 
In the conclusion of this third chapter I underline the differences between those 
sciences most frequently used to inform natural theologies such as physics and 
mathematics, and the natural science of chemistry. I stress the pivotal importance of 
the physical practice of chemical research, of the reliance on multiple explanations to 
get the researcher closer to the truth of any given process, of the importance of the 
practice of similarity and finally an acceptance of indeterminacy and contingency in 
any stated result. I affirm the essential orthodox Christian, indeed ‘Christ-centred’, 
character of what is being proposed and the importance of the language of beauty as 
being a connecting thread between the worlds of theology and chemistry. It is Christ 
in Creation who gives rise to perceptions of beauty. 
In the fourth chapter I review fifteen recent chemistry research papers. I 
acknowledge the restricted nature of what is being surveyed but stress as I visit each 
paper in turn, the more generic lessons that may be learnt. These are those aspects 
already noted including the indeterminacy of many of the reports, the use of 
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appreciations of similarity and the use of multiple forms of explanation, including 
those developed in theoretical chemistry, to probe the underlying mechanisms being 
seen. It is clear from the reports analysed here as well as in the discussion in 
chapter 3 above, that chemists do use words which indicate an aesthetic evaluation 
of their research. They use words such as ‘beauty’ or ‘beautiful’ and other terms to 
express their delight and sense of wonder, in describing the results of their work. 
The purpose of chapter five is to demonstrate both something of the breadth of the 
preoccupation across the centuries on the subject of God and beauty, and more 
importantly and centrally for this book, to show how it is the attitude of the individual 
to what they encounter that will determine whether they are enabled to encounter 
God in the beautiful. This chapter is constructed as a contrast between those who 
'look to the heavens' for an explanation of why humans perceive that which they call 
beautiful, and those who 'look to the earth' for the same. In this way I suggest that 
each such attitude finds its origins in the work of classical authors. This chapter 
reflects my desire to meet the arguments against theism head-on, and in so doing to 
continue to be faithful to the adopted form of realism. In this way it makes use of the 
work of a diverse group of commentators. 
In the sixth and final chapter I draw the various strands of the argument together to 
underline my thesis that chemistry can indeed inform a natural theology. I reaffirm 
those points made earlier regarding in particular the role and function of the aesthetic 
in chemistry, the place of beauty in the biblical writings and the evaluation of God 
and beauty. As presented, a more complete picture of beauty as encountered in 
human experience now enables me to come to a definition of beauty as used in this 
book. This definition of beauty encompasses all that has been said above of God, of 
Christ, of Trinitarian considerations, of realism, of chemical research, of contingency 
and of indeterminacy. In offering the given definition of beauty, use is made both of 
the concept of complementarity and a multi-vocal interpretation of the notion of 
shape, as follows: 
 Beauty is the perception of a shape as invoking sacred wonder: a 
shape complementary to a subject who holds it in value and with love. 
This definition of beauty is then read back into both chemistry and natural theology to 
ensure that it is adequate for both the contexts in which beauty is discussed in this 
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book. As a result, whilst continuing to hold that this does not amount to any form of 
definitive proof, the beauty perceived in chemical research can indeed rationally be 
argued to point to the God who created the Universe. For this reason chemistry may 
validly inform a natural theology. 
 
The Abstract (in Dutch) 
 
Verwondering hersteld 
Scheikunde als inspiratiebron voor een natuurlijke theologie 
Samenvatting 
 
Het centrale argument van dit boek is dat aspecten van de scheikunde zoals die 
vandaag de dag wordt beoefend als uitgangspunt kunnen dienen voor een 
natuurlijke theologie. Het betoog is gestructureerd als hypothetische conversatie 
tussen twee personen, waarvan de ene de positie van een natuurlijke theologie naar 
voren brengt en de ander een onderzoeker in de scheikunde is. Het doel van deze 
structurering van het gesprek is de natuurlijke theologie een concrete gestalte te 
geven, en zo verre te blijven van het louter theoretische en abstracte, en juist in staat 
te zijn in te gaan op de wereld zoals die in deze natuurwetenschap wordt ontmoet. 
Gezien het doel van dit onderzoek en de weg die ik daartoe heb gekozen, zal deze 
studie meerdere hindernissen moeten nemen. De natuurlijke theologie als 
kennistheoretische weg om te argumenteren voor de rationaliteit van het christelijk 
geloof, is momenteel geen gemeengoed. Scheikunde wordt tot nu toe weinig 
geschikt geacht als uitgangspunt voor de natuurlijke theologie. De moderne chemie 
is een zeer snel groeiend en breed vakgebied dat beoefend wordt in uiteenlopende 
culturen en in een veelheid van academische en industriële contexten. Welk aspect 
van de scheikunde is dan van zo’n centrale betekenis dat het ook in meer algemene 
zin gebruikt kan worden als bron voor een natuurlijke theologie? 
In hoofdstuk 1 en in paragraaf 1.1 onderzoek ik meerdere richtingen in de huidige 
religieuze kentheorie, waaronder een vorm van fideïsme, prudentiële benaderingen, 
de epistemische waarde van de religieuze ervaring, en met name de richting die 
bekend staat als Gereformeerde epistemologie (Reformed epistemology). In dat 
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kader komt ook het funderingsdenken (foundationalism) ter sprake. Ik zal aantonen 
dat de Gereformeerde epistemologie, opgevat als een aangepaste vorm van 
‘reliabilism’, van groot belang is voor mijn onderzoek. Deze benadering stelt, zoals 
bekend, dat mensen waarheidsclaims kunnen doen indien hun kennis tot stand is 
gekomen met inzet van goed functionerende, op waarheid gerichte mentale 
vermogens. De christelijke geloofsgemeenschap heeft daarbij de taak, bij te dragen 
aan een context waarbinnen die kenvermogens goed kunnen functioneren. 
Binnen het zojuist geschetste kennistheoretische kader wordt vervolgens in 
hoofdstuk 2 de geschiktheid van de natuurlijke theologie onderzocht om de doelen 
van deze studie te bereiken. Gezien het feit dat er vele richtingen in de natuurlijke 
theologie zijn, onderzoek ik welke ervan in een relatie met de scheikunde zouden 
kunnen functioneren. Vervolgens worden die aspecten van de eigentijdse 
scheikunde beschreven die op hun beurt ontvankelijk zouden kunnen zijn voor een 
benadering vanuit de natuurlijke theologie. Deze aspecten betreffen de inherente 
contingentie in de beschrijving van de mechanismen en processen in scheikundige 
reacties en voorts het besef van verwondering en bovendien van de schoonheid die 
onderzoekers in de scheikunde ervaren tijdens hun ontdekkingstochten. 
Schoonheid, of veeleer de gewaarwording iets als mooi te beleven, fungeert daarom 
in deze studie als het centrale aspect van de beoefening van de chemie van waaruit 
de verbinding naar een natuurlijke theologie kan worden gelegd. 
Elke natuurlijke theologie veronderstelt een specifiek godsbeeld, dat ze wil 
verhelderen. Met name in de paragrafen 2.1.2 en 2.1.6 belicht ik aspecten van de 
natuurlijke wereld die haar contingentie, onbepaaldheid en variëteit laten zien. Op 
grond daarvan stel ik enkele aanpassingen voor aan bestaande ontwerpargumenten 
(‘arguments from design’) om deze aspecten te behandelen.  
Deze aspecten blijken hier en in hoofdstuk 3 ook inherent te zijn aan scheikundig 
onderzoek (en de interpretatie daarvan), zodat de ‘fit’ tussen theologie en 
scheikundebeoefening wordt versterkt. 
Wanneer schoonheid de gekozen brug tussen theologie en scheikunde wil zijn, dan 
is het ook noodzakelijk te tonen in hoeverre schoonheid aan God kan worden 
toegeschreven. Dit is met name belangrijk omdat in de Bijbel nergens met dezelfde 
directheid waarmee wordt gezegd dat God liefde is, wordt gesteld dat God 
schoonheid is. Een kort overzicht van vindplaatsen in de Schrift toont dat in de 
Tenach schoonheid wel degelijk aan God wordt toegeschreven, en wel met 
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meerdere termen, veelal in relatie tot menselijke ervaringen van Gods schoonheid 
op momenten dat de aanwezigheid van God wordt ervaren, bijvoorbeeld in de 
eredienst. 
Eerdere bezwaren tegen de geschiktheid van de scheikunde om als uitgangspunt te 
dienen voor een natuurlijke theologie hebben van doen met het feit dat scheikunde 
wordt geassocieerd met het ‘maken’ van dingen, wat het een extra uitdaging maakt 
om te laten zien dat God aan het werk is in datgene wat mensen zelf hebben 
gemaakt. Om deze bezwaren te beantwoorden zal ik in dit hoofdstuk het begrip 
‘natuurlijk’ verbreden en tonen dat het de structuren zelf zijn die laten zien dat ze een 
goddelijke oorsprong hebben. Daarbij zet ik vraagtekens bij de veel voorkomende 
gedachte dat ontwerpargumenten gebaseerd moeten zijn op complexiteit, en begin 
ik tevens te laten zien dat er bepaalde overeenkomsten zijn in de esthetische 
waardering binnen scheikunde en theologie. De natuurwetenschappen leggen vaak 
een ordening op aan de complexiteit van wat ze ontdekken, en ook de chemie past 
in dat model. In paragraaf 2.2 bespreek ik de verschillen tussen theologieën van de 
natuur en natuurlijke theologieën, om daarmee de keuze te bevestigen voor een 
natuurlijke theologie als de meest geschikte kennistheoretische strategie voor mijn 
onderzoek. 
De vorm van natuurlijke theologie waarvoor in dit boek gekozen is, verschilt van 
eerdere versies uit de Verlichting, omdat ze niet tracht het bestaan van God te 
bewijzen, maar veeleer de onbevangen onderzoeker in de richting van de christelijke 
God wil leiden. Omdat ze niet zoekt Gods bestaan te bewijzen, heeft ze ook niet de 
behoefte gronden te verschaffen aan het geloof van wie ervan getuigt een christen te 
zijn. Het voorstellen van een dergelijke natuurlijke theologie resulteert wel in een 
ambiguïteit: de christen die hier in meegaat erkent dat het christelijke geloof een 
levensvorm is die een antwoord is op openbaring, en die dus buiten het bereik van 
de natuurlijke theologie ligt, en toch kan diezelfde persoon in alle oprechtheid een 
dergelijke theologie uitwerken zonder openbaringstaal te gebruiken. Zo wordt 
gebruik gemaakt van een taal, overigens, die kan worden verstaan in zowel de 
vakgebieden van de chemie als van de theologie. 
Ter afsluiting van dit hoofdstuk wil ik bevestigen dat de gekozen vorm van natuurlijke 
theologie een redelijke verklaring biedt voor de verwondering en bewondering die 
velen voelen, wanneer zij de structuren van de natuurlijke wereld ophelderen. Ruim 
gezien is deze natuurlijke theologie gebaseerd op een versie van het 
 
235 
ontwerpargument, maar daarbij maakt zij, zoals al eerder vermeld, geen gebruik van 
complexiteit en ingewikkeldheid, maar veeleer van de menselijke waarrneming van 
schoonheid als een soort evaluatieve interpretatie. In tegenstelling tot veel 
uiteenzettingen over de natuurlijke theologie, is de hier gekozen benadering erop 
gericht toegankelijk te zijn en betrokken op de wereld zoals die wordt beleefd. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de aandacht verlegd naar de chemie zelf; paragraaf 3.1 begint 
dan ook met een kort historisch overzicht, waarbij de oorsprong van de chemie 
eerder in de alchemie wordt gezien dan in het soort scheikunde dat momenteel 
wordt beoefend. Om te beginnen beschrijf ik de opvatting die zo’n vier of vijf eeuwen 
geleden opgeld deed, dat de toenmalige scheikunde zich verdiepte in zaken die je 
beter met rust kon laten en dat er iets potentieel gevaarlijks lag in een wetenschap 
die er naar streefde met de natuur te ‘knoeien’. Vervolgens laat ik zien dat minstens 
één eminent onderzoeker uit de Renaissance stelde dat juist het volstrekt 
omgekeerde gold. Zo ook zou eigentijds scheikundig onderzoek kunnen worden 
gezien als het ophelderen van de wonderen die de Schepper in de natuur legde; 
daarmee wordt dit onderzoek een vorm van goddelijke eredienst. 
Reflecterend op teksten van hedendaagse commentatoren over de vooruitgang in de 
chemie, wil ik illustreren hoe de studie van een vakgebied waarvan onbepaaldheid 
een onderdeel is, een theologie vereist en stimuleert die recht doet aan de 
menselijke ervaring in het alledaagse leven. Op deze wijze verwerpt een mogelijke 
‘chemico-theologie’ simplistische mechanische verklaringen van processen, en wil zij 
juist voorstellen om een veelvoud van narratieve modellen te hanteren, die ieder een 
aspect van een omvattende waarheid verhelderen, zich daarbij realiserend dat elk 
overkoepelend verhaal in zekere mate contingent is. 
Gebruikmakend van een klein aantal chemische formules voor stoffen, zal ik 
aantonen dat zelfs op dat niveau een zekere mate van contingentie bestaat, waarbij 
de formules elk alleen een deel tonen van het overkoepelend beeld van de 
betrokken verbindingen.  
Hier begin ik ook met een verheldering van de rol en de kracht van het gebruik van 
gelijkenis en analogie in chemisch onderzoek, en laat ik zien hoe zich hier hetzelfde 
proces afspeelt dat wij ook zagen in de kennistheoretische strategieën die leidden tot 
de selectie van een passende benadering binnen de natuurlijke theologie, zoals die 
eerder aan de orde kwam. Zo wordt de lezer geattendeerd op het impliciete gebruik 
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van metafysica in de scheikunde en op de relatie met de eerder ingenomen 
kennistheoretische positie. 
Hoofdstuk 3 bevat een uitvoerige behandeling van een aantal onderwerpen die bij 
elkaar genomen de relatie tussen metafysica en scheikunde versterken. Ik begin met 
een bespreking van het kritisch realisme. De aanname van een aangepaste vorm 
van kritisch realisme draagt ertoe bij dat chemici en theologen op een zinnige wijze 
met elkaar in gesprek kunnen raken. Er zijn echter ook redenen, die nader worden 
gespecificeerd, waarom niet alle kritisch-realistische benaderingen geschikt zijn voor 
het gekozen doel. Als onderdeel van de nadere bepaling van de gekozen vorm van 
kritisch realisme expliciteer ik de wezenlijk christocentrische aard van mijn gehele 
project door te tonen dat Christus vanuit de drievuldige relationaliteit van God de 
schoonheid in de Schepping bezielt. De algemene aanpak om de werkelijkheid te 
modelleren, bijvoorbeeld in het licht van de leer van de Triniteit, zo kan worden 
getoond, is ook aan de orde in verklaringen in chemisch onderzoek. Door de wijze 
waarop hij meerdere disciplines omvat, en ook door te insisteren op het gebruik van 
symbolen en modellen, verlaat de gekozen vorm van kritisch realisme het 
kennistheoretisch relativisme van sommige schrijvers en omhelst zij de ontologische 
openheid van de toekomst. Deze vorm van kritisch realisme bewaart daarmee zowel 
een echt realistisme in de zin dat er gewerkt wordt met objecten die extern zijn aan 
het subject, alsook een kritische attitude die aan de contingentie van het onderzoek 
(en ook het alledaagse) vasthoudt. 
Door in een aantal wetenschappelijke artikelen beschrijvingen van schoonheid in 
scheikundige processen te bestuderen, laat ik zien dat deze beschrijvingen een 
metafysisch karakter hebben. Dergelijke waarnemingen van schoonheid hebben de 
theologie en de chemie gemeenschappelijk. Ik breng verder naar voren dat een 
natuurlijke theologie als zodanig geen complete systematische theologie kan bieden; 
daarom is het noodzakelijk het perspectief te verruimen naar een omvattend verhaal 
over God waarin de gekozen natuurlijke theologie een plek heeft. In dit verband meld 
ik dat de procestheologie door sommigen wordt gezien als het meest veelbelovende 
raamwerk dat de scheikunde toestaat een inbreng te hebben in de natuurlijke 
theologie. Omdat de procestheologie tekortschiet op een ander punt, namelijk in 
orthodoxie, biedt zij niet het type systematische uiteenzetting van het geloof 
waarnaar ik op zoek ben.  
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Boven meldde ik al dat vaak wordt beweerd dat de scheikunde weinig vruchtbaar 
kan zijn voor een natuurlijke theologie, omdat ze stoffen maakt en dat dergelijke 
stoffen en verbindingen in zekere zin niet ‘natuurlijk’ zijn, want niet door God 
geschapen. Ik laat zien dat een dergelijke opvatting niet in overeenstemming is met 
de joodse en christelijke bronnen. Juist het tegenovergestelde geldt: God maakt het 
de mensen mogelijk een zegen voor hun naasten te zijn door het maken van 
gemaakte producten op basis van ingrediënten die Gods schepping hen biedt. 
In de conclusies van het derde hoofdstuk onderstreep ik de verschillen tussen die 
wetenschappen die het vaakst worden gebruikt om een natuurlijke theologie te 
voeden – zoals de natuurkunde en de wiskunde – en de scheikunde. Daarbij leg ik 
de nadruk op de fysieke praktijk van chemisch onderzoek, waarin het experiment 
centraal staat en de duiding van het resultaat vaak is gebaseerd op verschillende 
voorstellen vanuit de theoretische chemie en op redeneringen die zich op analogieën 
beroepen.  Vervolgens onderstreep ik het ten diepste rechtzinnige en 
christocentrische karakter van mijn voorstellen, alsook het belang van esthetische 
taal als een verbindende draad tussen de domeinen van de theologie en van de 
scheikunde. Het is de presentie van Christus in de Schepping die aan de wortel ligt 
van de waarneming van schoonheid. 
In het vierde hoofdstuk bespreek ik vijftien recente scheikundige wetenschappelijke 
publicaties. Dit is een beperkte selectie, waaruit echter wel een aantal algemene 
lessen kunnen worden getrokken. Opnieuw komen de al eerder genoemde aspecten 
naar voren, waaronder de onbepaaldheid van veel van de resultaten in deze 
artikelen, het gebruik van analogieën en het gebruik van theorieën die zijn 
ontwikkeld in de theoretische chemie. De hier geanalyseerde artikelen – zoals 
eerder de bespreking in hoofdstuk 3 naar voren bracht – tonen dat chemici een taal 
gebruiken die erop duidt dat zij de onderzochte verschijnselen ook esthetisch 
waarderen. Ze gebruiken woorden als ‘schoonheid’, ‘mooi’ en andere termen om hun 
plezier en besef van verwondering te uiten in het beschrijven van de resultaten van 
hun werk. 
Het doel van hoofdstuk 5 is enerzijds om aan te duiden hoe wijdverbreid in de loop 
der eeuwen de preoccupatie met het thema van God en schoonheid is geweest, en 
anderzijds – en belangrijker en centraler voor deze studie – om te laten zien hoe het 
komt dat de individuele houding ten opzichte van wat men ervaart zal bepalen of 
men in staat is om God in het schone te ontmoeten. Dit hoofdstuk is opgezet vanuit 
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het contrast tussen hen die ‘naar de hemelen kijken’ als uitleg waarom en hoe 
mensen ervaren wat ze schoon noemen en degenen die ‘naar de aarde kijken’ als 
antwoord op dezelfde vraag. Vanuit deze opzet wil ik naar voren brengen dat beide 
opvattingen hun oorsprong vinden in het werk van klassieke auteurs. Dit hoofdstuk 
weerspiegelt mijn streven naar een rechtstreekse confrontatie met de argumenten 
tegen het theïsme, waarbij ik trouw kan blijven aan de in deze studie aanvaarde 
vorm van realisme. 
In het zesde en afsluitende hoofdstuk worden de verschillende lijnen van mijn betoog 
bij elkaar gebracht om mijn stelling te benadrukken dat de scheikunde als 
uitgangspunt kan dienen voor een natuurlijke theologie. Eerder ging ik in op de 
aanwezigheid van esthetische waarderingen in de chemie, op de presentie van 
schoonheid in de Joodse en christelijke schriften, op het thema van God en 
schoonheid. Dit stelt mij in staat, nu een definitie van schoonheid te geven. Deze 
definitie van schoonheid verdisconteert wat ik eerder naar voren heb gebracht over 
God, Christus, de Drievuldigheid, realisme, scheikundig onderzoek, en contingentie 
en onbepaaldheid. Deze definitie van schoonheid maakt gebruik zowel van het 
begrip van complementariteit als van een meerstemmige interpretatie van het 
vormbegrip: 
Schoonheid is de gewaarwording dat een gestalte een 
heilige verwondering oproept; een gestalte die 
complementair is aan het subject dat haar met waardering 
en genegenheid koestert. 
Deze omschrijving van schoonheid wordt dan ‘teruggelezen’ in zowel de scheikunde 
als de natuurlijke theologie, om te verzekeren dat deze omschrijving voldoet in de 
beide contexten waarin schoonheid in deze studie aan de orde komt. Hoewel zij niet 
kan worden opgevoerd als een afdoend bewijs, kan in redelijkheid worden betoogd 
dat de schoonheid van de in de scheikunde onderzochte verschijnselen in de richting 
van de goddelijke Schepper van het universum wijst. Daarom kan ook de 
scheikunde als uitgangspunt voor een natuurlijke theologie dienen.                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                  
